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I.

Executive Summary

T

his report addresses how the term “medical necessity” is
defined in private health insurance coverage decisions. It
summarizes a review of the literature, an extensive review of
legal cases that challenge insurer decisions, materials prepared by the
insurance industry, consultation with experts in the field, a review of
investigations conducted by State departments of insurance and attorneys general, and interviews with health care executives regarding the
decisionmaking process itself. The report does not explore factors that
can affect access to care that might be considered clinically necessary by
treating professionals or the effects of medical necessity decisions on
therapeutic outcomes.

Sources of medical necessity definition: Few
regulations address the definition of medical
necessity. There is no Federal definition,
and only slightly more than one-third of
States have any regulatory definition of
medical necessity. As a result, the meaning
of “medical necessity” is most commonly
found in individual insurance contracts that
are defined by the insurer and hold primacy
in most determinations.
Rather than turning simply on whether a
proposed treatment meets professional medical standards, the prevailing definition of
medical necessity is broadly framed, multidimensional, and controlled by the insurer,
not the treating professional. The process of
medical necessity determination is rarely public information. Even where a claimant can
show that a clinical recommendation is consistent with professional clinical standards,
the insurer may reject a proposed treatment
if it is inconsistent with other definitional
elements such as relative cost and efficiency.

The multiple dimensions of the prevailing
medical necessity definition: The evidence
suggests that the medical necessity definition
spans five dimensions:
1. Contractual scope—whether the contract
provides any coverage for certain procedures and treatments, such as preventive
and maintenance treatments that are not
necessary to restore a patient to “normal
functioning.” This dimension preempts
any other coverage decision.
2. Standards of practice—whether the treatment accords with professional standards
of practice.
3. Patient safety and setting—whether the
treatment will be delivered in the safest
and least intrusive manner.
4. Medical service—whether the treatment
is considered medical as opposed to social
or nonmedical.
5. Cost—whether the treatment is considered
cost-effective by the insurer.
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Regulation of the medical necessity definition and coverage determination process:
Some State external review laws provide
appeals procedures that permit reviewers to
reject the insurer’s medical necessity definition and look at the evidence with a fresh
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eye. However, many State laws parallel
insurers’ multidimensional definitional
approach. It does not appear that either
the State or Federal regulatory process
has moved away from the industry’s
prevailing medical necessity standard.

II.

Introduction

U

nder basic principles that guide the American health care
system, decisions regarding which particular treatments, or
the amount of treatment, are medically necessary are made
by medical professionals in light of their patients’ condition and desires,
and the state of health care knowledge. Despite all the changes that have
taken place in the health system over the past generation, medical
professionals remain legally and ethically obligated to make treatment
recommendations that reflect sound professional judgment and that are
appropriate in light of their individual patients’ needs.

At the same time, however, whether a
patient ultimately will receive care considered necessary by a treating professional is
influenced heavily by the availability of
health insurance coverage to finance the recommended treatments (Hadley, 2002). The
influence of health insurance on access to
and utilization of behavioral health services
is well documented and is a consequence of
the high cost of treatment that frequently
can involve expensive and (in the case of
chronic conditions) long-term therapies
(Buck, Teich, Umland, & Stein, 1999). For
this reason, the coverage decisions made by
health insurers and employee health benefit
plans are fundamentally linked to the question of whether individuals will have access
to health services that their treating professionals consider medically necessary and
appropriate.
In the early years of the modern
American health insurance era (said to date
to the Second World War, when employersponsored group health insurance became

increasingly common), insurers paid for
whatever health services treating physicians recommended (Rosenblatt, Law, &
Rosenbaum, 1997; Rosenblatt, Rosenbaum,
and Frankford, 2002). As health care costs
escalated, first public and then private
health insurers introduced utilization review
techniques. These techniques were designed
to verify coverage and to independently
assess the treatment recommendations
made by health professionals. These early
utilization review decisions, as they were
known, were made retrospectively (after
the fact). Subsequent analyses of these
early cost containment efforts led to the
conclusion that retrospective review was
ineffective; as a result, insurers increasingly
turned to prospective and concurrent
review techniques.
Prospective and concurrent reviews soon
became an industry standard, particularly
with the growth of managed care. In
managed care–style insurance, coverage is
either entirely or partially conditioned on
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a patient’s receipt of care from a medical
professional who has been accepted into the
plan’s treating provider network and whose
covered treatment recommendations are
subject to the standards set by the plan. An
insurer or health plan can exercise control
in one of two ways. The intermediary might
in the first instance issue general treatment
guidelines that are supposed to guide physicians in their treating recommendations.
Alternatively, the treating professional may
submit specific recommendations for treatment to the insurer or health plan on behalf
of an individual patient. Both approaches
typically are present in any health plan; that
is, a treating professional may apply standard guidelines to many patient treatment
decisions (Domino et al., 1998; Institute of
Medicine, 1990; Manderscheid, Henderson,
& Brown, 2001; Varble, 2001), reserving
patient-specific requests for treatment to a
relatively small number of cases that do not
appear to fit the parameters of such standard
guidelines (e.g., patients with co-occurring
conditions that place them out of standardized norms or particularly complex versions
of a recognized health problem).
This analysis, prepared for the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, focuses on
medical necessity in health insurance as the
concept applies to utilization management
decisions by health insurers and employee
benefit plans in specific patient cases. This
analysis does not consider other factors
that can influence access to coverage in the
modern insurance system, such as the quality
of the general treatment guidelines used by
insurers or the contractual limitations on
coverage that can exclude certain treatments
altogether, no matter how medically neces-

4 Special Report

sary (a phenomenon that has received enormous attention in the case of behavioral
health as a result of the mental health parity
debate). Nor does this analysis consider
limitations on access to care that can result
from restrictions on the size and availability
of a provider network established and used
by an insurer or health plan.
Instead, this analysis focuses on those situations in which, in response to the perceived
needs of an individual patient, a treating
health professional recommends treatment
that may require specific approval of coverage by an insurer or health plan. This analysis examines both the standards and procedures that insurers and health plans use
explicitly to determine whether recommended services are necessary in specific instances;
it does not address the process involved in
determining the amount of treatment deemed
appropriate.
The structure of this review is based on
the assumption that, in determining whether
a recommended course of treatment is medically necessary under the terms of the insurance contract, the definition of medical
necessity and the process by which the contract is applied to a particular patient are of
equal importance. In assessing the process
of decisionmaking, this report considers the
qualifications and impartiality of the reviewer as well as the extent to which the reviewer
considers the specific condition of the individual patient, not merely what treatments
are generally recommended in preset treatment guidelines. The procedural aspects of
coverage decisionmaking are critical because,
as this analysis shows, medical necessity definitions are broad and ambiguous and vest
insurers with a great deal of discretion over
the treatment of individual patients. How
an insurer goes about deciding the necessity

of care is a particularly important question
in the case of patients whose conditions
are further complicated by the existence of
co-occurring health problems or a history
of failure under standard treatments.
This review examines a broad range of
information, including peer-reviewed literature, judicial decisions construing contract
terms, legislation, and documents developed
by insurers themselves. Much of the evidence
regarding medical necessity presented in this
analysis is found in legal documents, including judicial decisions in cases brought by
patients whose requests for treatment have
been denied, as well as in investigations conducted and actions brought by State attorneys general and insurance departments in
response to evidence of systemic problems in
obtaining access to insured coverage as a
result of ongoing medical necessity denials.
Judicial decisions and official investigations frequently involve complaints regarding
access to behavioral health coverage. This is
probably not surprising, given the cost of
long-term treatment for health conditions
related to mental illness and substance abuse
disorders as well as evidence of major efforts
by insurers over the past decade to achieve
significant reductions in behavioral health
spending (DHHS, 1999). Because of the
lengthy and costly process of pursuing a case
against an insurer or health plan, reported
judicial decisions are rare. (Indeed, in great
part in response to the difficulty of pursuing
legal claims against health plans that have
denied coverage, Federal and State lawmakers have sought in recent years to establish
simpler, less formal, and less costly external
appeals procedures to challenge insurer
denials) (Dallek & Pollitz, 2000).1 At the
same time, it is in these official sources of
evidence that one is able to see most clearly

the terms of the contract (which outside a
legal setting is a confidential and closely held
document) as well as the process by which
an insurer or health plan administrator
reached a decision. Medical necessity determinations that do not rise to the level of
appeal or complaint are beyond the scope of
this analysis.

Research Methods
The following research methods were used to
conduct this review:
■

Completing a literature review and synthesis of findings regarding the definition
and process of delimiting medical necessity
in a behavioral health context. Sources
included the peer-reviewed medical and
health services literature on medical necessity, as well as judicial decisions, Federal
and State laws, illustrative contract terms,
accreditation standards, materials gathered from the industry, and State-level
investigations and legal settlements
regarding medical necessity practices.2

■

Convening a working group of 20 experts
for a half-day consultation (May 7, 2002)
on issues related to medical necessity in
behavioral health care to provide comment
and feedback on the draft literature review.
Experts included professionals in clinical
practice (e.g., psychiatry, psychology),
employer purchasers of health care insurance, officials with managed care accreditation organizations, representatives of
consumer advocacy organizations, and
individuals with expertise in insurance and
health plan regulation at the State and
Federal levels. Officials from three large
managed care organizations who were not
able to attend the May 7 meeting were
later interviewed by telephone. Officials
from two State attorneys general offices
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(New York and Connecticut) and a State
bureau of insurance (Maine) were interviewed by telephone to provide additional
insight for the section on legal settlements
and investigations. This report was
refined based on the expert consultation,
feedback, and assistance provided by
these advisors.

Structure and Organization
of the Review
Part 1 summarizes peer-reviewed and professional literature on medical necessity, and
considers the views and recommendations
of researchers and analysts regarding both
the definition of medical necessity and the
structure of the review process.
Part 2 describes industry practices as
evidenced by individual insurer practices
and accreditation standards, as well as judicial opinions and official investigations that
have examined contract terms and decisionmaking procedures.
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Part 3 reviews State insurance laws and
examines in detail not only the definition of
medical necessity adopted by States as part
of their insurance regulation laws, but also
the procedural elements of their independent
review statutes.
Part 4 examines two major sources of law
relevant to understanding the medical necessity review process in the private insurance
context—the bodies of regulations that govern private employee health benefit plans
covered by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) and standards applicable to medical necessity determinations and
appeals under the Federal Employee Health
Benefits program.
This review concludes with a synthesis
of findings and a discussion of their implications for coverage of behavioral health
services.
Tables 1–9 and Appendixes A–D can be
found at the end of this review.

III.

Medical Necessity
and the Published
Literature

T

able 1 presents definitions of medical necessity drawn from
a search of peer-reviewed journals, trade journals, and industry and organization publications. A full list of these sources
appears in Appendix A. Over the past decade, authors have paid considerable attention to the question of medical necessity as prospective
utilization review has come to dominate health insurance.

While variation exists in the opinions
expressed, the articles summarized in Table 1
display a significant level of consensus on
three basic issues. The first is that merely
because a recommended treatment falls within the zone of professionally accepted medical practice does not mean it must be covered. Only one source (the National Health
Law Program) confines the evidence to the
opinion of the treating physician. The second
is that a recommended definition of medical
necessity should be multidimensional and
should consider factors such as cost, convenience, and relative effectiveness compared to
other treatments based on various forms of
evidence. Third, the authors uniformly recommend broadening the scope of when an
intervention can be considered necessary
(i.e., not merely to diagnose and treat an illness but also to improve functioning, avert
deterioration, and maintain functioning).
Several authors address the issue of the
quality, reliability, and relevance of the evidence considered when making a medical
necessity determination; in addition, one

article examines the question of who bears
the burden of proof in a medical necessity
determination, an issue that has not been
directly addressed in State or Federal law.
From the health services research community, probably the most seminal work is by
Singer, Bergthold, Vorhaus, and Enthoven
(1999). The definition of medical necessity
they crafted was the result of a consensus
process among project participants (Singer,
Bergthold, Vorhaus, & Enthoven, 1999):
For contractual purposes, an intervention will be covered if it is an otherwise
covered category of service, not specifically excluded, and medically necessary.
An intervention is medically necessary
if, as recommended by the treating
physician and determined by the health
plan’s medical director or physician
designee, it is (all of the following):
A health intervention for the purpose
of treating a medical condition; the
most appropriate supply or level of
service, considering potential benefits
and harms to the patient; known to be
effective in improving health outcomes.
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For new interventions, effectiveness is
determined by scientific evidence. For
existing interventions, effectiveness is
determined first by scientific evidence,
then by professional standards, then by
expert opinion; and cost-effective for
this condition compared to alternative
interventions, including no intervention.
“Cost-effective” does not necessarily
mean lowest price. An intervention may
be medically indicated yet not be a covered benefit or meet this contractual
definition of medical necessity. A health
plan may choose to cover interventions
that do not meet this contractual definition of medical necessity.
This definition requires a review of the
treating clinician’s recommendation to ensure
that it is “for the purpose of treating a condition” and “the most appropriate” intervention in light of the patient’s particular condition, benefits, and risks. The definition also
assumes plan review of the provider’s treatment recommendations. The authors also
contemplate that cost-effectiveness will be a
basic element of the decision, but clarify that
the question of cost-effectiveness is not one
of price alone. In addition, the authors create
a hierarchy of evidence, with “scientific”
evidence classified as the best evidence. No
distinction is made by type of condition.
Of particular significance in the Singer/
Bergthold analysis is its emphasis on the
primacy of coverage limitations, a major
concern of insurers. The authors recognize
that once a particular type of treatment is
excluded for a specific condition as a contractual matter,3 no general finding of medical necessity can override the exclusion.
This emphasis on the primacy of the contract in controlling the range of treatments
and procedures that will be considered at
all in a medical necessity determination is
reinforced by the Health Insurance
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Association of America (Schiffbauer, 1999),
which has stated:
When the provider, rather than the
health plan or insurer, interprets the
scope of coverage under the contract,
health plan fiduciaries cannot guarantee
to the insured that health care dollars
are being spent fairly and equitably
on medical treatments that are safe,
proven, and effective.
The American Medical Association
(AMA), representing physicians (including
psychiatrists), has created a prototype
medical necessity definition as part of its
Model Managed Care Contract project:
Section 1.9 defines medically necessary/medical necessity as health care
services or products that a prudent
physician would provide to a patient
for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, injury,
disease, or its symptoms in a manner
that is a) in accordance with generally
accepted standards of medical practice;
b) clinically appropriate in terms of
type, frequency, extent, site, and duration; and c) not primarily for the convenience of the patient, physician, or
other health care provider.4
Like the others this definition is multidimensional but it focuses the utilization
review on what a prudent physician would
conclude based on the evidence rather than
what the insurer would determine. While
the definition is crafted in such a way as to
transfer more medical decisionmaking power
back to the provider, the practical impact of
this distinction is difficult to assess, since the
decision remains reviewable and the review
is multidimensional. However, cost considerations as an explicit measure are removed.
By using the “prudent physician” rather than
the insurer as the standard of measurement
where judgment is concerned, the definition

seeks to focus the determination on “generally accepted” medical opinion (and thus the
phenomenon of multiple schools of thought)
rather than the opinion of utilization review
professionals who may or may not be physicians and who view their task as selecting
the single best form of treatment. Thus, in
an appeal made under the AMA definition,
a claimant would be able to introduce a wide
range of schools-of-thought evidence from
“prudent physicians” to show the variation
in treatments that prudent physicians might
recognize.
Several authors focus on definitions of
medical necessity in the behavioral health
arena, although their proposed definitions
appear to differ more in terminology than in
substance. Paul Chodoff (1998) and William
Ford (1998, 2000) have called for replacing
the term with “health necessity,” “treatment
necessity,” or “clinical necessity.” In Chodoff’s
view, health necessity criteria would be
founded on a biopsychosocial rather than on
a medical model. The former model requires
a view of health as encompassing qualityof-life factors and not just the absence of
disease. The terms “biopsychosocial” and
“psychosocial” arose from the need to differentiate between mental and physical health.5
The practical effects of this distinction
would be on the “scope” element of the
definition, that is, the range of possible
conditions for which treatment, if necessary,
would be approved. Interventions would
not be solely for the diagnosis or treatment
of an illness, but also for the achievement of
broader health goals. Furthermore, Chodoff
proposes consideration of services for individuals whose diagnoses may not easily fit
into categories defined by the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV), a reference often cited as a clini-

cal standard in medical necessity definitions
for behavioral health (APA, 1994).
Ford’s (1998, 2000) behavioral health care
definition urges a movement away from covering only acute care to covering longer-term
care designed to manage and prevent deterioration of chronic conditions and onset
of acute conditions. This definition would
include access to psychiatric rehabilitation
services when needed for the treatment of
chronic mental conditions. (This definition of
course would require a dramatic expansion
of the terms of coverage under conventional
insurance, which, unlike Medicaid, tends to
be confined to relatively short-term therapies
to help an individual significantly improve or
recover in a relatively short period of time.)
(Rosenbaum, forthcoming; Rosenbaum &
Rousseau, 2001) Like Chodoff, Ford stresses
the importance of both the quality of day-today functioning as a goal of treatment, and
the need to cover treatment designed for alleviation of symptoms in addition to “cure.”
Ireys, Wehr, and Cooke (1999) propose
a specific definition of medical necessity
for persons with developmental disabilities,
mental retardation, and other special health
care needs. Their article represents a detailed
and specific attempt to articulate individualized decisionmaking criteria that can “assist
the individual to achieve or maintain sufficient functional capacity to perform ageappropriate or developmentally appropriate
daily activities.”(p. 19) The authors call
for an expanded view of the information
sources an insurer should consider beyond
“medical evidence” (i.e., information from
the patient, the family, collateral providers,
and support institutions). They also emphasize the effect of treatment on day-to-day
functioning and require that final determinations be made by a physician employed by
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the insurer (rather than a claims reviewer
with lesser qualifications).
Two articles (Appendix A) deal specifically
with evidentiary matters and the use of evidence in decisionmaking. David Eddy (1994)
posits that when determining the appropriate
use of an intervention, analysis of its potential value should shift from qualitative to
quantitative, with use of randomized, controlled clinical trials as a definitive evidence
base. Furthermore, in his view, a shift from
individual-based decisionmaking to population-based decisionmaking is needed, based
largely on the utility of controlled clinical
trials that demonstrate treatment efficacy
across large numbers of people. He advocates for the development of explicit criteria
to sort out high-value practices from those
of little or no value and believes that the
term “medical necessity” is too vague and
open to too much variability in interpretation. By contrast, Rosenbaum, Frankford,
Moore, and Borzi (1999) recommend an
emphasis on individualized decisions rather
than across-the-board conclusions based on
the application of generalized guidelines and
research results to specific cases. They call
for strict scrutiny of the reliability and relevance of scientific evidence, as well as for
greater emphasis on the facts of an individual case and expert judgment. They also recommend shifting the burden of proof to the
health plan in any review of its decision on
medical necessity, arguing that the plan has
best access to the evidence, and that fairness
in allocating the burden of proof would
place the burden on the party with the best
access to evidence.
Sabin and Daniels (1994) address the
question of the utility of medical necessity
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definitions for mental health services from
the perspective of severity of diagnosis.
While no question exists that severe mental
illness such as schizophrenia, clinical
depression, and bipolar depression are covered by traditional medical necessity definitions, Sabin and Daniels investigate the
extent to which such definitions also should
cover conditions such as shyness, unhappiness, and lack of personal fulfillment. Using
six illustrative case studies, such as “The
Shy Bipolar,” “The Unhappy Husband,”
“The Cranky Victim,” (pp. 5–7) and others,
Sabin and Daniels illustrate the differences
of opinion between “hard-line” and
“expansive” clinicians (p. 5) in deciding
whether psychiatric services are needed.
Following an analysis of three models of
medical necessity, the authors conclude that
the most rational model is one that treats
a medically defined diagnosis, such as one
delineated in the DSM-IV, to decrease the
impact of disease or disability. A typical
mental health medical necessity definition
would be “those mental health services
which are essential for the treatment of a
Member’s mental health disorder as defined
by the DSM-IV in accordance with generally accepted mental health practice”(p. 12).
Sabin and Daniels note that diagnostic categories continue to change but that society
“needs a publicly acceptable and administerable system for defining the boundaries
of health insurance coverage.” To that end,
the DSM-IV (and subsequent editions) provides a workable definition of those boundaries, to the extent that it is “the result of
a highly public process open to scientific
scrutiny, field testing, and repetitive criticism over time.”6

IV.

Industry Practices
in the Managed
Care Industry

I

nsurers have continued to customize and streamline their definition of medical necessity over time to expand their control over,
and the allocation of, health plan resources. By defining medical
necessity and controlling the coverage determination process, insurers
can attempt both to stem what they perceive to be the unnecessary
expenditure of resources and to improve the quality of health care.7

Analysis of the Structure of
Medical Necessity Definitions
Insurers and insuring organizations rarely
make their medical necessity definitions
and determination procedures public. The
definitions and procedures are typically
contained in contracts and internal operational documents such as provider manuals
and operating guidelines that are considered
proprietary and confidential.8 While many
managed care organizations (MCOs) have
Web sites, most require registration and
passwords from contracted providers to
access detailed information about their
medical necessity definitions and procedures. Consumers and researchers usually
are permitted Web site access only to
general health plan information.
Table 2 presents five insurer definitions
obtained for this research. An exception to
the rule, ValueOptions allows public access
to its Web site, which contains the text of its
provider manuals. Cigna Behavioral Health
Care provides online access to its “Levels
of Care Guidelines for Mental Health and

Substance Abuse Treatment,” which contains a definition of medical necessity.9 Table
2 also contains definitions from Highmark
Blue Cross, an anonymous managed behavioral health plan, and United Behavioral
Health. The Highmark definition was
obtained from the proceedings of an Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) User Liaison workshop on coverage
decisions by Hill, Hanson, and O’Connell
(2000). The third medical necessity definition in Table 2 was obtained from materials
provided to one of this review’s authors
during a December 2001 meeting with
behavioral health care providers to discuss
medical necessity issues. The company’s
name is not disclosed for purposes of confidentiality. The United Behavioral Health
(UBH) medical necessity definition was
contained in a consent agreement that UBH
entered into in 2000 with the Maine Bureau
of Insurance, published on the Maine
Department of Professional & Financial
Regulation Web site.10 The consent agreement
itself is discussed in Legal Settlements below.
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Despite the limited number of definitions
available directly from the industry, those
available suggest that insurers and insuring
organizations use a definition of medical
necessity far more complex than whether
the prescribed treatment is consistent with
accepted practice in the field. The use of a
definition of medical necessity that extends
well beyond the threshold question of
whether the care is professionally sound can
best be understood as an attempt to mitigate
the “schools of thought” doctrine. This doctrine, a critical element of professional medical liability law, assumes the existence of
multiple and equally professionally acceptable approaches to professional medical
practice in any particular case (Rosenblatt,
Law, & Rosenbaum, 1997). For this reason,
insurers have adopted definitions that vest
them with the power to select among various
schools of thought for the approach that,
in the insurer’s view, also best satisfies the
other elements of the definition.
The first dimension of the medical necessity definition found in Table 2 (and the one
reflected in the overall structure of agreements themselves) can be thought of as contractual scope. This dimension is concerned
with whether the contract provides any coverage for certain procedures and treatments,
such as those that prevent the worsening
of a condition or that allow an individual
to maintain or promote functioning. It is
possible, in other words, for the definition
to exclude any procedures that, in the view
of the insurer, do not yield recovery or
result in what the insurer considers a significant short-term improvement. Table 2
shows that Highmark, the anonymous
managed behavioral health organization
(MBHO), and UBH limit the concept of
medical necessity to services necessary for
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the diagnosis or treatment of illness. Thus,
a treatment necessary to respond to a condition not regarded as an illness (e.g., a
developmental disorder in a child) might
fall outside the furthest reaches of the contract no matter how necessary the care or
effective the treatment. Similarly, if the
treatment is designed to avert deterioration
rather than treat illness to a point of
significant improvement, it might also be
considered outside the scope of coverage.11
ValueOptions, in contrast, will recognize
as covered (if medically necessary) services
aimed at preventing illness or avoiding deterioration. The Cigna definition, while still
including a “reasonable expectation” for
improvement, does include “level of functioning” in addition to a patient’s condition
or illness, an important criterion for persons with mental and physical disabilities
whose treatment needs extend beyond the
traditional medical model.
The second dimension of the definition
reflects whether the treatment is in accord
with professional standards of practice. This
dimension is most directly related to professional opinion and clinical judgment. In the
case of ValueOptions and Cigna, the specific
frame of reference is national practice standards, although the fact that Highmark does
not specifically reference national standards
is probably not particularly important, since
the professional standard of care has been
recognized as a national benchmark for
more than 40 years.12 The UBH definition
specifically refers to its own internal guidelines as the standard to measure the appropriateness of the type, frequency, and duration of treatment.13
The third dimension can be thought of
as patient safety and setting. It considers
whether the prescribed treatment will be

delivered in a manner that the insurer considers to be safe and effective.
The fourth dimension is whether, in the
insurer’s view, the treatment is medical in
nature and not prescribed either as a matter
of convenience or as a result of social or
environmental considerations. In all of the
definitions, convenience is measured in terms
of the patient, the family, or the provider, not
in terms of the managed care organization.
The fifth dimension of the definition
is cost. Table 2 suggests that a review of
treatment should include consideration of
whether there is an equally effective and
safe, but less costly, alternative to the recommended treatment. It is unclear whether
the UBH reference to “of demonstrated
medical value” refers to treatment effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, or both.
The various sources of information that
suggest the existence of these definitional
dimensions also suggest that the terms tend
to remain undefined, allowing an insurer
tremendous leeway to define the terms
within the context of each determination.
Consistent with the issue of contractual
scope, the ValueOptions definition explicitly
considers whether care, no matter how
necessary, is a service that falls outside the
contractual limits of the plan. This consideration can be seen in that portion of the
definition that authorizes consideration of
whether the recommended course of treatment would result in “non-treatment services addressing environmental factors.” It
is unclear how this element of the definition
would work in practice. An example might
be refusal to cover in-home care to a patient
unable to obtain transportation to an outpatient provider, while providing the same
services in-home to a patient medically
unable to travel. Even though the care is

technically medically necessary in both
cases, ValueOptions could refuse to cover
the in-home care to the first on the grounds
that such care results from environmental
(i.e., lack of transportation) rather than
medical need.
These dimensions of the medical necessity
definition delineate the criteria to be fulfilled
for an individual to be eligible for coverage.
By choosing a high evidentiary, or tightly
limited, standard regarding the evidence that
must be present in order to satisfy coverage
eligibility, such as the evidence-based medicine standard of requiring two controlled,
randomized clinical trials before a medical
intervention can be proven effective, insurers
could impose limits on many types of care.
Figure 1 summarizes the five dimensions of
the medical necessity definition derived from
the preceding analysis of industry practice.

Interviews With Managed Care
Officials on the Processes of
Medical Necessity Determinations
In mid-June 2002, semistructured telephone
interviews were conducted with three officials (two medical directors and a chief executive officer) of two large MBHOs and one
nationally based integrated health plan.14

Figure 1: The Five Dimensions
of the Medical Necessity Definition:
Industry Practice
•

•
•
•

•

The contractual scope of coverage: whether
proposed treatment is explicitly included or
excluded in the health plan contract
Whether the proposed treatment is consistent
with professional standards of practice
Patient safety and setting of the treatment
Whether the treatment is medical in nature
or for the convenience of the health
professional or patient and family
Treatment cost
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These officials, who, due to scheduling difficulties, were unable to participate in the May
7 meeting of the expert panel, also reviewed
the draft of this document. The interview
questions focused on the processes used in
the managed behavioral health care industry
for making initial medical necessity determinations and resolving appeals of claims
denials, as well as internal quality management procedures used to incorporate and
update treatment guideline information into
decisionmaking processes.
One official noted that his MBHO prefers
to use the term “clinical appropriateness”
rather than “medical necessity.” In the official’s view, the latter term implies a restrictive orientation relating to the question of
whether or not a patient needs care (a clinical decision that can only be made by the
provider and the patient). The official
emphasized that, in his opinion, the pivotal
question is what level of services in which
settings are most clinically appropriate for
a given patient in light of his or her clinical
and social needs. Thus, as the definition suggests, the MCO medical director views his
task as analyzing the health professional’s
recommendations in accordance with those
dimensions of the medical necessity definition that focus on how the care will be furnished, by whom, and in what settings, not
whether the professional was justified in
concluding that some particular approach
to treatment was needed. In this vein, the
coverage decision concentrates more on the
form and manner of treatment than whether
any treatment at all will take place.
The interviews confirmed that managed
care executives view their jobs not as determining the necessity of care from a professional point of view but as determining
whether the professional’s treatment judg-
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ment is consistent with the terms of coverage
in the contract. The organizations view their
task as administering and managing a package of contractual benefits to determine what
is included in the benefit package purchased
by an employer, not to determine what the
benefit package should contain. Within that
determination is the task of ensuring that
the levels of care and treatments provided
are appropriate for an enrollee’s needs and
covered in the benefit package.
When asked why behavioral health medical necessity definitions have been the subject of a higher level of discussion and scrutiny than in general medicine, the interviewees
offered several reasons:
■

The nature of behavioral health care services compared to general physical medical
care is such that there is less “objective”
evidence available to guide decisions that
reflect a consensus as to what the appropriate treatments should be for a given
diagnosis. While progress has been made
in developing a clinical evidence base for
behavioral health care, it has not yet
reached the level of precision as in, for
example, cardiology or orthopedics.
Behavioral health conditions are defined
by “clusters” of symptoms (e.g., as found
in the DSM-IV), and the technology available to provide confirmations of diagnoses
is less precise than in general medical care
(e.g., X-ray, magnetic resonanace imaging,
blood enzyme levels).

■

Heterogeneity of providers and variety
of treatment modalities and settings is
much greater in behavioral health than in
general medical care. Behavioral health
care providers include M.D. psychiatrists
to Ph.D. psychologists, clinical nurse specialists, psychiatric social workers, addic-

tion disorder treatment providers, and
others, all receiving different professional
educations and with different preferences
for how they approach and work with
patients. The range of treatment modalities spans psychoanalysis, problemfocused and insight-oriented psychotherapy (e.g., cognitive, behavioral),
psychopharmacology, intensive inpatient
care and crisis management, and longterm treatment of severe mental illness.
This heterogeneity relates to the “schools
of thought” doctrine discussed above.
■

Compared to behavioral health, general
medical health plans enjoy greater clarity
and specificity as to the scope of covered
benefits. The more clear and specific the
terms of the contract are, the less likely it
is that disputes will occur.

■

One interviewee cited greater antagonism
for managed care in behavioral health
provider associations, which has led to
their encouraging members to file appeals
in situations that they feel are questionable.

The officials from all three organizations
stated that requests for authorization of services are handled by clinical intake staff with
at least a master’s degree, supplemented by
ongoing in-house training. The guidelines
used to “vet” a request for authorization
focus on two criteria: a) level of care criteria
(e.g., inpatient, partial hospitalization, outpatient therapy in individual or group settings),
and b) treatment guidelines (e.g., crisis intervention, psychotherapy, prescription drugs).
One MBHO preauthorizes 10 outpatient
visits, requiring the provider to request and
justify additional needed visits.
In all three organizations, board-certified
or board-eligible staff psychiatrists must
review all denied claims. The vast majority

of disputed claims arise for inpatient admissions. As one interviewee noted, in behavioral health, unlike general medicine, most
inpatient admissions are unplanned and
occur because a person (or family member
or provider on behalf of that person) seeks
emergency crisis admission. Typically the
inpatient facility calls for authorization.
While the initial admission usually is
approved, disputes may arise over length of
stay, treatment plans, and care management.
The interviewees stated that many of these
disputes are later resolved when additional
information regarding the patient’s clinical
needs is provided. If such information had
been provided at the outset, the claim would
not have been denied. Most claims disputes
are resolved through internal appeals
processes; only a few go to the external
appeals process.
Interviewees cited a variety of sources
for the treatment guidelines used in the care
management and review processes: among
them guidelines developed by provider
organizations, such as the American
Psychiatric Association and the American
Psychological Association; guidelines promulgated by accreditation organizations; and
ongoing feedback and advice from contracted providers. One MBHO reported the use
of local clinical advisory committees in each
location, including subject matter specialists
(e.g., addiction disorder providers) who provide feedback and information on treatment
advances. Guidelines are updated annually
based on actual practice and expert opinion.
Interviewees stated that guidelines are not
mandates or absolute protocols; rather, they
are considered “guideposts” to be informed
by, and adapted to, individual circumstances
and psychosocial needs of patients. Ongoing
audits, performance measurement of in-house
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care managers and contracted providers, and
member and provider satisfaction surveys are
used to monitor the appropriate use of treatment guidelines in medical necessity decisions
and to build in quality improvements at all
levels of decisionmaking.

Managed Care Accreditation
Organizations
Accreditation organizations such as the
National Committee for Quality Assurance
(NCQA) and the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO) have not formulated a medical
necessity definition. For example, NCQA
officials say they want to avoid conflicts with
existing laws governing the definition of
medical necessity (Pawlson, 2002). Instead,
the accreditation bodies focus on the medical
necessity review process, including both utilization management and internal appeals.
In addition, NCQA and JCAHO specify the
existence of an external appeals process as a
condition of accreditation.
Figures 2 and 3 and Appendix B excerpt
utilization management and external appeals
standards promulgated by NCQA and
JCAHO (JCAHO, 1997, 2001; NCQA,
2000, 2001). NCQA’s procedural standards
for MBHOs stress the individualization of
the process. The entity must consider evidence from the individual patient’s case
(as well as the characteristics of the local
delivery system) and therefore, presumably
cannot rely on national treatment guidelines
for specified conditions.15 NCQA standards
also assume involvement of practitioners in
the development of criteria, though not necessarily in the evaluation of individual cases.
The JCAHO standards are written from
the point of view of providers and provider
networks, typically the focus of JCAHO
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accreditation. Standard CC 1 stipulates provision of health care appropriate to the sociocultural needs of the provider’s patient population and consistent with the provider’s
mission and contractual obligations, as well
as being based on an individual patient’s
needs. Disclosure of the review criteria used
in adverse determination decisions, timely
notice, and a review of adverse decisions by
a physician, dentist, or behavioral clinician
prior to notification to the enrollee or prescribing provider are all required by JCAHO.
The JCAHO guidelines for MBHOs are
very similar to its general MCO guidelines.
However, in some instances the MBHO
guidelines are somewhat more explicit.
Decisions regarding a member’s eligibility
for entry into specific treatment programs
can be interpreted as a frame of reference
for meeting medical necessity criteria.
CC 2.1: Criteria define the information
necessary to determine a member’s eligibility for entry to a program or service
within the delivery system.
Intent of CC 2.1: The delivery system’s
central operations require care and service provider organizations to define the
information necessary to determine a
member’s eligibility for entry to a program or service. The care and service
provider organization defines the minimum essential information needed to
determine a member’s eligibility for
entry to a setting or program. The criteria are based on the specific program
or service that can meet or respond to
the member’s needs or presenting conditions. To add clarity, entry criteria also
include exclusionary statements that
indicate the information needed to initiate referral to another, more appropriate
care and service provider organization.
JCAHO takes a condition/treatmentspecific view for substance abuse services

Figure 2: NCQA and JCAHO Utilization Management Standards
NCQA Managed Behavioral Health
Utilization Management Standards
UM 2. To make utilization decisions, the
managed healthcare organization uses
written criteria based on sound clinical
evidence and specifies procedures for
applying those criteria in an appropriate
manner:
• The criteria for determining medical
necessity are clearly documented
and include procedures for applying criteria basedon the needs of
individual patients and characteristics of the local delivery system.
• The managed healthcare organization involves appropriate, actively
practicing practitioners in its development or adoption of criteria and
in the development and review of
procedures for applying criteria.
• The managed healthcare organization reviews the criteria at
specified intervals and updates
them, as necessary.
• The managed healthcare organization states in writing how
practitioners can obtain the UM
[Utilization Management] criteria
and makes the criteria available
to its practitioners upon request.
• At least annually, the managed
care organization evaluates the
consistency with which the health
care professionals involved in
utilization review apply the
criteria in decision making.

JCAHO Utilization Management Standards
CC 1: Health care services provided directly or by arrangement are
appropriate:
• In scope to meet the health care needs of the population served;
• To the health care needs, as influenced by socio-cultural
characteristics, of the population served;
• To the network’s mission;
• To the network’s contractual obligations.
CC 8: When the network or an external entity conducts a utilization
review of a licensed independent practitioner’s or a network component’s care that results in denial of payment, decisions by the
licensed independent practitioner or network component regarding
ongoing care or discharge are based on the care required by the
member’s assessed needs.
CC 8.1: When utilization review results in an adverse utilization management decision, the network provides the criteria for the decision
and information regarding appeal to the licensed independent practitioner responsible for the member’s care.
JCAHO provides examples of implementation. “These examples
are simply ideas for your network to consider.”
Example of implementation for CC 8: The network requests the
review criteria used by any external entity that carries out a utilization review on the network’s members. The review criteria are made
available to those within the network responsible for treatment and
discharge decisions. When the external utilization review organization’s recommendation conflicts with the member’s medical care
requirements, justification for the course of action taken is documented. Information from the external entity is collected and incorporated into the network’s assessment and improvement activities.
RI 2: The network provides for member involvement in care and
treatment decisions.
RI 2.1: The network provides an authorization process for care and
treatment that is timely, efficient, and meets member health care
needs.
The network’s process for authorizing care and treatment includes:
• Providing members with a description of the treatment
authorization process.
• Initial decisions made by an appropriately trained health care
professional using evidence-based, network approved criteria to
authorize admission, care, and transition to another care setting.
• A review of all initial treatment authorization denials by a
physician, dentist, or behavioral clinician prior to notifying the
member or their representative(s) of an adverse
determination.
• Informing members in a timely manner, in writing, when a
request to authorize treatment has been denied.
• Informing members of the basis and reason(s) for the adverse
determinations.
• Informing members of the review criteria used to make the
determination.
• Providing members with information as to whether, and under
what circumstances, investigational procedures are available
and are covered by the network.
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Figure 3: NCQA and JCAHO External Appeals Standards
NCQA Managed Behavioral Health
External Appeals Standards
UM 7.5 The managed behavioral healthcare organization has a procedure for providing independent,
external review of final determinations, including:
Eligibility criteria stating that the MBHO offers
enrollees the right to an independent, third party,
binding review whenever:
• The enrollee is appealing an adverse determination that is based on medical necessity,
as defined by MBHO.
• The MBHO has completed two levels of internal reviews and its decision is unfavorable to
the enrollee, or has elected to bypass one or
both levels of internal review or has exceeded
its time limit for internal reviews, without good
cause and without reaching a decision.
• The enrollee has not withdrawn the appeal
request, agreed to another dispute resolution
proceeding, or submitted to an external dispute
resolution proceeding required by law.
• Notification to enrollees about the independent appeals program and clear and timely
explanations of denials and approvals to
both enrollees and their physicians.
Use of an independent review organization that meets
the following criteria:
• Conducts a thorough review in which it considers anew all previously determined facts,
allows the introduction of new information,
considers and assesses sound medical
advice, and makes a decision or conclusions
that are not bound by the decisions or conclusions of the internal appeal.
• Has no material professional, familial, or
financial conflicts of interest with the MBHO.
• MBHO non-interference with the proceedings
of the external review.
• Enrollee exemption from the cost of external
review, including filing fees, and allowance
of designating a representative to act on the
behalf of the enrollee.
• Implementation of independent review organization decision within specified timeframe.
MBHO data tracking of external appeals for
use in evaluating its medical necessity decision making process.
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JCAHO External Appeals Standards
RI 2.2: The network provides a method for resolving
disagreements between the network and the member
or designated decision maker(s) regarding care or
treatment authorization decisions.
The network’s process includes:
• Informing members how to seek appeals of
adverse determinations.
• Defined timeframes in which the member can
anticipate response to an appeal.
• Appeal timeframes that are appropriate to the
urgency of the member’s health care needs.
• An appeal review panel including health care
professionals who are appropriately trained,
experienced, and competent with respect to
the care and treatment involved, and who
were not involved in the initial determination.
• Informing members about further steps available when disagreements cannot be resolved
through the treatment authorization and
appeal process, such as an internal grievance
process, arbitration, legal proceedings, and
any other external review processes.
RI 5: The network provides for the receipt and
resolution of complaints and grievances from
members in a timely manner.
The member has the right to voice complaints without
fear of recrimination about the care received and to
have complaints reviewed and, whenever possible,
resolved. This right and the way it is protected are
explained to the member. The network has a means
of providing for the following:
• Procedures for registering and managing complaints and grievances, including identifying
the party receiving complaints and grievances.
• Aggregating and reporting actions taken on
complaints and grievances.
• A timely response to the member, substantively
addressing the action taken on the complaint
or grievance.
• Including the aggregate complaint and grievance information in performance improvement
activities.
• An appeal process for grievance decisions.
• Member protection from any sanctions or
penalties resulting solely or primarily from
using the complaint or grievance process.

as well. In discussing how an MBHO can
provide access to the appropriate level of
care to meet an enrollee’s needs, it provides
the following example:
The alcohol/drug program of a community mental health center established
separate admission criteria for subpopulations. Separate criteria are in place
for alcoholism, cocaine dependence,
dual diagnosis, and heroin dependence.
Members are placed in levels and sites
of care in accordance with the primary
substance(s) being abused.
In sum, neither NCQA nor JCAHO provide prototypical medical necessity definitions but rather focus on the adequacy of the
decision processes used by the organizations
they accredit. As is shown in the discussion
of case law below, the procedures used to
make these decisions are as important as, and
at times more important than, the structure
and content of the definitions upon which
they are based.

Judicial Case Law, Official
Investigations, and Legal Actions
Since the introduction of the concept of medical necessity into insurance contracts, countless challenges have been made to insurer
and health plan denials of coverage based
on medical necessity criteria. In deciding a
medical necessity case, a court must construe
the terms of an agreement; consequently
these decisions offer a rich source of contractual medical necessity definitions, since
the court’s opinion almost invariably sets
out the relevant contract terms.

Judicial Case Law
Two types of medical necessity cases predominate. The first type of case involves
challenges to the actual decision on the
merits, with the claimant arguing that the

insurer’s conclusions about a treatment’s
medical necessity are not supported by the
evidence in the record. The second type of
challenge goes to alleged flaws in the decisionmaking process, such as a decisionmaker’s failure to follow applicable legal procedural standards in reviewing the case or
considering the evidence. In all such cases
the claimant (i.e., the provider and/or the
patient) carries the burden of proving that
the insurer’s decision was contrary to the
terms of the agreement.
Other cases raise questions of medical
necessity in a malpractice context. In such
cases, a managed care organization’s allegedly negligent treatment (and subsequent coverage) decisions are claimed to be a proximate
cause of death or injury. These cases typically
appear in the case law at a threshold point
(i.e., before there is any review on the merits
of the claim) and are decided on ERISA preemption grounds. For this reason, these cases
are omitted from this review. Two of the best
known managed care liability cases involving
behavioral health services are Moscovitch v.
Danbury State Hospital (1998) and Lazorko
v. Pennsylvania Hospital (2000). Both cases
involved suicides by individuals covered by
ERISA health plans. The patients were
ordered to be discharged from treatment following a determination by the MCO that
care was not medically necessary. Both cases
were permitted to proceed as malpractice
actions after a judicial determination that the
claims in question fell outside of the scope of
ERISA because they raised issues of State law
professional liability rather than ERISA coverage claims.
For this review, an online search was
conducted for all cases decided since 1992
involving challenges to medical necessity coverage decisions. The search was confined to
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the past decade in order to avoid examining
contracts whose terms may be significantly
outdated. A total of 54 medical necessity
cases were identified, 21 of which involve
appeals by insurers and health plans seeking
reversals of treatment orders issued by lower
courts, and 33 of which are cases brought
by providers and patients that seek to
reverse a claims denial. Insurers are slightly
more likely to prevail in these cases with
29 of the 54 cases decided in favor of the
insurers while in only 25 of the cases the
insurers’ denials were reversed. A summary
of all of the cases reviewed can be found in
Appendix C.
The fact that insurers are somewhat more
likely to prevail in medical necessity cases
may reflect the merits of their decisions. It
may also reflect the difficulties claimants
encounter in challenging a medical necessity
denial. For example, the plaintiff carries the
burden of proof and generally is barred from
introducing new medical evidence on appeal,
since review is limited to the evidentiary
record before the court. Thus, if the insurer
or plan failed to consider certain evidence
or misconstrued the evidence before it, the
plaintiff typically cannot rectify the shortcoming in court. Furthermore, under principles of contract and trust law (the two
bodies of law that apply to decisions on
coverage in the case of employee health
plans) (Firestone Tire and Rubber v. Bruch,
1989), insurers and health plan administrators are vested with considerable power to
decide whether contract beneficiaries are
entitled to the benefits they seek. A court’s
scope of review is therefore limited under
judicial principles, and a court will generally
scrutinize a record closely if it considers the
insurer or plan to have a clear conflict of
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interest that has colored its views (Bedrick
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1996).16
Of the 54 identified cases, 28 contain a
definition of medical necessity (Table 3).
Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance Plan
(1999), not included in Table 3 but summarized in Appendix C, is the leading case for
the proposition that insurers have the power
to contractually limit the types of necessary
treatments they will cover by building their
guidelines directly into the structure of the
plan documents. As a result, Jones, which
concerned treatment of alcoholism, contained no medical necessity definition per se
but instead a provision construed by the
court as limiting treatment to the guidelines
used by the managed behavioral health
subcontractor.
Other cases shown in Table 3 contain
a more traditional definition of medical
necessity and reflect the multidimensional
approach seen in Table 2. This finding suggests that rather than being isolated events,
the multidimensional definitions found in
Table 2 are the prevailing industry standard.
That is, the insurance industry today uses an
approach to defining medical necessity that
goes beyond assessing whether treatment
meets a professional standard of care and
permits the insurer to select among the
treatments that ostensibly are all appropriate in favor of one that is the safest, the
least costly, and not only for the convenience of the member or provider.
Four of the definitions drawn from the
case law contain an explicit reference to the
site of care, identifying treatment delivery in
outpatient settings as preferable to inpatient
care (Dettmer Clinic v. Associated Insurance
Companies, Inc.; Kornman v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Louisiana; Milone v. Exclusive
Health Care, Inc.; Scalamandre v. Oxford

Health Plans, Inc.). For example, in the 1995
case Kornman v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Louisiana, the insurer’s third criterion for
medical necessity was as follows: “as to
inpatient care, could not have been provided
in a Physician’s office, in the Outpatient
department of a Hospital, or in a lesser
facility without affecting the patient’s condition or quality of medical care rendered.”17
Forty-two of the 54 cases reviewed—the
single largest subgroup—involved a challenge
to a medical necessity determination based
on a treatment exclusion clause or an alleged
flaw in the insurer’s decisionmaking processes. Twenty-two cases focused on exclusions
based on the allegedly experimental status of
the requested treatment and thus dealt with
the proper application of an exclusionary
term rather than a medical necessity denial
on the merits. Twenty cases involved allegations that the insurer improperly applied the
definition in its determination procedures.
Plaintiffs most typically alleged that the
insurer acted in an arbitrary or capricious
manner by unfairly denying claims in some
cases while approving them in equivalent
cases.
Four of the 54 cases involved mental
health and substance abuse services (Heil
v. Nationwide Life, Koenig v. Metropolitan
Life, Burrell v. United Health Care Insurance,
and Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance
Plan). The Heil and Burrell cases involved
denials of inpatient hospitalization for a
mental condition, and the Koenig and Jones
cases involved denial of substance abuse
treatment services. All four were concerned
with alleged flaws in the insurers’ determination procedures.

Investigations and Official Legal Actions
In addition to cases decided in courts of law,
State attorneys general and bureaus of insurance have responded to complaints filed by
providers and patients regarding adverse
determinations based on MCOs’ medical
necessity criteria. In New York, Maine, and
Connecticut, official investigations were
launched in response to alleged instances of
arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking,
inconsistent application of criteria, failure to
meet disclosure requirements, and conflicts
of interest on the part of MCO decisionmakers. In New York and Maine, MCOs entered
into settlement agreements with the States;
in Connecticut, an MCO’s alleged abuses
formed the basis for remedial legislation.
Figure 4 summarizes the most common
problems identified from these investigations
of the procedures used by health plans and
insurers to make medical necessity determinations, followed by descriptions of each of
these States’ legal actions.
New York
The series of October 2001 settlement agreements reached between the New York State
Attorney General’s Office and six large
MCOs was a significant legal development
regarding medical necessity.18 Following a
2-year investigation into how these MCOs
informed their providers and enrollees of
adverse determination decisions on the
grounds of medical necessity, the Attorney
General found that these MCOs were not in
compliance with New York State’s utilization
review law (discussed in more detail in Part
V below). The focus of the investigation was
on the processes used by the MCOs to make
determinations and to inform providers and
enrollees, rather than the content of the medical necessity definitions themselves. The
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Figure 4: Common Procedural Problems in Medical Necessity
Determination Processes Noted in Investigations, Litigation, and Case Law
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Decision made in arbitrary or capricious manner without consideration of individual patient needs
Decision made inconsistently (i.e., some patients’ claims denied while others in equivalent circumstances
approved)
Claims reviewers unqualified or not appropriately trained
Application of arbitrary and unreasonable caps on coverage and/or dollar limits
Insufficient information provided in claims denials:
– No disclosure of clinical rationale used in making decision
– No disclosure of qualifying credentials of reviewer
– No disclosure of evidence or documentation used in decision
– No description of the procedures, timeframes, and consumer rights for grievance and appeal
Failure to consult with treating physician
Failure to consider medical evidence provided by patient
Failure to provide full and fair review to patient appealing claims denial
Lack of clarity and specificity in plan documents of excluded services (e.g., definitions of “experimental,”
“convenience”)
Conflict of interest of MCO decisionmaker that biased impartial judgment

Attorney General’s office found, for example,
that MCOs were often denying authorization
or reimbursement for inpatient mental health
and substance abuse treatment and offering
nothing more than a generic explanation that
the service was “not medically necessary.”
There was often no disclosure of the underlying reasons or clinical rationale the MCOs
used in making their decisions, which is
required in New York’s utilization review
law (see Appendix D for more details).
A representative of the New York
Attorney General’s Office indicated that
although their investigation did not review
the underlying substance of claims denied
owing to medical necessity, behavioral
health patients appeared to be more vulnerable to abusive medical necessity practices
than patients with physical conditions. In
the representative’s view, medical necessity is
harder to define and measure in behavioral
health. The representative cited New York’s
utilization review law as an effort to overcome this difficulty by ensuring that all
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patients receive individualized medical necessity decisions based on specific clinical facts
and individualized assessments. Despite this
statute, the New York Attorney General’s
office continues to receive complaints from
providers and patients regarding the medical
necessity decision process used by MCOs in
behavioral and physical health cases.
The Attorney General’s Office representative cited the lack of a uniform medical necessity definition in State insurance laws as the
most significant problem in medical necessity
decisionmaking and investigation of abusive
practices. External appeal statutes, utilization
review regulations, and other insurance laws
use medical necessity definitions and standards that are often conflicting or confusing.
No uniform criteria are required. As a result,
each health plan uses its own definition, and
this variation makes regulation of medical
necessity practices difficult.

Maine
In 2000, both United Behavioral Health and
Cigna Behavioral Health, Inc., entered into
consent agreements with the Maine Bureau of
Insurance.19 These agreements were reached
as a result of complaints filed with the bureau
by health plan enrollees concerning denials of
coverage based on medical necessity grounds.
The bureau determined that the denials were
not in conformance with Maine rules regarding utilization review (see Appendix D for
more details).
A representative from the Maine Bureau
of Insurance indicated the potential for medical necessity abuses is similar in the physical
and behavioral health care contexts, but that
behavioral health medical necessity determinations in Maine are qualitatively different
from those in other jurisdictions. Both the
rural character of the State and general
shortage of behavioral health care providers
have a significant effect on the application of
medical necessity criteria. For example, there
is only one practicing psychiatrist in
Washington County, which has a population
of over 30,000 people. Since outpatient settings are scarce, national MCOs that do
business in Maine often apply medical necessity and “appropriate setting” criteria to
resist coverage of inpatient behavioral health
treatment, sometimes all that is available in
certain regions of the State.
The paucity of providers also affects grievance procedures. Maine requires MCOs to
offer an independent medical review as part
of their internal grievance process (it also has
an external review statute for further appeals
after the internal process has been exhausted). The shortage of providers leads MCOs
to find reviewers from other jurisdictions.
These reviewers often question the medical
necessity or appropriateness of inpatient

behavioral health care even though outpatient
care is not available or not practical owing
to distance. Maine consumers and providers
file complaints with the Bureau of Insurance
over these issues and the general shortage of
behavioral health care providers and services.
Maine’s Insurance Code contains a definition of “medically necessary health care,”
and according to the representative, insurers generally appear to understand the
definition and the statute’s process requirements (despite the frequent struggle over
inpatient behavioral health services). The
representative indicated that several highprofile consent agreements with insurers
that failed to follow Maine’s definition or
process requirements have had a deterrent
effect on other insurers.
Connecticut
A recent case that dramatically highlights the
potential for misconduct in the area of medical necessity decisionmaking by health plans
involves an investigation conducted by the
Connecticut Attorney General into the activities of the State’s largest insurer, Anthem
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and its subcontractor,
Psych Management, Inc. (PMI). In a widely
disseminated report issued in February 2002,
the Attorney General reported that Anthem
Blue Cross/Blue Shield (which enrolls
600,000 State residents), prompted by
desires for significant savings and profit
maximization, contracted with PMI to
administer the behavioral health component
of its product line following a notably low
project bid. The investigation found that
PMI’s president had serious financial conflicts of interest and engaged in inappropriate
use of aggressive utilization management and
denials of medically necessary care solely to
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improve PMI’s profit margin (Blumenthal,
2002) (see Appendix D for more details).
A representative of the Connecticut
Attorney General’s Office indicated that their
investigation showed that the potential for
abuses of medical necessity is greater in the
behavioral health context than in physical
health cases. In the view of the office, not
only is it harder to define what is medically
necessary in behavioral health, but the
patients involved are more vulnerable and
politically weak. In addition, the representative indicated that the behavioral health
provider lobby in Connecticut is relatively
weak and not effectively organized.
The Connecticut Attorney General’s office
receives more complaints from providers and
consumers regarding behavioral health care
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than physical health care. The complaints
include a failure to pay claims in a timely
manner, arbitrary coverage denials (citing
medical necessity), and difficulties in finding
behavioral health providers due to out-ofdate provider lists given to consumers
(commonly known as “phantom panels”).
Finally, the representative indicated
that the arbitrary financial goals, phantom
panels, and lack of regulatory oversight
of subcontractors are the most pressing
problems they found during their investigation. The Connecticut Department of
Insurance has taken the position that
the State’s laws regulating managed care
practices do not give the department
jurisdiction over subcontractors.

V.

State Law Regulation
of Medical Necessity

I

n their capacity as insurance regulators, States have developed an
extensive body of law related to the insurance industry. State laws
fall into two basic categories: laws that regulate the actual content
of the insurance contract itself (e.g., mandated benefit laws); and laws
that regulate other aspects of the business of insurance (e.g., consumer
protection laws, antidiscrimination law, corporate law, laws providing
for oversight of insurance practice, and administrative and judicial review
of insurer determinations). This section examines two types of State insurance laws that address medical necessity: insurance contract statutes and
laws that establish independent review procedures for medical necessity
determinations.

Laws That Regulate the Content
of Insurance Contracts
In addition to detailing specific classes of
benefits and services that must be included
in a contract of insurance sold in the State
(e.g., pediatric immunizations, in vitro fertilization, inpatient psychiatric care),20 a
number of States have attempted to define
medical necessity. This effort to define medical necessity by statute is relatively recent
and tracks the growth of (and backlash
against) managed care. It probably would be
incorrect to view the evolution of medical
necessity definitions in State law solely in
the context of consumer protection. Indeed,
codifying a medical necessity definition in
statute actually might favor the industry,
since once a statutory definition exists, a
court cannot insert its own definition into
the contract. Today it is still relatively common to find insurance contracts that authorize an insurer to decide issues of medical

necessity without a precise definition of the
term.21 In the face of this silence, a court
can fashion its own definition under common law principles of jurisprudence.22 In
so doing, a court might be inclined to use
principles of professional liability law to
arrive at a definition and adopt a standard
that measures the recommended treatment
against accepted standards of professional
practice, as established through the testimony of experts.23
The absence of a medical necessity definition can be as harmful to insurers as it
might be to patients. In this situation, it
would be in the interest of the industry as
well as consumers to adopt a definition,
particularly if the definition adopted is
multidimensional, giving the insurer discretion to select among competing schools
of thought in accordance with criteria
other than whether the treatment meets
professional standards of practice.
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Seventeen definitions of medical necessity
were found in the course of this review.
Table 4 sets forth these definitions, which
vary considerably in length and scope.
For example, at one end of the spectrum,
Massachusetts defines medical necessity as
“health care services that are consistent
with generally accepted principles of professional medical practice.”24 At the other
end, Hawaii offers:
A health intervention is medically
necessary if it is recommended by the
treating physician or treating licensed
health care provider, is approved by
the health plan’s medical director or
physician designee, and is: (1) For the
purpose of treating a medical condition; (2) The most appropriate delivery
or level of service, considering potential benefits and harms to the patient;
(3) Known to be effective in improving health outcomes; provided that:
(A) Effectiveness is determined first by
scientific evidence; (B) If no scientific
evidence exists, then by professional
standards of care; and (C) If no professional standards of care exist or
if they exist but are outdated or contradictory, then by expert opinion;
and (4) Cost-effective for the medical
condition being treated compared
to alternative health interventions,
including no intervention. For the
purposes of this paragraph, costeffective shall not necessarily mean
lowest price.25
It is evident that Hawaii’s definition
approximates those found in modern industry practices, while Massachusetts’s definition tracks the unidimensional standard
that limits the authority of the industry to
choose among equally appropriate types
of treatments. Of special note is the fact
that Hawaii’s definition, enacted in 2000,
is virtually identical to the prototype defi-
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nition proposed in 1999 by Singer et al. (see
Part 1 and Table 1).

Independent Review Statutes
By 2002, 40 States and the District of
Columbia had enacted external review laws
that allow enrollees to appeal to an independent review organization (IRO) health
plan decisions to deny, reduce, or terminate
care. Nearly half of these States have drafted
regulations pursuant to their IRO statutes.26
Table 5 lists the statutory and regulatory
citations of these laws.
External review laws are a recent development. Only Michigan (1978) and Florida
(1985) had external review statutes prior to
1990. By 1998, the number of statutes had
grown to 13 (Dallek & Pollitz, 2000), with
the remaining 28 statutes enacted within the
past 4 years.
IRO statutes and administrative regulations raise, and try to answer, many questions. This section focuses on questions in
three critical areas that courts consider to
be basic issues of fairness in decisionmaking:
(1) whether the States are tailoring statutes
specifically to address appeals of denials
involving behavioral health care; (2) the key
procedural elements of the statutes, including
who may serve as an IRO and the qualifications of IRO reviewers (including the possession of expertise relevant to the case under
review); and (3) how much deference the
IRO must give to the initial decision and
whether new evidence may be introduced
during the IRO review. In addition, the
statutes were reviewed to determine whether
they specify who has the burden of proof
in the appeal (i.e., whether the insurer must
present evidence defending its initial decision
or the claimant must present evidence to
challenge it). Only one State, Maryland,

addresses the specific burden of proof and
places it on the MCO to demonstrate that
its initial adverse decision was correct.27
In States that regulate the definition of
medical necessity under their insurance content statutes, the IRO presumably would be
guided by this definition. Among States that
do not have a definition of medical necessity
in their insurance laws but that have enacted
IRO statutes, seven include a definition of
medical necessity in the IRO statute itself.
Table 6 lists these States and the definition
of medical necessity that they have adopted
for IRO purposes.
Only two States, Pennsylvania and
Vermont, specifically mention behavioral
health care in their IRO statutes.28 Table 7
sets forth the relevant provisions from State
law. Pennsylvania’s statute identifies licensed
psychologists as qualified reviewers; Vermont
specifies an independent review system for
appeals involving mental health services and
substance abuse treatment. While most State
IRO statutes use broad language that could
include a range of providers to review behavioral health determinations, the Vermont
statute is unique in its explicit recognition
of behavioral health reviewers.
The independent reviewer: Who, how
chosen, and what qualifications? Central to
the process of obtaining external review are
questions about who performs the review,
how the reviewer is chosen, and what qualifications the reviewer possesses. Table 8 sets
forth information on the review process. All
41 statutes provide some detail about what
entities qualify to perform IRO functions.
Most States require that the IRO obtain certification or a license from the State insurance
or health department, and many States use
accreditation by a national accrediting organization as a proxy for State certification.

Thirty-seven of the 41 States require that
reviewers used by the IRO have appropriate
license, board certification (if applicable),
and experience in the medical condition or
health care service under review. Of the
remaining four States, three do not specify
such a requirement, and the last makes utilizing relevant expertise an option “when
necessary,” but does not define when that
is or who makes that determination.
In seven States, the MCO chooses the
independent review organization to perform
the review (either from an approved insurance/health department list or from any qualified IRO). The insurance or health departments assign the reviewer in the remaining
States. A number of States require a rotation
of the IRO so no MCO is reviewed by the
same organization for every case.
Thirty states disqualify an IRO from
serving as a reviewer if the entity has financial or other conflicts of interest with the
parties to the case. Nine of the 11 remaining
States do not explicitly prohibit conflicts,
and one State requires only that the conflict
be disclosed.
Standard of review and permissible evidence: Table 9 addresses the issue of standard of review, identifying those States in
which review is de novo (i.e., brand new)
and those in which additional evidence of
necessity can be submitted. The standard
of review specifies how much deference,
if any, the IRO should or must give to the
prior decision made by the MCO. In a
de novo review, the IRO is not bound at
all by an earlier decision and no deference
is required. Six States accord this absolute
review power to their IROs. Few States
specify any level of review short of de
novo, and the majority of State IRO
statutes and regulations are silent on
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what standard of review to apply to prior
decisions by the MCO.
Twenty-seven of the States permit the
enrollee requesting the review to submit
additional evidence for consideration by the
IRO. The statutes range from allowing specific additional medical evidence to allowing
any evidence the enrollee considers relevant
to the appeal. Three States allow the enrollee
to request or attend a review hearing.
Additional process questions: The statutes
and regulations compiled in this review
contain additional process questions worth
noting. Most States require an enrollee to
exhaust an MCO’s internal appeals process
before filing a request for external review,
but there are notable exceptions. Some
States require a preliminary review by the
department of insurance or IRO to determine whether the request is eligible for
review. Many States require the enrollee
seeking review to pay a filing fee. Most
States require the MCO to pay the cost of
each appeal, but other States have assessed a
fee for each MCO operating in the State to
cover the costs of the entire appeals system.
Almost every statute includes detailed timelines for filing requests for appeal and
responses, and some States require that the
appeal be filed on specific forms. While
none of these process questions answer large
questions, taken together, they allow an
examination of the burdens that enrollees
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face when attempting to invoke the right to
an external review.
Viewed as a whole, State independent
review statutes suggest a desire on the part
of States to afford insured persons a right
to a second opinion in the case of medical
necessity determinations. While State insurance law contains minimal regulation of
insurers’ internal utilization management
and internal appeals processes, these statutes
suggest that States are willing to establish
minimum standards for how insurer decisions are to be reviewed, including absolute
review powers, impartial reviewers, and
the authority to consider new evidence in
reviewing a medical necessity determination.
Few IRO statutes contain independent
definitions of medical necessity, although
the State’s content definition presumably
would apply where one exists.
The power of the procedural standards
to support the overturning of a denial may
be somewhat limited, however. For example, if the definition of medical necessity
gives the insurer discretion to select from
among several professionally acceptable
courses of treatment, one would expect
an independent reviewer to uphold the
insurer’s decision unless it was not supported by the evidence (i.e., the insurer’s
choice among selected treatments was not
grounded in sufficient evidence to justify
a rejection of other choices).

VI.

Relevant Federal
Laws Pertaining to
Medical Necessity
Reviews

T

his part considers two sources of law relevant to medical
necessity determinations. First, two sets of Federal standards
governing employee health plans are examined. The first set of
standards is embodied in the regulations promulgated by the Department
of Labor in 2000 that set forth the “full and fair review” procedural
requirements that all ERISA health benefit plans must meet. The second
set is embodied in the standards governing medical necessity reviews that
are currently in use by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.

ERISA
The ERISA statute regulates health and welfare benefits for more than 140 million workers and their families (Rosenbaum, Frankford,
Moore, & Borzi, 1999). ERISA requires every
health benefit plan within its scope to provide
adequate notice in writing to a participant
when a claim is denied, “setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant.”29 In addition, ERISA affords a health
plan member whose claim has been denied
a “reasonable opportunity . . . for a full and
fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.”
In November 2000, the Department of
Labor issued final regulations that revise the
full and fair review requirements for appeals
of denials of claims for health benefits,
including both retrospective and prospective

claims. These regulations became effective
for group health plans on July 1, 2002.
Although ERISA does not define medical
necessity or provide a right to external
administrative review,30 these regulations
establish extensive standards for internal
reviews required in the case of health
claims.31
The November 2000 regulations require
ERISA-covered plans to “establish and
maintain reasonable procedures governing
the filing of benefit claims, notification
of benefit determinations, and appeal of
adverse benefit determinations.”32 A plan’s
claims procedures must safeguard and verify
that claims are made in accordance with
governing plan documents and that plan
provisions are applied consistently for
similarly situated claimants.
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The full and fair review regulations were
intended to make the claims process “faster,
fairer and fuller.” With respect to the speed
of the process, the regulations shortened the
permissible time for initial claim decisions
and appeals. Instead of 90 days under the
prior applicable regulation, the November
2000 rule requires initial decisions in 72
hours for urgent care claims, 15 days for
pre-service claims, and 30 days for postservice claims.33 Health plans are allowed
one 15-day extension for pre- and postservice claims. On appeals of denied claims,
instead of 60 days under the prior applicable
regulation, the new regulation requires decisions on appeals within 72 hours for urgent
care claims, 30 days for pre-service claims,
and 60 days for post-service claims. There
are no extensions of time for health plans
in determining appeals.34
Under the “fairness” category, the regulation allows claimants more time to file an
appeal (180 days instead of 60 under the
prior regulation). The decisionmaker cannot
be the same person who denied the initial
claim or that person’s subordinate. The
claimant also has the opportunity to submit
written comments, documents, records, and
other information related to the claim, and
the review must take into account all information submitted by the claimant (whether
or not the information was considered in
the initial benefit determination).35
If the appeal involves a decision based
on medical judgment, including whether
an item or service was medically necessary,
the health plan must consult with a “health
care professional who has appropriate
training in the field of medicine involved in
the medical judgment.” The health care
professional must not have been involved
with the initial decision or be a subordinate
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of the initial decisionmaker. Upon request,
the health plan must disclose the identity of
the health care expert it consulted. Health
plans cannot require more than two levels
of internal review of denied claims, and if
there are two levels, both levels must be
completed within the time frames required
of one level.36
The “fullness” category relates to
improved access to information by persons
appealing an adverse determination. As
an initial matter, the plan must provide all
plan members with a full description of
the plan’s claims and appeals procedures.
Claimants appealing an adverse determination must have access to any information
relevant to their claim upon request and
free of charge. Relevant information
includes any information the health plan
relied on in making the initial decision;
any information submitted, considered, or
generated while making the initial decision;
and any statements of policy or guidance
concerning the denied treatment or benefit,
even if such documents were not relied
upon in making the decision.37 In addition,
when a health plan denies a claim based
on a protocol or guidelines, the plan must
disclose such reliance and inform the
claimant that a copy of the protocol is
available upon request. Similarly, when the
denial is based on medical necessity, the
rule requires the plan either to explain
the scientific or clinical judgment used in
applying the plan’s terms or to include a
statement that such an explanation will
be provided free of charge if requested.38
With disclosure of protocols and explanations of the application of medical necessity,
the Federal full and fair review regulations
exceed the reach of State utilization and
independent review statutes and regulations.

Office of Personnel Management
Standards: FEHBP
Another relevant Federal law establishes
separate standards for reviewing claims
involving the denial of medical necessity for
Federal employees. The Federal Employees
Health Benefit Plan (FEHBP)39 provides
health insurance coverage to more than
nine million Federal employees and their
dependents. The U.S. Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), which contracts with
health plans to serve Federal employees,
administers the FEHBP.
Neither the FEHBP statute nor its implementing regulations define “medical necessity” or how health plans are to make such
determinations. The FEHBP regulations,
however, do offer enrollees a right to appeal
to OPM if the health plan denies a claim a
second time after reviewing its first denial or
if it fails to respond to an enrollee’s request
for reconsideration of a claim’s denial.40 The
enrollee must exercise the right to appeal
within 90 days of the health plan’s decision,
or within 120 days of the request for reconsideration if the health plan failed to
respond. In reviewing the claim denied by
the health plan, OPM may (1) request that
the claimant submit additional information;
(2) obtain an advisory opinion from an
independent physician; (3) obtain any other
information it believes is required to make a
decision; or (4) make its determination based
solely on the information the claimant submitted with the request for OPM review.41

Neither the OPM statute nor its implementing regulations specify the standard OPM
is to use in reviewing denied claims. If a
claimant wishes to sue, the suit must be filed
in Federal court to review OPM’s final action
on the claim, but the claimant is limited to
ERISA remedies. The suit must be brought
against OPM, not the health plan or its
contractors, and a recovery in such a suit
is limited to a court order directing OPM to
require the health plan to pay the amount
of the benefits in dispute.42
Figure 5 presents the key elements of medical necessity review and compares ERISA
procedures with those established by OPM.
Although the ERISA full and fair hearing
regulations and the FEHBP provide further
procedural safeguards to health plan
enrollees, both have important limitations.
The ERISA regulations do not contain a
right to an external appeal, despite providing
important additional access to information
and better claims procedures not previously
available. The FEHBP, limited to Federal
employees, provides a right to appeal outside
the health plan to the OPM or to Federal
court if necessary, but, as with ERISA plans,
monetary damages are limited to payment
for the cost of the denied benefit itself (i.e.,
punitive and “pain and suffering” damages
are not available).
As a result of the modest reach of Federal
law, the definition of medical necessity is
still governed by the terms of the contract
negotiated between buyers and sellers.
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Figure 5: Medical Necessity Utilization Review and Appeals Procedures
Issue

ERISA

Standards for initial utilization review process

✓

Standards for internal appeals of initial denials

✓

Timelines

✓

Qualifications of reviewer

✓

De novo review

✓

Evidentiary standards

✓

Access by claimant to health plan evidence

✓

Treatment guidelines

✓

Definition of medical necessity
External de novo administrative review of health plan decision
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FEHBP

✓

VII.

Synthesis and
Implications

A

s recently as 30 years ago, health professionals had virtual
autonomy to determine whether health care was medically necessary. Today the evidence suggests that this autonomy had a profound impact on both health care cost and quality. After
tentative incursions on decisionmaking through retrospective utilization
review, the health insurance industry has moved to prospective review
and has developed increasingly tight coverage provisions and definitional terms. Some commentators such as Eddy, Singer, and Bergthold have
focused on the importance of scientific evidence in decisionmaking.
Others such as Rosenbaum and Frankford have readily acknowledged
the need for external review of clinical judgment.

The evidence presented in this literature
review suggests that the modern definition
of medical necessity is multidimensional and
turns only in part on the consideration of
whether the treating professional’s recommendations fall within professionally accepted standards. Whether in State statutes,
insurance contracts, case law, or peerreviewed literature, the modern medical
necessity definition assumes external control
of the ultimate decision. Furthermore, relatively widespread consensus has been
reached that the definition of medical necessity should have certain specific dimensions.
The first dimension (and the one that is
most embedded in the structure of the agreement itself and often the most elusive) is best
thought of as contractual scope. Does the
agreement cover treatments that prevent
worsening and maintain or promote functioning, or is the agreement limited to treatments that show recovery or at least signifi-

cant improvement in the short term?43 The
second dimension is the professional standard. Is the treatment in accord with professional standards of care in the relevant area
of practice? The third dimension can be
thought of as patient safety and setting. Is
the prescribed treatment gauged to be delivered in the safest and most effective setting?
The fourth dimension is that the treatment
be medical and not a convenience matter or
one that emanates from social or environmental factors.
The fifth dimension is cost. Here, however,
most of the definitions (and the literature as
well) are vague on exactly what is meant by
cost. Ford (2000) attempts to grapple with
what is meant by cost, emphasizing long-term
over short-term in order to permit coverage
of care and services that, while not capable
of producing immediate improvements, show
long-term payoff. At this point, of course,
one begins to cross over from questions
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related to the necessity of covered services to
the underlying issue of coverage itself, since
coverage may be structured to categorically
exclude services of certain duration or services that do not show recovery or significant
improvement within a brief period of time.
One of the notable aspects of this review
is that there is little to suggest that health
insurers, State legislators, accreditation
bodies, or the experts consider behavioral
disorders to be so unique that the general
multidimensional test used to measure medical necessity is not appropriate. A number
of commentators call for a broadening of
coverage to include services related to the
treatment and management of chronic conditions, where the goal is to attain or maintain
functioning over the long term. Such goals
can be thought of as a form of significant
improvement: attaining the ability to function better can be thought of as a significant
improvement in the case of individuals with
serious and chronic behavioral health disorders. But the improvement in such cases is
not on a “recovery” trajectory (in the sense
that the insurer may equate “recovery”
with “leading to cure”) and so may continue
to fall outside the scope of coverage. This
represents an inconsistency with treatment
for many persons with severe mental illness,
wherein recovery, as evidenced by improved
functioning, is a primary treatment goal.
The evolution of a multidimensional definition of medical necessity reflects the problems inherent in a standard that measures
the proposed treatment simply against the
prevailing standard of care. As the schoolsof-thought doctrine in liability law underscored, the professional standard is built on
custom, practice, clinical observation, and
consultation and may embody several possible approaches to a single condition. Were
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an insurer to seize on one school of thought
to the exclusion of all others, its determination would be vulnerable on appeal. Even
if the plaintiff carries the burden of proof,
it is possible to introduce evidence showing
the full range of possible and professionally
appropriate approaches to a particular
problem, thereby undermining the insurer’s
insistence on one particular approach.
The modern definitions found in the
industry’s own materials, the case law, State
statutes, and the literature all point to an
emerging standard of medical necessity
that effectively permits an insurer or health
plan vested with decisionmaking discretion
to select among a series of professionally
accepted approaches to care and to choose
the approach that best satisfies other considerations, including cost, safety, and convenience factors. This power to choose one
specific approach to treatment, as opposed
to being obligated to recognize the full
range of treatments that fall within the
professional standard of care, is the essence
of what separates the modern definition
from its predecessors.
Furthermore, depending on how the
definition is drafted, an insurer or health
plan can exclude all evidence from its
consideration other than evidence gleaned
from certain sources of information such
as randomized controlled studies (Harris
v. Mutual of Omaha Co., 1993).
This shift to a multidimensional test of
necessity can be expected to affect any condition where there are multiple professionally
recognized approaches to the treatment of
any particular condition. Because professional opinion varies to a disproportionate
degree in the area of behavioral health, the
issue of medical necessity has generated
heightened attention in this area. However,

experts in behavioral health who write about
medical necessity do appear to advocate a
definition that allows a decisionmaker to
select among competing approaches in
accordance with numerous other factors.
The cost dimension of the modern medical necessity definition also may have an
especially strong impact in behavioral health
if treatments for such illnesses vary widely in
cost. A course of treatment that emphasizes
prescribed medications and brief therapy
may have radically different costs from one
that is long-term and emphasizes psychotherapy over medication. Similarly, a requirement of prior failure as a precondition to
the use of more expensive prescription drug
therapies may have a greater impact in
behavioral health, depending on the cost of
emerging medication treatments compared
to existing treatments. A corollary consideration is that of consumer choice, which is
rarely, if ever, addressed in medical necessity
definitions except in the context of exclusions for “convenience.”
The concept of convenience is a difficult
one. For example, could a “fail first” policy
be designed to limit “convenience” treatments for patients and thus be a basis for
denying access to emerging and professionally accepted treatments? There has been a
rapid increase in the development of a new
generation of psychopharmaceuticals used to
treat unipolar and bipolar depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, and alcohol and opiate
addictions. These drugs have usually been
found in clinical development testing to have
greater effectiveness and fewer negative side
effects than previous drugs, thus increasing
the likelihood that patients who use them
will be able to adhere to the treatment regimen. Since these drugs are new to the market
and not yet widely prescribed, they are typi-

cally relatively expensive. A “fail first” test
used as part of the convenience or cost
dimension of the medical necessity review
would result in a denial of access to certain
advanced medications. The impact of this
decision might extend beyond the immediate
denial of certain forms of recognized treatment. Because the modern medical necessity
definition turns in part on what is the accepted treatment, the fact that insurers and
health plans reject use of the treatment on
a widespread basis may lengthen the delay
before the treatment becomes “accepted.”
The evidence also shows a consensus in
the law and literature for an independent
review of an insurer’s medical necessity decision. More than 40 States have enacted legislation that, to varying degrees, establishes
an independent review process and the ability to introduce additional relevant and reliable evidence. While the burden of proof is
not specifically addressed in these laws,
these statutes lean toward creating an independent second opinion process, in which
the original determination is given no benefit of weight or presumption. Federal regulations revising the full and fair review process
in the case of ERISA plans also emphasize
(to the extent possible given the internal
nature of these reviews) independence, fresh
evidence, and claimant access to the plan’s
evidence and information. On June 20,
2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
Illinois’s independent review statute is not
preempted by ERISA. The majority opinion
(five justices) stated that: “[A]n HMO is
both: it provides health care, and it does so
as an insurer.... [R]egulating insurance tied
to what is medically necessary is probably
inseparable from enforcing the quintessentially state-law standards of reasonable
medical care.” (Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.,
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Petitioner, v. Debra C. Moran et al., 2002)
The practical effect of the decision is to
leave intact the status quo regarding States’
abilities to enact independent review
statutes, thus preserving consumers’ right to
pursue State-level appeals of claims denials,
which occur in behavioral health care cases
more often than in general medical care.
Regardless of how the process is structured, however, the importance of the
modern medical necessity definition is the
power it affords an insurer or health plan to
select from among professionally accepted
treatments the one treatment that it will
elect to cover. Depending on the quality
of the evidence pointing to one treatment
as preferable to all others, this power may
represent an advance in the effort to standardize the approach to the treatment of
certain conditions. But to the extent that the
evidence is weak, unreliable, or irrelevant,
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or that little focus is given to a particular
patient’s condition (or conditions) in the
course of evaluating possible treatments,
the power to select on the basis of factors
other than the professional standard of
care may result in the rejection of possible
treatment approaches that are beneficial in
the long run.
Finally, even the broadest definition of
medical necessity that tolerates multiple
schools of thought and that calls for extensive consultation with the treating physician
in arriving at the right treatment cannot
overcome contractual terms that limit or
exclude long-term maintenance treatments
designed to avert deterioration or maintain
functioning in the case of persons with
chronic behavioral health conditions. This
is a wholly separate issue, and one that is
of increasing importance for behavioral
health care services.
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to the descriptive text based on a careful consid-

anization and analysis of medical necessity

eration of the available research about the vari-
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begun considering “relational disorders” as a

parity legislation would appear to allow con-

new diagnostic code in the future DSM-V

tractual treatments to vary by diagnosis, even

(expected for publication in 2010). See http://

as it constrains insurer discretion to formulate

www.psych.org/clin_res/dsm/dsmintro81301.cfm.

mental illness-specific coverage limitations for

4

The plausibility of this distinction has been

dures for all health benefit plans maintained by

gram has offered an informal administrative

2

5

7

The fact that the industry views the utilization

broad classes of benefits. Thus, an insurer pre-

review process as linked to both health care

sumably could specify covered contractual treat-

quality and cost is best evidenced in industry

ments in the case of mental illness while using

accreditation standards, which identify an

a broader and more flexible individualized

appropriate utilization management program

“medical necessity” decisionmaking approach

as an essential feature of health care quality

in the case of physical illness.

and thus, of accreditation. See, e.g., JCAHO

Available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/

(1997, 2001) and NCQA (2000, 2001).

upload/mm/368/supplement1.pdf. Accessed
December 19, 2001.

8

Full and fair hearing review regulations issued
in 2000 by the U. S. Department of Labor
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require ERISA health benefit plans to disclose

considered this limitation have tended to uphold

any relevant information to claimants appealing

it where it is explicit in the contract and have

a benefit denial through the plan’s internal

rejected it when it is not an express limitation

review system. See 65 Fed. Reg. 70246 (Nov.

on coverage. See McGraw v. Prudential Ins.

21, 2000); 29 C.F.R. Part 2560 (2001). When a

Co., 137 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) and

health plan denies a claim based on a protocol

Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149 (4th

or guidelines, the plan must disclose such

Cir. 1996) (rejecting limitation when not explicit

reliance and inform the claimant that a copy
of the protocol or guideline is available upon

in contract’s medical necessity definition).
12

349 A.2d 245, 249-50 (Md. 1975), Maryland’s

medical necessity, the rule requires the plan

highest court set forth what is still viewed as the

either to explain the scientific or clinical judg-

seminal articulation of the modern standard of

ment used in applying the plan’s terms to the

care for measuring professional liability:

claimant’s medical circumstances or to include

“...that degree of care and skill which is expected

a statement that such an explanation will be

to a reasonably competent practitioner in the

provided free of charge if requested. These

same class to which he belongs, acting in the

regulations are effective for claims filed under

same or similar circumstances. Under this stan-

an ERISA health plan on or after July 1, 2002.

dard, advances in the profession, availability

The regulations effectively reverse a series of

of facilities, specialization or general practice,

judicial decisions holding that under ERISA,

proximity of specialists and special facilities,

health plans’ fiduciary obligations do not

together with all other relevant considerations,

require disclosure of treatment guidelines.

are to be taken into account.”

See Jones v. Kodak, 169 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir.

See also Law and the American Health Care

1999); Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 187 F.3d 53

System, op. cit., at 846.

(1st Cir. 1999).
13
9

Available at https://apps.cignabehavioral.com/

they refer to professional or national stan-

Accessed September 22, 2002.
14

For purposes of confidentiality, we do not

Docket No. 00-3005. Available at http://

identify the managed care organizations or the

www.state.me.us/pfr/ins/ins003005.htm.

officials by name.

Accessed April 16, 2002.
11

dards of care.

In RE: United Behavioral Health, Consent
Agreement with Maine Bureau of Insurance,

Since the UBH guidelines were not available
to the authors, it is not known to what extent

web/basicsite/provider/pdf/CBHguide.pdf.
10

In Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital,

request. Similarly, when the denial is based on

15

Of course, if the contract limits coverage for

It is typical for insurers to limit the concept of

specified conditions to certain treatments, this

treatment to interventions that are calculated

limitation in coverage would take precedence.

to yield either a full recovery or a significant

16

It would probably seem that any insurer has

improvement. See McGraw v. Prudential Ins.

an inherent conflict of interest because it is at

Co., 137 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) and

risk for the cost of its decision. In fact, courts

Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149 (4th

do not perceive the dual role of insurers as risk

Cir. 1996). Where the patient cannot improve or

bearers and decision makers as a fatal flaw,

show significant recovery, an insurer may deny

although many will more closely review a

the coverage as unnecessary. Courts that have

record as a result.

42 Special Report

17

Advocates note the qualitative advances inher-

which an insurer denied reconstructive facial

ent in emphasizing outpatient over inpatient

surgery for a severely deformed infant on the

care wherever appropriate. Chris Koyanagi,

grounds that the construction was excluded

Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law.

as “cosmetic” without ever defining the term.

Personal communication. April 5, 2002. (By

22

547 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff’d, 768 F.2d 1303 (11th

side, providers of long-term psychotherapy and

Cir. 1985) (finding “no consensus among the

psychoanalysis have seen restrictions put on the
scope and duration of their treatments, with a

courts” as to the definition of “necessary” care).
23

particular emphasis on short-term behavioral

age but access to the care itself. Courts therefore

Aetna/U.S. HealthCare Inc./Prudential Health

might consider professional liability law as a

Plan of Hartford, CT; Excellus Health Plans

relevant source of law from which to derive an

of Rochester; Group Health Inc. of Manhattan;

insurance standard of medical necessity. In recent

HIP Health Plan of Greater New York, Inc.;

years, courts have repeatedly noted the “two

Oxford Health Plans of Trumbull, CT; and

hats” of managed care, affecting both coverage

Vytra Health Plans of Long Island, Inc. See:

and health care quality through their conduct.

“Landmark Agreements Give Consumers New

See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).

Protections in HMO Disputes.” NY Attorney
General’s Office Press Release. October 16,

24

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 176O (1) (2001).

25

HRS § 432E-1.4 (2000).

26

We limited our review of state regulations to

2001. Available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us.
Accessed October 29, 2001.
19

those available in the LEXIS-NEXIS legal

In RE: United Behavioral Health, Consent

databases.

Agreement with Maine Bureau of Insurance,
op. cit. In RE: Cigna Behavioral Health, Inc.,
Consent Agreement with Maine Bureau of

27

Md. Ins. Code Ann. § 15-10A-03(e) (2001).

28

28 Pa. Code § 9.504 (2001) and VT. Stat. tit. 8,

Insurance, Docket No. 00-3003. Available at

20

21

The prospective nature of utilization review
means that managed care affects not only cover-

and cognitive therapy as preferred.)
18

See Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 574 F.Supp.

the same token of course, on the outpatient

§ 4089f (2001).

http://www.state.me.us/pfr/ins/ins003003.htm.

29

Accessed April 17, 2002.

30

29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2001).
Individuals may seek judicial review of a claim’s

In Metropolitan Life Insurance v.

denial. In such a case the review is on the record

Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), the

rather than de novo. Under the standard of

Supreme Court affirmed the power of states to

review set forth by the United States Supreme

set minimum content standards in the case of

Court in Firestone Tire and Rubber v. Bruch,

insured ERISA plans. The case involved a

489 U.S. 101 (1989), the plan administrator’s

Massachusetts state law mandating inpatient

decision is upheld unless the claimant can

hospitalization coverage up to certain levels in

demonstrate that it is arbitrary and capricious

the case of mental illness.

or an abuse of discretion. Courts may conduct

A recent decision illustrating the still common

a more rigorous review when a claimant is able

practice of insurers to leave critical terms unde-

to demonstrate a conflict of interest; however,

fined is Bynum v. Cigna Healthcare of North

although the fact that the internal review was

Carolina, Inc., 287 F.3d 305 (4th Cir., 2002) in

conducted by the insurer or the health plan
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administrator raises the potential for conflict,

39

5 U.S.C. § 8901 (2001).

the interest is not sufficient to compel a more

40

5 C.F.R. § 890.105 (2001).

rigorous review in every case. See Firestone Tire

41

Id.

42

5 C.F.R. § 890.107(c) (2001).

and Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989);
Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149 (4th
Cir. 1996).
31

Pending patients’ bill of rights legislation before
Congress would establish independent review as
a basic element of ERISA for all covered plans
and health insurance arrangements. See H.R.
and S. 1052, 107th Cong., 1st sess.

43

Several cases have focused specifically on the
use of “significant improvement” and “recovery” by insurers to narrow the scope of the
treatments that can be considered medically
necessary. See McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
137 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) and Bedrick v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 1996).
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29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b) (2001).

33

See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1(f), (i) (2001).

“gloss on the contract” imposed by utilization

34

See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1 (i) (2001).

management review, courts have tended to
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29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1(h) (2001).

overturn the insurer’s decision. But where the
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37
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Where the concept is not contractual but is a

contract documents actually specify recovery
or short term improvements, courts will honor
the limitation.
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Sabin, James E.
and
Norman Daniels

Author

Hastings Center
Report 24(6):5–13

“Determining
‘Medical
Necessity’ in
Mental Health
Practice”

Title, Source

Medical Necessity Definition1

The authors posed the question, “Should
Those mental health services that are essential for the treatment of a
mental health insurance cover only disorders Member’s mental health disorder as defined by the DSM-IV in accordance
found in DSM-IV, or should it be extended to with generally accepted mental health practice.
treatment for ordinary shyness, unhappiness,
and other responses to life’s hard knocks?”
Through the use of six illustrative case studies, the authors examined the reasoning
behind the determinations of medical necessity. The article includes a discussion of a
recurrent conflict between “hard-line” and
“expansive” views of medical necessity,
noting that it frequently reflects unrecognized moral disagreement about the targets
of clinical intervention and the ultimate goals
of psychiatric treatment. The authors present
three models for defining medical necessity
and argue a defensible rationale for the
“normal” model, which comprises a target
of a medically defined deviation intended to
decrease the impact of disease or disability.
Three tests of medical necessity are offered:
(1) Does it make distinctions the public and
clinicians regard as fair? (2) Can it be administered in the real world? (3) Does it lead to
results that society can afford? The authors
conclude that the DSM-IV standard provides
workable boundaries for medical necessity
definitions.

Summary/Abstract

1Definitions have been taken verbatim from the relevant document; quotation marks have been omitted.

1994

Year

Table 1. Medical Necessity Definitions in Published Literature (See Also Appendix C)
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Chodoff, Paul

Ford, William

1998

Author

1998

Year

Table 1. Continued
Summary/Abstract
Managed care and, specifically, the need to
conform to medical necessity requirements
have had a dramatic effect on the medical
and psychiatric practice, especially on
psychotherapy. The author describes the
progression of the concept of medical
necessity from a simple accounting of
services reimbursable by insurance companies to an ambiguous term without
definitional consensus. He describes its
relationship to the medical model and
discusses the incongruity between medical
necessity and certain aspects of psychotherapy. He proposes a broader concept—
health necessity—based on an evaluation
of the advantages, disadvantages, and
costs of medical and psychiatric services.
Discusses the impact of managed care
medical necessity definitions on psychiatric
care. Points to some possible reasons why
MBHOs focus on cutting short-term costs
rather than managing long-term costs,
including short contract terms and laborintensive reviews.

Title, Source
“Medical
Necessity and
Psychotherapy”
Psychiatric
Services
49(11):1481–1483

“Medical
Necessity:
Its Impact in
Managed Mental
Health Care”
Psychiatric
Services
49(2):183–184

“Treatment necessity” or “clinical necessity” would require that, to qualify for
payment, a service must be: for the treatment of mental illness and substance
use disorders, or symptoms of these disorders, and impairments in day-to-day
functioning related to them; for the purpose of preventing the need for a more
intensive level of mental health and substance abuse care; for the purpose of
preventing relapse of persons with mental illness and substance abuse disorders; efficient, in the sense that a less expensive treatment works as well as a
more expensive treatment; and not for the patient’s or provider’s convenience.

“Health Necessity” would rely on medical criteria when they are relevant but
would also acknowledge that the health of the citizenry can be perceived in
broader terms. A theoretical foundation for this concept may be found in the
biopsychosocial model. Health necessity would be based on three broad
fundamentals: uniform qualifications for practitioners, acceptable professional
identities, and competence; criteria for the kinds of services that would be
provided and covered; and a fair mechanism for resolution of disputes about
questions of service coverage. The criteria for services would include biotechnical medical criteria when appropriate, as would be the case in most ordinary
medical practice, but they would be acknowledged to be only a subset of the
health necessity criteria. For mental health needs, a broad range of services
could also be considered, including appropriate psychotherapy for individuals
who may not fit comfortably with DSM-IV diagnostic categories but who suffer
a significant degree of distress and interpersonal impairment.

Medical Necessity Definition1
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National Center
for Education
in Maternal and
Child Health,
Georgetown
University

“Defining
Medical
Necessity:
Strategies for
Promoting
Access to
Quality Care for
Persons with
Developmental
Disabilities,
Mental
Retardation,
and Other Special
Health Care
Needs”

Stanford
University,
August, 1999

“Decreasing
Variation in
Medical
Necessity
Decision
Making”

Title, Source

Discusses medical necessity determinations
in regards to persons with developmental
disabilities. The report has a flow chart
showing the dynamics of medical necessity
decisions within current service systems.
It also provides its own specifications for
determining medical necessity.

This is an in-depth report looking into the
question of medical necessity. It deals with
the variation and inconsistencies of definitions that the various stakeholders have.
It notes a paucity of research regarding
health plan decision-making and whether
medical necessity definitions play a real role
in decision-making. It documents a number
of conferences and original research,
eventually concluding with a consensus
for a model decision-making process and
medical necessity definitions. It concludes
by reviewing the various stakeholders, their
concerns, and what actions they could take
to decrease medical necessity variability.

Summary/Abstract

1Definitions have been taken verbatim from the relevant document; quotation marks have been omitted.

Ireys, Henry T.,
Elizabeth Wehr,
and
Robert E. Cooke

Singer, Sara J.,
Linda A.
Bergthold,
Carol Vorhaus,
Alain Enthoven,
et al.

1999

1999

Author

Year

Table 1. Continued

A covered service or item is medically necessary if it will do, or is reasonably
expected to do, one or more of the following: arrive at a correct medical diagnosis; prevent the onset of an illness, condition, injury, or disability (in the individual or in covered relatives, as appropriate); reduce, correct, or ameliorate
the physical, mental, developmental, or behavioral effects of an illness, condition, injury, or disability; and assist the individual to achieve or maintain sufficient functional capacity to perform age-appropriate or developmentally
appropriate daily activities. The MCO or insurer must determine medical
necessity on the basis of health information provided by the following persons:
the individual (as appropriate to his or her age and communicative abilities),
the individual’s family, the primary care physician, and consultants with appropriate specialty training, as well as other providers, programs, multidisciplinary
teams, educational institutions, or agencies that have evaluated the individual.
The determination of medical necessity must be made on an individual basis
and must consider the functional capacity of the person and those capacities
that are appropriate for persons of the same age or developmental level and
available research findings, health care practice guidelines, and standards
issued by professionally recognized organizations or governmental agencies.
Final determinations will be made by a physician in concert with the following
persons: the individual’s primary care physician; a consultant with experience
appropriate to the individual’s age, disability or chronic condition; and the
individual and/or family. Medically necessary services must be delivered in
a setting that is appropriate to the specific health needs of the individual.

For contractual purposes, an intervention will be covered if it is an otherwise covered category of service, not specifically excluded, and medically
necessary. An intervention is medically necessary if, as recommended by
the treating physician and determined by the health plan’s medical director
or physician designee, it is (all of the following): a health intervention for the
purpose of treating a medical condition; the most appropriate supply or level
of service, considering potential benefits and harms to the patient; and known
to be effective in improving health outcomes. For new interventions, effectiveness is determined by scientific evidence. For existing interventions, effectiveness is determined first by scientific evidence, then by professional standards,
then by expert opinion; and the cost-effectiveness for this intervention is
compared to alternative interventions, including no intervention. “Costeffective” does not necessarily mean lowest price. An intervention may be
medically indicated yet not be a covered benefit or meet this contractual
definition of medical necessity. A health plan may choose to cover interventions that do not meet this contractual definition of medical necessity.

Medical Necessity Definition1
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Author

National Health
Law Program

Corlin, Richard

Ford, William

Year

1999

1999

2000

Table 1. Continued

The Psychiatric
Clinics of North
America
23(2):309–317

Comprehensive reform to increase commercial psychiatric insurance coverage must include changing the definition of medical necessity by reorienting
insurers from an acute care model to a model that provides both care for
acute episodes and longer-term care designed to manage chronic conditions.
Such longer-term management includes delivering services designed to
avoid future acute episodes. Commercial insurance ought to understand that
a legitimate function of psychiatric services is to maintain behavioral health in
addition to returning someone to health after an acute episode. Ford proposed
the concept of “treatment necessity” or “clinical necessity” to encompass
this broader view of the goals of psychiatric services. Treatment necessity
requires a service to be: for the treatment of mental illness and substance
abuse disorders, or symptoms of these disorders, and impairments in day-today functioning related to them; for the purpose of preventing the need for a
more intensive level of psychiatric care; for the purpose of preventing relapse
of persons with psychiatric disorders; consistent with generally accepted
clinical practice for psychiatric disorders; and not solely for the patient’s or
provider’s convenience.

“Medical
Necessity and
Psychiatric
Managed Care”
The concept of medical necessity is one tool
used by third-party payers to contain their
financial risk in a seemingly nonarbitrary
manner. The definitions tend to reflect
corporation philosophies that would need
to change to achieve real parity.

“Medical necessity” means: “Health care services or products that a prudent
physician would provide to a patient for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing
or treating an illness, injury, disease or its symptoms in a manner that is:
(1) in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice;
(2) clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and duration;
and (3) not primarily for the convenience of the patient, physician, or other
health care provider.”

“Statement of
the AMA to
the Committee
on Health,
Education, Labor
and Pensions,
U.S. Senate”

Medical Necessity Definition1
Medically necessary care is the care which, in the opinion of the treating
physician, is reasonably needed: to prevent the onset or worsening of an
illness, condition, or disability; to establish a diagnosis; to provide palliative,
curative, or restorative treatment for physical and/or mental health conditions;
and to assist the individual to achieve or maintain maximum functional capacity
in performing daily activities, taking into account both the functional capacity
of the individual and those functional capacities that are appropriate for individuals of the same age.

Summary/Abstract

“Medical
Necessity
Definition,
Model Medicaid
Managed Care
Contract
Provisions”

Title, Source
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Section 1.9 defines medically necessary/medical necessity as health care
services or products that a prudent physician would provide to a patient for
the purpose of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, injury, disease,
or its symptoms in a manner that is (1) in accordance with generally accepted
standards of medical practice; (2) clinically appropriate in terms of type,
frequency, extent, site, and duration; and (3) not primarily for the convenience
of the patient, physician, or other health care provider.

Consortium for
Citizens with
Disabilities
AMA Model
Provider Contract

AMA council on medical service defined medically necessary treatment as:
health care products or services that a prudent physician would provide to a
patient for the purpose of diagnosing or treating an illness, injury, disease, or
its symptoms in a manner that is: (1) in accordance with generally accepted
standards of medical practice; (2) clinically appropriate in type, frequency,
level, site, and duration; and (3) not primarily for the convenience of the
patient, physician, or other health care provider.

Medical Necessity Definition1

The CCD believes that a federal definition of medical necessity should require
plans to cover services that are: calculated to prevent, diagnose, correct, or
ameliorate a physical or mental condition that threatens life, causes pain or
suffering, or results in illness, disability, or infirmity; calculated to maintain or
preclude deterioration of health or functional ability; individualized, specific,
and consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness, disability,
or injury under treatment; not in excess of the individual’s needs; necessary
and consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as
determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the state
Department of Health; and reflective of the level of service that can be safely
provided and for which no equally effective treatment is available.

Reviews AMA’s definition of medical necessity and points out problems with its application to psychiatry. Recommends its own
definition for psychiatry after a discussion of
HIPAA law and possible implications for
fraud in psychiatry.

Summary/Abstract

“A Strong and
Consistent
Definition of
Medical
Necessity Forms
the Core of
Meaningful
Patient
Protections”

Psychiatric
Services
51(6):711–712, 719

“What is
Psychiatric
‘Medical
Necessity’?”

Title, Source

1Definitions have been taken verbatim from the relevant document; quotation marks have been omitted.

American
Medical
Association

Force, C. T.

2001

2000

Fleishman, Martin

Author

2000

Year
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Source
Highmark Blue
Cross Blue Shield
(from AHRQ
report on coverage decisions)

ValueOptions
Providers Manual
(available online)

Anonymous
Managed
Behavioral Health
Plan Provider
Packet

United Behavioral
Health
Source: UBH
Consent
Agreement with
Maine Bureau
of Insurance

Cigna Behavioral
Health Care
Source: Cigna’s
“Level of Care
Guidelines for
Mental Health
and Substance
Abuse
Treatment”

Year
2000

2001

2000

2000

1999

[Available at: https://apps.cignabehavioral.com/web/basicsite/provider/pdf/LevelofCareGuidelines_2003.pdf]

In considering the appropriateness of any level of care, the four basic elements of Medical Necessity should be present: (1) a diagnosis as
defined by standard diagnostic nomenclatures (DSM-IV or its equivalent in ICD-9-CM) and an individualized treatment plan appropriate for the
participant’s illness or condition; (2) a reasonable expectation that the participant’s illness, condition, or level of functioning will improve through
treatment; (3) the treatment is safe and effective according to nationally accepted standard clinical evidence generally recognized by mental
health or substance abuse professionals; and (4) it is the most appropriate and cost-effective level of care that can safely be provided for the
participant’s immediate condition.

Medical Necessity—health care services and supplies that are determined by the Plan to be medically appropriate, and (1) necessary to meet
the basic health needs of the covered person; (2) rendered in the type of setting appropriate for the delivery of the health service; (3) consistent
in type, frequency, and duration of treatment with United Behavioral Health guidelines; (4) consistent with the diagnosis of the condition;
(5) required for reasons other than the comfort or convenience of the covered person or his or her physician; and (6) of demonstrated medical
value. [Available at: http://www.state.me.us/pfr/ins/ins003005.htm]

“Medical Necessity” is used here to mean care which that is determined to be effective, appropriate and necessary to treat a given patient’s
disorder. For all levels and types of care, the definition is as follows: (1) the patient must have been diagnosed with a psychiatric illness by a
licensed mental health professional; (2) symptoms of this illness must accord with those described in the DSM-IV; (3) the diagnosis must have
been arrived at prior to admission in a face-to-face encounter between the professional and patient. [Note: The company defines separate
admission and continuing care criteria by type of service, e.g., inpatient and outpatient psychiatric treatment, substance dependence treatment,
residential treatment, methadone maintenance, electroconvulsive therapy, psychological testing, etc.]

Medically necessary treatment is that which is: intended to prevent, diagnose, correct, cure, alleviate, or preclude deterioration of a diagnosable
condition (ICD-9 or DSM-IV) that threatens life, causes pain or suffering, or results in illness or infirmity; expected to improve an individual’s condition or level of functioning; individualized, specific, and consistent with symptoms and diagnosis, and not in excess of patient’s needs; essential
and consistent with nationally accepted standard evidence generally recognized by mental health or substance abuse care professions or
publications; reflective of a level of service that is safe, where no equally effective, more conservative, and less costly treatment is available;
not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, caretaker, or provider; no more intensive or restrictive than necessary to balance
safety, effectiveness, and efficiency; and not a substitute for non-treatment services addressing environmental factors.

Medical Necessity Definition1
Coverage process—contractual definition of medical necessity, which includes the following criteria for establishing the medical necessity of
a service: appropriate for symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment of a condition, illness, or injury; provided for diagnosis, direct care, or treatment;
in accordance with the standards of good medical practice; not primarily for the convenience of the member or member’s provider; the most
appropriate supply or level of service that can be safely provided to the member. To determine what services meet this definition, Highmark has
an information-gathering process that includes systematic reviews of published literature, a consulting program with practicing physicians,
review of coverage decisions by Highmark managers, review by an independent Medical Affairs Committee.

Table 2. Medical Necessity Definitions: Managed Care Industry
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Evans v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield
of South Carolina

1993

Medical Necessity Definition1

Medically Necessary: benefits are payable for services or supplies that are medically necessary. The simple fact that a physician has performed
or prescribed something does not mean that it is medically necessary. Some services or supplies that you get may not be covered under your
insurance health policy. Expenses for the following will not be paid:
*Surgery just to make you look better (usually called cosmetic surgery)
*Experimental surgery or services, such as acupuncture or sex change
*Services or supplies that are not medically necessary, including luxury or convenience items and travel expenses
(except those provided for human organ transplants).

Medically necessary means recommended by a licensed physician and commonly recognized in the licensed physician’s profession as proper
care or treatment. Medically Necessary does not mean a procedure that is deemed experimental or investigational in nature by any appropriate
technological assessment body established by any state or federal government.

The group contract defines “medically necessary” or “medical necessity” as those: services or supplies, provided by a Provider, Facility, or
Provider Individual, which are required for treatment of illness, injury, diseased condition, or impairment and are: (a) consistent with the Insured’s
diagnosis or symptoms; (b) appropriate treatment according to generally accepted standards of medical practice; (c) not provided only as a
convenience to the Insured or Provider (d) not Investigational or unproven; and (e) not excessive in scope, duration, or intensity to provide safe,
adequate, and appropriate treatment to the Insured. Any service or supply provided at a Provider Facility will not be considered medically
necessary if the Insured’s symptoms or condition indicate that it would be safe to provide the service or supply in a less comprehensive setting.
The fact that any particular Provider Individual may prescribe, order, recommend, or approve a service, supply, or level of care does not, of
itself, make such treatment medically necessary or make the charge a Covered Charge under this Contract.

A medically necessary service is one required to identify or treat an illness, injury, or pregnancy-related condition which a Provider has diagnosed
or reasonably suspects. To be medically necessary, the service must: be consistent with the diagnosis of your condition; be in accordance with the
standards of good medical practice; not be for the convenience of the patient, the patient’s family, or the Provider; and be performed in the least
costly setting required by your medical condition.

The Travelers determines, in its discretion, if a service or supply is medically necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an accidental injury or
sickness. This determination is based on and consistent with standards approved by Travelers medical personnel. These standards are developed,
in part, with consideration to whether the service or supply meets the following: *It is appropriate and required for the diagnosis or treatment of
the accidental injury or sickness. *It is safe and effective according to accepted clinical evidence reported by generally recognized medical
professionals and publications. *There is not a less intensive or more appropriate diagnostic or treatment alternative that could have been used
in lieu of the service or supply given. A determination that a service or supply is not medically necessary may apply to the entire service or supply
or to any part of the service or supply.

Covered charges include only those incurred for services or items specifically recommended by a licensed physician as necessary for the diagnosis,
care, or treatment of a physical or mental condition, and falling within the Plan guidelines. For a service to be determined as necessary for medical
care, it must be widely accepted by medical professionals in the United States as effective, appropriate, and essential under recognized health
care standards.

1Definitions are verbatim from case law; quotation marks have been omitted.

Esdale v.
American
Community
Mutual Insurance
Company

Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of
Virginia v.
Katharine Keller

1994

1996

Bedrick v.
Travelers
Insurance

1996

Dettmer Clinic v.
Associated
Insurance
Companies, Inc.

Bancroft v.
Tecumseh
Products
Company

1996

1993

Case

Year
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Farley v. Benefit
Trust Life
Insurance
Company

Fenio v. Mutual of
Omaha Insurance
Company

Florence
Nightingale
Nursing Service,
Inc. v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of
Alabama

Grethe v.
Trustmark
Insurance
Company

Harrison v. Aetna
Life Insurance
Company

Hundley v.
Wenzel

Juliano v. HMO of
New Jersey, Inc.,
dba U.S.
HealthCare

1994

1993

1995

1996

2001

2000

Case

1992

Year

Table 3. Continued

The Contract defines “Medically Necessary or Medical Necessity” as appropriate and necessary services as defined by HMO which are rendered
to a Member for a condition requiring, according to generally accepted principles of good medical practice, the diagnosis or direct care and treatment of an illness or injury and which are not provided only as a convenience.

Medically necessary means that a service or supply is necessary and appropriate for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness or injury based
on generally accepted current medical practice. A service or supply will not be considered medically necessary if any of the following apply:
(1) It is provided only as a convenience to the covered person or provider; (2) It is not appropriate treatment for the covered person’s diagnosis
or symptoms; (3) It exceeds (in scope, duration, or intensity) the level of care that is needed to provide safe, adequate, and appropriate diagnosis
or treatment; (4) It is part of an experimental treatment. The fact that any particular doctor may prescribe, order, recommend, or approve a
service or supply does not, of itself, make the service or supply medically necessary.

“Necessary” means a service or supply which is necessary for the: diagnosis; or care; or treatment; of the physical or mental condition involved.
It must be widely accepted professionally in the United States as: effective; and appropriate; and essential; based upon recognized standards of
the health care specialty involved.

The term “Medically Necessary” as used above means: drugs, therapies, or other treatments that are required and appropriate for care of the
sickness or the injury; and that are given in accordance with generally accepted principles of medical practice in the U.S. at the time furnished;
and that are reimbursed by Medicare; and are not deemed to be experimental, educational, or investigational in nature by any appropriate technological assessment body established by any state or federal government; and that are not furnished in connection with medical or other research.

Medically Necessary means the use of a Hospital or the furnishing of other services or supplies which are necessary to treat a Member’s illness
or injury. To be medically necessary, the services and supplies furnished must (as determined by the Claims Administrator): be appropriate and
necessary for the symptoms, diagnosis, or treatment of the Member’s condition, disease, ailment, or injury; be provided for the diagnosis or direct
care of the Member’s medical condition; be in accordance with standards of good medical practice accepted by the organized medical community;
and not be solely for the convenience of the Member, his family, his Physician or another provider of services; not be experimental or investigative;
and be performed in the least costly setting the Member’s medical condition requires.

“Medically Necessary” service or supply means one which: (a) is appropriate and consistent with the diagnosis in accord with accepted standards
of community practice; (b) is not considered experimental or investigative; (c) could not have been omitted without adversely affecting the insured
person’s condition or quality of medical care.

The insurance contract defines “medically necessary” treatment as “drugs, therapies, or other treatments that are required and appropriate care
for the sickness or the injury; and that are given in accordance with generally accepted principles of medical practice in the U.S. at the time
furnished; and that are approved for reimbursement by the Health Care Financing Administration; and that are not experimental, educational, or
investigational; and that are not furnished in connection with medical or other research.”

Medical Necessity Definition1
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Milone v.
Exclusive Health
Care, Inc.

Milone v.
Exclusive
Healthcare, Inc.

2001

1999

A medically necessary service or supply means one which is ordered or authorized by the Primary Care Physician, and with the Primary Care
Physician, our medical staff or our Medical Director and/or a qualified party or entity selected by us determines is: (1) provided for the diagnosis
or direct treatment of an injury or sickness; (2) appropriate and consistent with the symptoms and findings or diagnosis and treatment of the
member’s injury or sickness; (3) provided in accord with generally accepted medical practice on a national basis; and (4) the most appropriate
supply or level of service which can be provided on a cost-effective basis (including, but not limited to, inpatient vs. outpatient care, electric vs.
manual wheelchair, surgical vs. medical or other types of care). The fact that the member’s physician prescribes services or supplies does not
automatically mean such services or supplies are medically necessary and covered by the Contract.

The Plan defines medical necessity as follows: A medically necessary service or supply means one which is ordered or authorized by the Primary
Care Physician, and which the Primary Care Physician, our medical staff or our Medical Director and/or a qualified party or entity selected by us
determines is: (a) provided for the diagnosis or direct treatment of an injury or sickness; (b) appropriate and consistent with the symptoms and findings or diagnosis and treatment of the member’s injury or sickness; (c) provided in accord with generally accepted medical practice on a national
basis; and (d) the most appropriate supply or level of service which can be provided on a cost-effective basis (including, but not limited to, inpatient
vs. outpatient care, electric vs. manual wheelchair, surgical vs. medical or other types of care). The fact that the member’s physician prescribes
services or supplies does not automatically mean such services or supplies are medically necessary and covered by the Contract.

To be considered “needed”, a service or supply must be determined by Prudential to meet all of these tests: (a) It is ordered by a Doctor; (b) It is
recognized throughout the Doctor’s profession as safe and effective, is required for the diagnosis or treatment of the particular sickness or injury,
and is employed appropriately in a manner and setting consistent with generally accepted United States medical standards; (c) It is neither educational nor experimental or investigational in nature. The case also mentions: “As we read the record, Prudential has modified its definition of
“medical necessary” with the additional requirement the treatment provide a measurable and substantial increase in functional ability for a condition having potential for significant improvement.”

1985 policy defines “medically necessary” as health services which: are appropriate and consistent with the diagnosis and which, in accordance
with accepted medical standards in the State of Louisiana, could not have been omitted without adversely and severely affecting the patient’s
condition; are not primarily custodial care; are appropriate and can be safely used under the circumstances. Inpatient hospital services should be
used only when a lesser equipped facility (e.g., outpatient hospital services, physician’s office, etc) could adversely and severely affect the patient’s
condition. 1987 policy: “Medically Necessary” means a service or treatment which, in the judgment of the plan: (1) Is appropriate and consistent
with the diagnosis and which, in accordance with accepted medical standards in the State of Louisiana, could not have been omitted without
adversely affecting the patient’s condition or the quality of medical care rendered; (2) Is not primarily custodial care; and (3) as to institutional care,
could not have been provided in a physician’s office, in the outpatient department of a hospital, or in a lesser facility without affecting the patient’s
condition or quality of medical care rendered.

Medically Necessary and/or Medical Necessity—Services or supplies provided by a: (1) Hospital, (2) Physician, or (3) other qualified provider...are
medically necessary if they are: (1) required for the diagnosis and/or treatment of the particular condition, disease, injury or illness; (2) consistent
with the symptom or diagnosis and treatment of the condition, disease, injury, or illness; (3) commonly and usually noted throughout the medical
field as proper to treat the diagnosed condition, disease, injury, or illness; and (4) the most fitting supply or level of service which can be safely
given.

Medical Necessity Definition1

1Definitions have been taken verbatim from the relevant document; quotation marks have been omitted.
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Medically necessary is defined as: The extent of services required to diagnose or treat a Bodily Injury or Sickness which is known to be safe and
effective by most Qualified Practitioners who are licensed to diagnose or treat that Bodily Injury or Sickness. Such services must be performed in
the least costly setting required by the patient’s condition, and must not be provided primarily for the convenience of the patient of the Qualified
Practitioner.

The Plan defines ‘necessary’ as follows: A service or supply is necessary if it is for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of a physical or mental condition and widely accepted professionally in the U.S. as effective, appropriate, and essential, based upon recognized standards of the health care
specialty involved.

Medically necessary services and/or supplies are defined as: the use of services or supplies as provided by a hospital, skilled nursing facility,
physician, or other provider required to identify or treat a Member’s illness or injury and which, as determined by the Medical Director, are:
(1) Consistent with the symptoms or diagnosis and treatment of the Covered Person’s condition, disease, ailment or injury; (2) Appropriate with
regard to standards of good medical practice; (3) Not solely for the convenience of the Covered Person, his or her physician, hospital, or other
health care provider; and (4) The most appropriate supply or level of service which can be safely provided to the Covered Person. When specifically applied to an inpatient, it further means that the Covered Person’s medical symptoms or condition requires that the diagnosis or treatment
cannot be safely provided to the Covered Person as an outpatient.

A service is covered as “medically necessary” if Rush finds:
(a) [The service] is furnished or authorized by a Participating Doctor for the diagnosis or the treatment of a Sickness or Injury or for the maintenance of a person’s good health.
(b) The prevailing opinion within the appropriate specialty of the United States medical profession is that [the service] is safe and effective for
its intended use, and that its omission would adversely affect the person’s medical condition.
(c) It is furnished by a provider with appropriate training, experience, staff and facilities to furnish that particular service or supply.

To be “medically necessary” under the Plan, a treatment must meet two requirements, measured under Oregon law. First, the treatment must
be “appropriate and consistent with the diagnosis (in accord with accepted standards of community practice).” Second, “medically necessary”
treatments “could not be omitted without adversely affecting the covered person’s condition or the quality of medical care.”

Benefits will be paid only for “medically necessary” care and treatment of sickness and injury. As used above, ‘medically necessary’ means:
drugs, therapies, or other treatments that are required and appropriate for care of the sickness or the injury; and that are given in accordance with
generally accepted principles of medical practice in the U.S. at the time furnished; and that are approved for reimbursement by the Health Care
Financing Administration; and that are not experimental, educational, or investigational; and that are not furnished in connection with medical or
other research.

Medical Necessity Definition1
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Sven v. Principal
Mutual Life
Insurance
Company

Whitehead v.
Federal Express
Corporation

1996

1994

Medically necessary services or supplies are defined as: (a) Required for diagnosis or treatment of the illness or symptoms; (b) provided for the
diagnosis or direct care and treatment of the illness; (c) Within the standards of normal medical practice; (d) Not primarily for the convenience of
the Participant or any provider; and (e) a supply or level of services required to provide safe and adequate care.

Eligible expenses for treatment of an illness or injury must be medically necessary under all plan options. Medical necessity is determined by the
claims paying administrator. Care that is medically necessary may include, but is not limited to, care that is: *commonly and customarily recognized
as standards of good practice; *appropriate and consistent with the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury; *appropriate supply or level of
service that can be safely provided.

“Medically Necessary Care” is defined as: any confinement, treatment, or service that is prescribed by a physician and determined by the
Company [Principal] to be: (a) necessary and appropriate; and (b) non-experimental and non-investigational and not in conflict with accepted
medical standards.

“Medically Necessary” means any services and supplies provided for the diagnosis and treatment of a specific illness, injury, or condition. Such
services and supplies must be: ordered by a doctor; required for the treatment or management of a medical symptom or condition; the most efficient and economical service which can safely be provided to such person; and provided in accordance with approved and generally accepted
medical or surgical practice. We may require proof in writing satisfactorily to us that any type of treatment, service, or suppy received is medically
necessary. Medical necessity will be determined solely by us. The fact that a doctor may prescribe, order, recommend, or approve a service does
not, in itself, make such service or supply medically necessary.

Medical Necessity Definition1

1Definitions have been taken verbatim from the relevant document; quotation marks have been omitted.
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None
For the purpose of this act, “medical necessity” means the providing of covered health services or products that a prudent physician
would provide to a patient for the purpose of diagnosing or treating an illness, injury, or disease or its symptoms, in a manner that is:
(1) In accordance with the generally accepted standards of medical practice; (2) Consistent with the symptoms or treatment of the condition;
and (3) Not solely for anyone’s convenience.

None

None

Ark. Code
§ 23-99-507 (2001)

Cal. Wel. & Inst.
Code
§ 14059.5 (2001)

None

None

16 Del. Code
§ 9119 (2000)
(IRO Statute)

None

Fla. Stat.
§ 627.732 (2001)

O.C.G.A.
§ 33-20A-31
(2000) (IRO
Statute)

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

District of
Columbia

Florida

Georgia

(5) “Medical necessity,” “medically necessary care,” or “medically necessary and appropriate” means care based upon generally accepted
medical practices in light of conditions at the time of treatment which is: (A) Appropriate and consistent with the diagnosis and the omission
of which could adversely affect or fail to improve the eligible enrollee’s condition; (B) Compatible with the standards of acceptable medical
practice in the United States; (C) Provided in a safe and appropriate setting given the nature of the diagnosis and the severity of the symptoms;
(D) Not provided solely for the convenience of the eligible enrollee or the convenience of the health care provider or hospital; and (E) Not
primarily custodial care, unless custodial care is a covered benefit under the eligible enrollee’s evidence of coverage.

“Medically necessary” refers to a medical service or supply that a prudent physician would provide for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing,
or treating an illness, injury, disease, or symptom in a manner that is: (a) In accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice;
(b) Clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and duration; and (c) Not primarily for the convenience of the patient, physician, or other health care provider.

None

None

“Medically necessary” or “medical necessity”: A service is “medically necessary” or a “medical necessity” when it is reasonable and
necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain.

(b) The term “medical necessity” as applied to benefits for mental illness and developmental disorders means: (1) Reasonable and necessary
for the diagnosis or treatment of a mental illness, or to improve or to maintain or to prevent deterioration of functioning resulting from the
illness or developmental disorder; (2) Furnished in the most appropriate and least restrictive setting in which services can be safely provided;
(3) The most appropriate level or supply of service which can safely be provided; and (4) Could not have been omitted without adversely
affecting the individual’s mental or physical health, or both, or the quality of care rendered.

None

None

None

Alabama

None

Statute/Regulation

State

Medical Necessity Definition1
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Iowa Code 514J.5

None

None

None

24-A M.R.S.
§ 4301-A (11)
(2000)

COMAR
§ 10.09.62.01
(2001)

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

“Medical necessity” means what is medically necessary and appropriate.

Medical Necessity. “Medical necessity” means health care services or products that a prudent physician or other health care practitioner
would provide to an enrollee for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, injury, disease, or the symptoms of an illness,
injury, or disease in a manner that is: (A) In accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice; (B) Clinically appropriate in
terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and duration; and (C) Not primarily for the convenience of the enrollee or physician or other health care
practitioner.

None

None

None

Medical necessity is defined as the insurer’s plan defines it.

None

1 Definitions have been taken verbatim from the relevant document; quotation marks have been omitted.

(Medicaid
Managed Care
Regulations)

None

215 ILCS 105/2
(2001)

Illinois

Indiana

None

None

Idaho

“Medically necessary” means that a service, drug, or supply is necessary and appropriate for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury
in accord with generally accepted standards of medical practice at the time the service, drug, or supply is provided. When specifically applied
to a confinement it further means that the diagnosis or treatment of the covered person’s medical symptoms or condition cannot be safely
provided to that person as an outpatient. A service, drug, or supply shall not be medically necessary if it: (i) is investigational, experimental, or
for research purposes; or (ii) is provided solely for the convenience of the patient, the patient’s family, physician, hospital, or any other provider;
or (iii) exceeds in scope, duration, or intensity that level of care that is needed to provide safe, adequate, and appropriate diagnosis or treatment; or (iv) could have been omitted without adversely affecting the covered person’s condition or the quality of medical care; or (v) involves
the use of a medical device, drug, or substance not formally approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration.

Medical necessity (b) A health intervention is medically necessary if it is recommended by the treating physician or treating licensed health
care provider, is approved by the health plan’s medical director or physician designee, and is: (1) For the purpose of treating a medical condition; (2) The most appropriate delivery or level of service, considering potential benefits and harms to the patient; (3) Known to be effective in
improving health outcomes; provided that: (A) Effectiveness is determined first by scientific evidence; (B) If no scientific evidence exists, then
by professional standards of care; and (C) If no professional standards of care exist or if they exist but are outdated or contradictory, then by
expert opinion; and (4) Cost-effective for the medical condition being treated compared to alternative health interventions, including no intervention. For the purposes of this paragraph, cost-effective shall not necessarily mean lowest price.

HRS § 432E-1.4
(2000) (IRO
Statute)

Hawaii

Medical Necessity Definition1

Statute/Regulation

State
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None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Proposed
Legislation

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New
Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

A.5048a (2001)
(In Assembly
Committee on
Rules as of
January 9, 2002)

Minn. Stat. § 62Q.53 “Medically necessary care” means health care services appropriate, in terms of type, frequency, level, setting, and duration, to the enrollee’s
(2000) (IRO Statute) diagnosis or condition, and diagnostic testing and preventive services. Medically necessary care must be consistent with generally accepted
practice parameters as determined by health care providers in the same or similar general specialty as typically manages the condition, procedure, or treatment at issue and must: (1) help restore or maintain the enrollee’s health; or (2) prevent deterioration of the enrollee’s condition.

Minnesota

PROPOSED DEFINITION: “medically necessary” means, with respect to a health care service, that it has been reasonably determined, and
could be shown, by the enrollee’s health care professional in consultation with the patient, or could be reasonably determined and shown
by a health care professional in consultation with the patient, to be consistent with the enrollee’s condition, circumstances and best interests in relation to type, frequency, site and duration, and with professional health care practice, unless it is reasonably shown by means of
substantial medical and scientific literature, and considering the enrollee’s condition, circumstances and best interests, that either (a) that
the health care service would be unsafe or ineffective, or (b) that the health care plan’s preferred health care service or no service would
lead to an equally good outcome. “Medical necessity” is the quality of being medically necessary. All definitions in section forty-nine
hundred of this chapter shall apply to this subdivision.

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Michigan

Medical Necessity Definition1
“Medical necessity” or “medically necessary.” health care services that are consistent with generally accepted principles of professional
medical practice.

Statute/Regulation

Massachusetts Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 176O (1) (2001)
(IRO Statute)

State
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Medical Necessity Definition1

O.A.C.
§ 317:30-5-46
(2000)
(Statute
regarding
inpatient
psychiatric
facilities)

Oklahoma

1 Definitions have been taken verbatim from the relevant document; quotation marks have been omitted.

(C) Medical necessity criteria for continued stay—acute psychiatric admission. Continued stay—acute psychiatric admissions must meet all
of the conditions set forth in (i) to (iv) of this subparagraph.

(III) Physiological evidence or expectation of withdrawal symptoms which require 24-hour medical supervision.

(II) Needs extensive treatment under physician direction.

(I) Stabilization of acute psychiatric symptoms.

(v) Requires secure 24-hour nursing/medical supervision as evidenced by:

(IV) Specifically described episodes of incapacitating depression or psychosis that result in an inability to function or care for basic needs.

(III) Specifically described episodes of unprovoked significant physical aggression and patterns of escalating physical aggression in intensity
and duration.

(II) Specifically described patterns of escalating incidents of self-mutilating behaviors.

(I) Specifically described suicide attempts, suicide intent, or serious threat by the patient.

(iv) Within the past 48 hours the behaviors present an imminent life threatening emergency such as evidenced by:

(iii) It has been determined by the Gatekeeper that the current disabling symptoms could not have been managed or have not been manageable in a lesser intensive treatment program.

(ii) Conditions are directly attributable to a mental disorder as the primary need for professional attention (this does not include placement
issues, criminal behavior, status offenses). Adjustment or substance related disorder may be a secondary Axis I diagnosis.

(i) Any DSM-IV-R Axis 1 primary diagnosis with the exception of V-codes, adjustment disorders, and substance related disorders, accompanied
by a detailed description of the symptoms supporting the diagnosis. In lieu of a qualifying Axis I diagnosis, children 18-21 years of age may
have an Axis II diagnosis of any personality disorder.

(B) Medical necessity criteria for acute psychiatric admissions. Acute psychiatric admissions for children 13 or older must meet the terms and
conditions contained in (i), (ii), (iii) and two of the (iv)(I) to (v)(III) of this subparagraph. Children 12 or younger must meet the terms or conditions
contained in (i), (ii), (iii) and one of (iv)(I) to (iv)(IV), and one of (v)(I) to (v)(III) of this subparagraph.

None

None

Ohio

Medical Necessity—An insurer that limits its health benefit plan coverage to medically necessary services and supplies shall define “medically
necessary services or supplies” in its health benefit plan as those covered services or supplies that are: (1) Provided for the diagnosis, treatment, cure, or relief of a condition, illness, injury, or disease; and, except as allowed under G.S.58-3-255, not for experimental, investigational,
or cosmetic purposes. (2) Necessary for and appropriate to the diagnosis, treatment, cure, or relief of a health condition, illness, injury,
disease, or its symptoms. (3) Within generally accepted standards of medical care in the community. (4) Not solely for the convenience
of the insured, the insured’s family, or the provider. For medically necessary services, nothing in this subsection precludes an insurer from
comparing the cost-effectiveness of alternative services or supplies when determining which of the services or supplies will be covered.
None

G.S. § 58-3-200(b)

North
Carolina

North Dakota None

Statute/Regulation

State
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Statute/Regulation

O.A.C.
§ 317:30-5-46
(2000) (Statute
regarding inpatient psychiatric
facilities)

State

Oklahoma

Table 4. Continued

(F) Medical necessity criteria for admission—residential treatment (psychiatric and chemical dependency). Residential Treatment Center
admissions must meet the terms and conditions in (i) to (iv) and one of (v)(I)-(v)(IV), and one of (vi)(I)-(vi)(III) of this subparagraph.

(E) Medical necessity criteria for continued stay—inpatient chemical dependency program. No continued stay in inpatient chemical dependency
program is allowed. Initial certification for admission is limited to up to five days; exceptions may be made up to seven to eight days based on
a case-by-case review.

(IV) Physiological evidence or expectation of withdrawal symptoms which require 24-hour medical supervision.

(III) Need extensive treatment under physician direction.

(II) Need for stabilization of acute psychiatric symptoms.

(I) Need for active and aggressive pharmacological interventions.

(iv) Requires secure 24-hour nursing/medical supervision as evidenced by:

(iii) It has been determined by the gatekeeper that the current disabling symptoms could not be managed or have not been manageable in a
lesser intensive treatment program.

(ii) Conditions are directly attributable to a substance dependency disorder as the primary need for professional attention (this does not include
placement issues, criminal behavior, status offenses).

(i) Any psychoactive substance dependency disorder described in DSM-IV-R with detailed symptoms supporting the diagnosis and need for
medical detoxification, except for cannabis, nicotine, or caffeine dependencies.

(D) Medical necessity criteria for admission—inpatient chemical dependency detoxification. Inpatient chemical dependency detoxification
admissions must meet the terms and conditions contained in (i), (ii), (iii), and one of (iv)(I)-(v)(IV).

(iv) Documented efforts of working with child’s family, legal guardians and/or custodians and other human service agencies toward a tentative
discharge date.

(iii) Conditions are directly attributable to a mental disorder as the primary need for professional attention (this does not include placement
issues, criminal behavior, status offenses).

(II) If condition is unchanged, evidence of re-evaluation of treatment objectives and therapeutic interventions.

(I) Documentation of regression is measured in behavioral terms.

(ii) Patient continues to manifest a severity of illness that requires an acute level of care as defined in the admission criteria and which could
not be provided in a less restrictive setting.

(i) Any DSM-IV-R axis 1 primary diagnosis with the exception of V-Codes, adjustment disorders, and substance abuse related disorders,
accompanied by a detailed description of the symptoms supporting the diagnosis. In lieu of a qualifying Axis I diagnosis, children 18–20 years
of age may have an Axis II diagnosis or any personality disorder. Adjustment or substance related disorders may be a secondary Axis I
diagnosis.

Medical Necessity Definition1
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O.A.C.
§ 317:30-5-46
(2000) (Statute
regarding inpatient psychiatric
facilities)

Oklahoma

Medical Necessity Definition1

(IV) There are documented efforts and evidence of active involvement with the family, guardian, child welfare worker, extended family, etc.

(III) There is active, ongoing psychiatric treatment and documented progress toward the treatment objective and discharge.

(II) Patient has made gains toward social responsibility and independence.

(I) Progress is measured in behavioral terms and reflected in the patient’s treatment and discharge plans.

(iii) Patient is making measurable progress toward the treatment objectives specified in the treatment plan.

(ii) Conditions are directly attributed to a mental disorder as the primary reason for continued stay (this does not include placement issues,
criminal behavior, status offenses).

(i) Any DSM-IV-R Axis 1 primary diagnosis with the exception of V codes, adjustment disorders, and substance abuse related disorders,
accompanied by detailed symptoms supporting the diagnosis. In lieu of a qualifying Axis I diagnosis, children 18–20 years of age may have
an Axis II diagnosis of any personality disorder.

(G) Medical necessity criteria for continued stay—residential treatment center. Continued stay residential treatment center admissions must
meet the terms and conditions contained in (i); (ii); and either (iii) or (iv); and (v); and (vi) of this subparagraph.

(III) Intensive treatment in preparation for re-entry into community.

(II) Intensive treatment with the family/guardian and child in a structured milieu.

(I) Intensive behavioral management.

(vi) Requires 24-hour observation and treatment as evidenced by:

(IV) Current incapacitating psychosis or depression.

(III) Serious threats or evidence of physical aggression.

(II) History of or current self-injurious behavior.

(I) Suicidal ideation and/or threat.

(v) Patient demonstrates escalating pattern of self injurious or assaultive behaviors as evidenced by:

(iv) Child must be medically stable.

(iii) Patient has either received treatment in an acute care setting or it has been determined by the gatekeeper that the current disabling
symptoms could not or have not been manageable in a less intensive treatment program.

(ii) Conditions are directly attributed to a mental disorder as the primary reason for professional attention (this does not include placement
issues, criminal behavior, status offenses).

(i) Any DSM-IV-R Axis 1 primary diagnosis with the exception of V-codes, adjustment disorders, and substance related disorders, accompanied
by detailed symptoms supporting the diagnosis. In lieu of a qualifying Axis I diagnosis, children 18–20 years of age may have an Axis II diagnosis
or any personality disorder. Adjustment or substance related disorders may be a secondary Axis I diagnosis.

1 Definitions have been taken verbatim from the relevant document; quotation marks have been omitted.

Statute/Regulation

State
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None
None
None

O.A.C.
§ 317:30-5-46
(2000) (Statute
regarding inpatient psychiatric
facilities)

None

None

Oregon

Pennsylvania None

None

Oklahoma

Rhode Island

South
Carolina

Medical Necessity Definition1

None

(C) If a denial decision is made, a reconsideration request may be made directly to the OHCA designated agent within ten (10) working
days of notification of the denial. The agent will return a decision within ten (10) working days from the time of receiving the reconsideration
request. If the denial decision is upheld, the denial can be appealed to the Oklahoma Health Care Authority within 20 working days of
notification of the denial by the OHCA designated agent.

(B) Extension requests (psychiatric) must be made through the OHCA designated agent. All requests shall be made prior to the expiration
of the approved extension following the guidelines in the Gatekeeping Manual. Extension requests for the continued stay of a child who has
been in an acute psychiatric program for a period of thirty (30) days will require a face to face evaluation by the gatekeeper. Requests for
the continued stay of a child who has been in an acute psychiatric program for a period of sixty (60) days will require a review of all treatment
documentation completed by the OHCA designated agent.

(A) Pre-authorization and extension procedures. Pre-admission authorization for inpatient psychiatric services must be requested from
the OHCA designated agent. The OHCA or designated agent will evaluate and render a decision within 24 hours of receiving the request.
A Certificate of Need will be issued by the OHCA or its designated agent, if the recipient meets medical necessity criteria.

(vi) Documented efforts of working with child’s family, legal guardian and/or custodian and other human service agencies toward a tentative
discharge date.

(III) Intensive treatment in preparation for re-entry into community.

(II) Intensive treatment with the family/guardian and child in a structured milieu.

(I) Intensive behavioral management.

(v) There is documented continuing need for 24-hour observation and treatment as evidenced by:

(II) If condition is unchanged, there is evidence of re-evaluation of the treatment objectives and therapeutic interventions.

(I) Documentation of regression is measured in behavioral terms.

(iv) Child’s condition has remained unchanged or worsened.

Statute/Regulation

State

Table 4. Continued

Medical Necessity in Private Health Plans 63

None

Wyoming

1 Definitions have been taken verbatim from the relevant document; quotation marks have been omitted.

None

None

None

Wisconsin

Medical necessity for inpatient care means a requested service which is reasonably calculated to: (a) Diagnose, correct, cure or alleviate a
mental disorder; or (b) prevent the worsening of mental conditions that endanger life or cause suffering and pain, or result in illness or infirmity
or threaten to cause or aggravate a handicap, or cause physical deformity or malfunction, and there is no adequate less restrictive alternative
available.
None

Rev. Code Wash.
§ 71.34.020 (2001)
(mental health
services for
minors)

Washington

“Medical necessity” or “medically necessary” means appropriate and necessary health care services which are rendered for any condition
which, according to generally accepted principles of good medical practice, requires the diagnosis or direct care and treatment of an illness,
injury, or pregnancy-related condition, and are not provided only as a convenience.

West Virginia None

Va. Code Ann. §
38.2-5800 (2001)
(IRO Statute)

Virginia

None

None

None

None

Utah

Vermont

None

None

Texas

None

None

Tennessee

State
Statute/Regulation
Medical Necessity Definition1
South Dakota S.D. Codified
Medically necessary hospital services are services provided in a hospital which meet the following criteria: (1) Are consistent with the
Laws 28-13-27.1
person’s symptoms, diagnosis, condition, or injury; (2) Are recognized as the prevailing standard and are consistent with generally accepted
(2001)
professional medical standards of the provider’s peer group; (3) Are provided in response to a life-threatening condition; to treat pain, injury,
illness, or infection; to treat a condition which would result in physical or mental disability; or to achieve a level of physical or mental function
consistent with prevailing standards for the diagnosis or condition; (4) Are not furnished primarily for the convenience of the person or the
provider; and (5) There is no other equally effective course of treatment available or suitable for the person needing the services which is
more conservative or substantially less costly. A court shall rely on the attending physician’s determination as to medical necessity of hospital
services unless evidence exists to the contrary.

Table 4. Continued

64 Special Report
D.C. Code § 44-301.07 (2001)
Fl. Stat. §§ 408.7056 (2001)
Ga. Code § 33-20A-32 (2001)
Hi. Rev. Stat. § 432E-6 (2001)

√

√

√

√

√

Delaware

District of
Columbia

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

La. Rev. Stat. § 22:3081 (2001)
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A § 4323 (2001)

√

√

Kansas
Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Minn. Stat. § 62Q.73 (2000)
√
√

√

√

√

Minnesota

Mississippi
Missouri

Montana

Mont. Code § 33-37-102 (2001)
Mont. Admin. R. § 37.108.315 (2001)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 376.1385 (2000) 20 C.S.R. 100-5.020 (2001)

Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 550.1901-1929 (2001)

√

Michigan

Md. Ins. Code § 15-10A-03 (2001)
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 1760, § 14 (2001) 105 C.M.R. 128.00 (2001)

Ind. Code § 27-13-10.1-1 (2001)
Iowa Code §§ 514J.1 to .14 (2001)
Kan. Stat. §§ 40-22a13-16 (2000)
Ky. Stat. § 304.17A-623 (2001)

√
√
√
√

Indiana
Iowa

Maryland
√
Massachusetts √

215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 125, § 4-10 (2001)

√

Conn. Agencies Regs. §§ 38a-478n-1 to 5 (2001)

Illinois

√
√

Del Code tit. 16 § 9119 (2001)

√

√

Connecticut

Idaho

Cal. Ins. Code § 10169 (2001) Proposed Regulation at Cal. Reg. Law Bulletin 2001-39 CRLB 500 (Sept. 28, 2001)
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-16-113.5 Colo. Ins. Reg. 4-2-21 (2000)

√
√

√
√
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-478n (2001)

Alaska Stat. § 21.07.050 (2001)
Arizona Rev. Stat. § 20-2537 (2001)

√

Citations

√

IRO Regulations
(√ if yes)

Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado

IRO Statute
(√ if yes)

Alaska

Alabama

Jurisdiction

Table 5. State Independent Review Statutes and Regulations
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√

√

New York

√
√

Virginia
√
Washington √
West Virginia √
Wisconsin

Wyoming

Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.58A 28 Tex. Adm. Code 12.5 (2001)
Utah Code § 31A-22-629 (2001) Proposed Regulation at 2001-23 Utah Bull. 126 (Dec. 1, 2001)

√
√
√

Texas
Utah
Vermont

Va. Code §§ 38.2-5900 – 5905 (2001) 14 VAC 5-215-10 (2001)
Wash. Rev. Code § 48.43.535 (2001) WAC § 246-305-050 (2001)
W.Va. Code § 33-25C-6 (effective July 1, 2002)

For Mental Health Services:
VT. Stat. Tit. 8, § 4089a (2001)
Regulation 95-2 (2001)

Tenn. Code § 56-32-227 (2001)
√
√
√

√

Tennessee

For Physical Health Services:
VT. Stat. tit. 8, § 4089f (2001)
Regulation H-99-1 (2001)

S.C. Code §§ 38-71-1910-2060

40 Pa. Stat. § 991.2162 (2001) 28 Pa. Code § 9.501 (2001)
R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-17.12-10 (2001) R23-17.12-I-UR (2001)

Or. Legis. ch. 266 (effective date July 1, 2002)

South
√
Carolina
South Dakota

Pennsylvania √
Rhode Island √

√

Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2528.3 (2001)

√

Oregon

Ohio Rev. Code § 1751.84 (2001)

√

Oklahoma

2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 446 (S.B. 199) (2001)

N.Y. Ins. Law § 4910 (2001) 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 410.1 (2001)

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-A-57-1 (2001)
N.M. Adm. Code tit. 13, § 10.17.24 (2001)

N.J. Stat. §§ 26:2S-11 to 26:2S-12 (2001)
N.J. Adm. Code § 8:38A-3.6

N.H. Rev. Stat. 420-J:5 (2000)

Citations

Ohio

North Dakota

√
√

√

√

New Mexico

North Carolina √

√

√

New Jersey

IRO Regulations
(√ if yes)

√

IRO Statute
(√ if yes)

Nevada
New
Hampshire

Nebraska

Jurisdiction
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Medical Necessity
Definition in
Insurance Content
Statutes (Y/N)

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

N

State

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

District of
Columbia

Florida

Georgia
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

IRO Statute
(Y/N)

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

N

N

N

Medical Necessity
Definition in IRO
Statute

(5) “Medical necessity,” “medically necessary care,” or “medically necessary and
appropriate” means care based upon generally accepted medical practices in light
of conditions at the time of treatment which is: (A) Appropriate and consistent with
the diagnosis and the omission of which could adversely affect or fail to improve
the eligible enrollee’s condition; (B) Compatible with the standards of acceptable
medical practice in the United States; (C) Provided in a safe and appropriate setting
given the nature of the diagnosis and the severity of the symptoms; (D) Not provided
solely for the convenience of the eligible enrollee or the convenience of the health
care provider or hospital; and (E) Not primarily custodial care, unless custodial care
is a covered benefit under the eligible enrollee’s evidence of coverage.
O.C.G.A. § 33-20A-31 (2000)

For the purpose of this act, “medical necessity” means the providing of covered
health services or products that a prudent physician would provide to a patient for
the purpose of diagnosing or treating an illness, injury, or disease or its symptoms,
in a manner that is: (1) In accordance with the generally accepted standards of
medical practice; (2) Consistent with the symptoms or treatment of the condition;
and (3) Not solely for anyone’s convenience. 16 Del. Code § 9119 (2000)

IRO Statute Definition

Table 6. Medical Necessity Definitions: State Insurance Laws and IRO Statutes
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N

N

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Illinois

Iowa

Y

Idaho

Y

N

State
Hawaii

Indiana

Medical Necessity
Definition in
Insurance Content
Statutes (Y/N)
N
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Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

IRO Statute
(Y/N)
Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Medical Necessity
Definition in IRO
Statute
Y

“Medical necessity” or “medically necessary,” health care services that are consistent with generally accepted principles of professional medical practice. Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 176O (1) (2001)

“Medically necessary health care” means health care services or products provided
to an enrollee for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing or treating an illness, injury
or disease or the symptoms of an illness, injury or disease in a manner that is
(A) consistent with generally accepted standards of medical practice; (B) clinically
appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site and duration; (C) demonstrated
through scientific evidence to be effective in improving health outcomes; (D) representative of “best practices” in the medical profession; and (E) not primarily for the
convenience of the enrollee or physician or other health care practitioner. 24-A
MRSA § 4301-A(10-A).

Medical necessity is defined as the insurer’s plan defines it. Iowa Code 514J.5

IRO Statute Definition
Medical necessity (b) A health intervention is medically necessary if it is recommended by the treating physician or treating licensed health care provider, is
approved by the health plan’s medical director or physician designee, and is: (1) For
the purpose of treating a medical condition; (2) The most appropriate delivery or level
of service, considering potential benefits and harms to the patient; (3) Known to be
effective in improving health outcomes; provided that: (A) Effectiveness is determined
first by scientific evidence; (B) If no scientific evidence exists, then by professional
standards of care; and (C) If no professional standards of care exist or if they exist
but are outdated or contradictory, then by expert opinion; and (4) Cost-effective for
the medical condition being treated compared to alternative health interventions,
including no intervention. For the purposes of this paragraph, cost-effective shall not
necessarily mean lowest price. HRS § 432E-1.4 (2000)
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Medical Necessity
Definition in
Insurance Content
Statutes (Y/N)

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

State

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Vermont
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Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

N

Y

IRO Statute
(Y/N)

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Medical Necessity
Definition in IRO
Statute
IRO Statute Definition
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Medical Necessity
Definition in
Insurance Content
Statutes (Y/N)

N

N

N

N

N

State

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming
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N

N

Y

Y

Y

IRO Statute
(Y/N)

N

N

Y

Medical Necessity
Definition in IRO
Statute

“Medical necessity” or “medically necessary” means appropriate and necessary
health care services which are rendered for any condition which, according to
generally accepted principles of good medical practice, requires the diagnosis or
direct care and treatment of an illness, injury, or pregnancy-related condition, and
are not provided only as a convenience. Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5800 (2001)

IRO Statute Definition
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Specifies that licensed psychologists may be reviewers for IROs, with Insurance Department approval. Licensed psychologists may not review
denials regarding inpatient care or prescription drugs. 28 Pa. Code § 9.504 (2001).

Establishes a separate independent review system for mental health services, including substance abuse treatment. 8 Vt. Stat. § 4089a (2001).
Provides for a seven-member Independent Panel of Mental Health Care Providers appointed by Insurance Commissioner to review mental health
service decisions. The Panel must include at least one psychiatrist, psychologist, mental health social worker, psychiatric nurse, mental health
counselor, and drug and alcohol counselor.

Vermont

Content of Behavioral Health Provision

Pennsylvania

Jurisdiction

Table 7. State Independent Review Statutes With Specific Behavioral Health Provisions
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√
√
√
√

√

√

√
√
√
√

√

√ (noted “when
necessary”)
√

√

Department of
Health
Department of
Insurance
Department of
Insurance
Department of
Insurance
Department of
Health
Department of
Insurance
Agency for Health
Care Administration

Department of
Health Planning
Division
Commissioner of
Insurance

IRO using physicians and other health professionals licensed in Arizona or another
state (if board-certified or eligible).

IRO certified by Insurance Commissioner and using health care providers licensed in
California and board-certified.

IRO certified by Insurance Commissioner and using physicians or other health care
professionals.

IRO may include medical peer review organizations, independent utilization review
companies, or nationally recognized health experts or institutions approved by the
Insurance Commissioner.

IRO certified by Secretary of Health or accredited by an independent national
accrediting organization and includes licensed and board-certified physicians or
other appropriate health care providers.

IRO consisting of at least two physicians licensed in D.C., Maryland, or Virginia
(exceptions when necessary due to the condition under review) who have meaningful
experience in prior utilization review.

IRO panel consisting of individuals from the Agency for Health Care Administration,
the Department of Insurance, a consumer, a physician appointed by the Governor,
physicians with relevant expertise to case at issue (rotating pool), and a medical
director from an MCO (not a party) and a primary care physician.

IRO with licensed and board-certified health care providers certified by the
Department of Health Planning Division.

Three-member panel appointed by the Insurance Commissioner and composed
of a representative from the managed care plan not involved in the complaint, a
provider licensed in Hawaii not involved in the complaint, and the Commissioner
or Commissioner’s designee. The Commissioner may also retain an IRO to assist
in the review.

Arizona

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

District of
Columbia

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

√

√

√

MCO

Certified appeal agency using panels of “two clinical peers.” Agency must be certified
by a private standard-setting organization approved by Department of Health or a
health insurer operating in state.

Alaska

Conflict of
Interest
Prohibition
(√ if yes)

Reviewer

Entity that
Selects
Reviewer

Requirement
that Reviewer Have
Relevant Expertise
or Particular Case?
(√ if yes)

Jurisdiction

Table 8. Qualifications of External Reviewer in State IRO Statutes
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√

√

√
√

√
√

√

√

√

√
√

√
√

√

MCO (but must go
through the entire
list of certified IROs
before selecting the
same one again)
MCO selects from
list of certified IROs

Commissioner of
Insurance

Department of
Insurance
MCO

Insurance Bureau
Commissioner of
Insurance

Department of
Public Health,
Office of Patient
Protection

IRO certified by the Department of Insurance assigns a medical review professional
who is licensed and board certified in applicable specialty for the appeal and who
has knowledge about the proposed service at issue.

IROs certified by the Insurance Commissioner may include (but are not limited to)
medical peer review organizations and nationally recognized health experts or
institution. Individual reviewer must hold applicable health care license and be
board-certified.

IRO under contract with Commissioner of Insurance. IRO must have experience in
administering Kansas health programs or be a nationally accredited external review
organization that uses Kansas health care providers to conduct the review (unless no
Kansas providers are qualified and credentialed in the specialty at issue in the case)

IROs must use a reviewer(s) with the appropriate license, board certification, and
clinical experience applicable to the medical condition under review.

IRO must be licensed by the Insurance Commissioner and have qualified and impartial clinical peer reviewers who hold appropriate licenses and board certification in
the specialty at issue and have clinical expertise in the relevant medical condition.

IRO must have qualified and impartial reviewers who hold applicable licenses and
board certification with respect to the adverse health care treatment under review.

The Commissioner may make a determination on a patient’s appeal or designate
an IRO to do so. An IRO must have qualified and impartial reviewers who hold
applicable licenses and board certification with respect to the adverse health care
treatment under review.

Department of Public Health’s Office of Patient Protection contracts with “unrelated
and objective” review agencies and refers appeals to them on a random basis.
Reviewers are to be actively practicing health care professionals in the same or
similar specialty who typically treat the medical condition, perform the procedure
or provide the treatment under review.

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky1

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

review entity found in favor of the insurer and no new clinical evidence is available. Ken. Rev. Stat. ß 304.17A-623(6).

1 A patient cannot obtain an external review if the subject of the patient’s adverse determination has previously gone through the external review process and the independent

√

√

MCO

A physician who holds the same class of license as the patient’s primary care physician and who is appointed by the patient, the primary care physician, and the MCO.

Illinois

Conflict of
Interest
Prohibition
(√ if yes)

Reviewer

Entity that
Selects
Reviewer

Requirement
that Reviewer Have
Relevant Expertise
or Particular Case?
(√ if yes)

Jurisdiction
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Insurance
Department

Party seeking review and the MCO may agree upon a peer to conduct the review
(a peer is defined as “a health care provider actively practicing in this state who
has substantially the same education and training...who provides substantially the
same service...who has the same license or certification...as the provider whose
practice...[is] being considered, reviewed, evaluated or judged.”
If the parties cannot agree on a peer, then the Insurance Department designates
an IRO.
Commissioner of Insurance certifies IROs. Reviewers must hold appropriate licenses
and board certification in the specialty at issue and have clinical expertise in the
relevant medical condition.

Montana

√
Superintendent of
Insurance

The Superintendent of Insurance designates a hearing officer (an attorney licensed
in New Mexico) and two medical co-hearing officers (at least one of whom practices
in a specialty that would typically manage the case that is the subject of the review).

New Mexico

plan (involving other enrollees, representatives of the plan not involved in the case, and clinicians not involved in the case). The third level is independent review and is the level
addressed in this analysis. See Rev. Stat. Mo. ß 376.1385 (2000).

2 Missouri has three levels of review for adverse medical determinations. The first level is internal to the health plan, and the second level is external but arranged by the health

Provides “when necessary” but does not
require (and does not
define “when necessary” but implies this
determination is in the
discretion of the IRO).
Commissioner of
Health

IROs conduct an initial review through a registered professional nurse or physician
licensed in New Jersey, and, when necessary, refer all cases to a consultant physician in the specialty or area of practice that generally would manage the type of
treatment that is the subject of the appeal.

√
Commissioner of
Insurance

New Jersey

New Hampshire

Director of
Insurance

IRO under contract to the Department of Insurance.

Missouri2

Requires disclosure of potential
conflicts to
Superintendent
but does not
prohibit
conflicts

√

√

√

√

Commissioners of
Health,
Administration

IRO under contract to Commissioner of Health and using qualified reviewers.

Minnesota

√

√

√

Commissioner of
Insurance

IROs approved by Commissioner of Insurance. IROs must use reviewers licensed
and board-certified in the applicable specialty and who have had an active clinical
practice in the last year in which the reviewer “devoted a majority of his or her time
in . . . the specialty most relevant to the subject of the review.”

Michigan

Conflict of
Interest
Prohibition
(√ if yes)

Reviewer

Entity that
Selects
Reviewer

Requirement
that Reviewer Have
Relevant Expertise
or Particular Case?
(√ if yes)

Jurisdiction
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√

To Be
Determined

√

√

To Be Determined

√

MCO chooses from
Department of
Health-certified
organizations.
Director of
Business and
Consumer Affairs
Department
Insurance
Commissioner (or
MCO if Insurance
Commissioner fails
to assign IRO within
2 business days of
request for external
review)
Designated by
Insurance Director

MCO selects IRO from a list of organizations certified by the Department of Health.
Reviewers have the appropriate license, board certification, and clinical experience
applicable to the medical condition under review.

When legislation becomes effective (July 1, 2002), Director of Business and
Consumer Affairs Department will contract with IROs qualified under regulations
to be developed prior to July 1, 2002.

Insurance Commissioner assigns IRO on a rotating basis from list of approved organizations. IRO reviewers must have the appropriate license, board certification, and
clinical experience applicable to the medical condition under review. Reviewers
may include licensed psychologists (although they cannot review denials of inpatient
care or prescription drugs).

Insurance Department certifies IROs. Reviewer must be a physician, dentist, or other
health care professional of the specialty relevant to the care or service under review.

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania3

3 Pennsylvania allows an MCO and provider to agree to an alternate dispute resolution system in a written contract if the Insurance Department approves of the alternate system.

Rhode Island

If Insurance Commissioner fails to assign an IRO within 2 business days of the
request for review, the MCO may assign an IRO from list of organizations approved
by Insurance Department.

40 Pa. Stat. ß 991.2162.

√

√

√

Insurance
Superintendent
(MCO chooses
among two IROs
selected at
random)

Insurance Superintendent accredits IROs and maintains a list of approved organizations. Upon a request for external appeal, Superintendent provides two IROs chosen
at random from the list, and the MCO chooses one of them. One reviewer conducts
the review (unless the MCO or IRO determines that more than one is necessary),
and the reviewer(s) must have the appropriate license, board certification, and
clinical experience applicable to the medical condition under review.

Ohio

√

√

√

Insurance
Commissioner

Insurance Commissioner assigns IRO on a rotating basis from list of approved
organizations. IRO reviewers must have the appropriate license, board certification,
and clinical experience applicable to the medical condition under review.

North Carolina

√

√

The Superintendent of Insurance and the Commissioner of Health certify IROs and
randomly assign appeals to them. IRO reviewers must have the appropriate license,
board certification, and clinical experience applicable to the medical condition under
review.

New York

Superintendent
of Insurance and
Commissioner of
Health

Reviewer

Jurisdiction

Conflict of
Interest
Prohibition
(√ if yes)

Entity that
Selects
Reviewer

Requirement
that Reviewer Have
Relevant Expertise
or Particular Case?
(√ if yes)
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√

√
Department of
Insurance

The Department of Insurance certifies IROs, which must use at least one physician
or other health care provider knowledgeable about the health care service under
review.

West Virginia4

W. Va. Code ß 33-25C-6.

√

√
Department of
Health

Department of Health certifies IROs and maintains registry for assignment.
Reviewers must have five years of clinical experience and have the appropriate
license and board certification applicable to the medical condition. Under review.

Washington

4 West Virginia allows MCOs an exemption from the IRO statute if the MCO has an external review plan approved by the Department of Insurance.

√

√
Bureau of
Insurance

IROs contract with the Bureau of Insurance. Reviewers must have the appropriate
license and board certification applicable to the medical condition under review.

√

Virginia

An Independent Panel of Mental Health Care Providers reviews decisions
involving mental health services, including drug and alcohol treatment.

√

MCO

MCO designates IRO, which must be impartial.

Utah

Commissioner of
BISHCA

√

√

Department of
Insurance

Department of Insurance assigns IROs randomly from an approved list. Reviewers
must be in active practice and have the appropriate license and board certification
applicable to the medical condition under review.

Texas

Commissioner of Department of Banking, Insurance, Securities, and Health Care
Administration (BISHCA) designates IROs. Reviewers must be in active practice
and have the appropriate license and board certification applicable to the medical
condition under review.

√

√

MCO

MCO designates IRO, which must be impartial and use reviewers that have the
appropriate license and board certification applicable to the medical condition under
review.

Tennessee

Vermont

√

√

Insurance
Department

Insurance Department maintains list of approved IROs and designates IRO upon
request for external review. IRO reviewers must have the appropriate license,
board certification, and clinical experience (within the past three years) applicable
to the medical condition under review.

South Carolina

Conflict of
Interest
Prohibition
(√ if yes)

Reviewer

Entity that
Selects
Reviewer

Requirement
that Reviewer Have
Relevant Expertise
or Particular Case?
(√ if yes)

Jurisdiction
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√

1 Maryland’s IRO statute places the burden of proof on the MCO to demonstrate that its initial adverse decision was correct.

New Hampshire

√

√

Missouri

Montana

√

Minnesota

Michigan

√

Md. Ins. Code Ann. ß 15-10A-03(e) (2001).

√

Maryland1

Massachusetts

√ (Patient may attend the external review, ask questions of the insurance company representative,
and use outside assistance such as counsel [at the patient’s expense].)

Maine

√

√

Louisiana

√

√

Kentucky

√

√

Kansas

Iowa

Indiana

Illinois

Hawaii

Georgia

√

√ (Insured can also request a hearing before IRO.)

District of Columbia

Florida

√

Delaware

√
√

√

Connecticut

Colorado

√

California

If Standard is De Novo or Not Specified,
Can Insured Submit Additional Evidence? (√ if yes)

√

√

Alaska

Other

Arizona

De Novo

Jurisdiction

Table 9. Independent Reviews: Standard of Review for Medical Necessity Determinations
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√
√
To Be Determined
√

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

West Virginia

Washington

Virginia

Vermont

Utah

Texas

Tennessee

South Carolina

√

√

√

√

√

North Carolina

Rhode Island

√

If Standard is De Novo or Not Specified,
Can Insured Submit Additional Evidence? (√ if yes)

New York

Other

√ (Hearing officer and co-medical hearing officers conduct hearing with witnesses and
presentation of evidence.)

√

De Novo

New Mexico

New Jersey

Jurisdiction
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Anderson, G. F.,
and M. A. Hall

Hall, Mark, and
Gerard Anderson

1992

1993

Eddy, David

Author

1992

Year

American Journal
of Public Health
83:1635–1639

University of
Pennsylvania Law
Review 140 U Pa.L.Rev.
1637

Models of
Rationing: Health
Insurers’
Assessment of
Medical
Necessity

Medical
Technology
Assessment and
Practice
Guidelines: Their
Day in Court

JAMA 268(18): 2575–2582

Source

Clinical Decision
Making: From
Theory to
Practice.
Applying Cost
Effectiveness
Analysis, the
Inside Story

Title

There is the expectation that outcomes research and the promulgation of medical practice guidelines will be able to identify and hopefully reduce the amount of unnecessary or inappropriate
medical care through a variety of methods, including utilization review. However, the courts for
multifarious reasons have frequently overturned past efforts by public and private insurers to deny
claims on the basis of formal technology assessments or practice guidelines. This paper examines
the court’s reluctance to accept a variety of technology assessment methods in coverage policy
decisions. The paper reviews the options that have been proposed to restrict judicial involvement
in the formulation of coverage policy and then proposes a new option that employs a more precise
taxonomy of medical practice assessment.

EXCERPTS:
... Tishna, I was told, had virtually no chance of surviving the relapsed Wilms’ tumor [of the kidney]
from which she is suffering and Blue Cross/Blue Shield had denied coverage for autologous bone
marrow transplant (“ABMT”) with accompanying high dose chemotherapy, a treatment which
could well prolong and quite possibly save her life and which, concededly, provided her only realistic hope of either. ... In about a dozen similar cases, however, judges have ruled that the use of
ABMT is still experimental and denied coverage. ... From a legal perspective, however, these
rulings are merely the latest in a long series of ordinary contract disputes over the interpretation
of terms such as “medical necessity” or “experimental,” which determine the coverage of health
insurance policies. ... In addition to this humanitarian objective, the courts have been concerned
about the perceived unfairness of a retroactive denial of coverage after a patient has relied on his
physician’s advice and incurred a bill for treatment later found by the insurer to be inappropriate.
... An assessment that a technology is “experimental” at one time must be modified if additional
research or clinical findings validate (or repudiate) its effectiveness....

An account of how analysis of cost-effectiveness was used to change practice guidelines on high
and low osmolar radiographic contrast agents at Kaiser. Difficulties with analysis and buy-in are
discussed. The general logistics of the analysis itself are described, as are the lines of thought
behind each step of the analysis.

Summary/Abstract
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1994

Year

Sabin, James E.,
and Norman
Daniels

Author

Appendix A. Continued

Determining
“Medical
Necessity” in
Mental Health
Practice

Title
Hastings Center Report
24(6):5–13

Source

The authors posed the question, “Should mental health insurance cover only disorders found
in DSM-IV, or should it be extended to treatment for ordinary shyness, unhappiness, and other
responses to life’s hard knocks?” Through the use of six illustrative case studies, the authors
examined the reasoning behind the determinations of medical necessity. The article includes a
discussion of a recurrent conflict between “hard-line” and “expansive” views of medical necessity, noting that it frequently reflects unrecognized moral disagreement about the targets of clinical
intervention and the ultimate goals of psychiatric treatment. The authors present three models
for defining medical necessity and argue a defensible rationale for the “normal” model, which
comprises a target of a medically defined deviation intended to decrease the impact of disease
or disability. Three tests of medical necessity are offered: (1) Does it make distinctions the public
and clinicians regard as fair? (2) Can it be administered in the real world? (3) Does it lead to
results that society can afford? In the authors’ view, a typical medical necessity definition in
the “normal” model would be “those mental health services which are essential for the treatment
of a Member’s mental health disorder as defined by the DSM-IV in accordance with generally
accepted mental health practice.” The authors conclude that the DSM-IV standard provides
workable boundaries for medical necessity definitions to the extent that they are the result of a
highly public process open to scientific scrutiny, field testing, and repetitive criticism over time.

Summary/Abstract
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1994

Year

Eddy, David M.

Author

Appendix A. Continued

From Theory
to Practice:
Rationing
Resources While
Improving Quality:
How to Get More
for Less

Title
JAMA 272(10)

Source

“If health plans and individual practitioners are to succeed in making transfers that increase
quality while reducing costs, they will need both guidance and protection. Guidance will be
needed to ensure that decisions are consistent and have the desired effects. Protection will be
needed to defend both plans and practitioners when they make and implement controversial
decisions. The best way to address both those needs is to develop explicit criteria that will sort
out high-value practices from those that have little or no value and will support transfers from
one to the other. Currently, the closest we get to such criteria are through vague and variable
terms such as “medically necessary” and “medically appropriate.” But these are far too vague
and variably interpreted. If we are to control costs while preserving quality, the first need is to
develop better criteria for benefit language.”

“[...] we will need to change from focusing on individuals to focusing on populations—from “individual-based” decision making to “population-based” decision making. In particular, practitioners
need to develop an allegiance to the entire membership of the health plan. This will be difficult
for those who see themselves as serving as their patients’ advocate in a struggle with administrators and insurers. That perception is incorrect. When physicians hoard resources for their own
patients, they are not taking from administrators or insurers; they are taking from other patients.
If each practitioner is concerned only about his or her individual patient, without concern for the
impact of his or her decisions on other patients, the result will not be lower costs and higher
quality, but higher costs and lower quality.

EXCERPT: “[...] when determining the appropriate use of an intervention, we will need to change
our way of thinking from qualitative reasoning to quantitative reasoning. To a great extent, the
predicament we face today is the result of qualitative reasoning that assumes that if a practice
might have any benefit it should be done—the “criterion of potential benefit.” Because this type
of reasoning does not try to determine the amount of value a practice provides—separating those
with high value from those with small value—it has left us with the large inefficiencies that we
see in our practices today. To take advantage of these inefficiencies, we will have to develop
better skills for quantitative reasoning. It is no coincidence that every example in this article was
studded with numbers; it is not possible to determine how much benefit will be gained or how
much cost will be saved by a transfer without estimating the benefits or the costs.

Summary/Abstract
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Bergthold,
Linda A.

Eddy, David

Gross, Joshua M.

Hester, Thomas
W.

1996

1997

1997

Author

1995

Year
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JAMA

International Journal
of Group Psychotherapy
47(4):499–507

MASMHPD Research
Institute Report

Promoting Group
Psychotherapy in
Managed Care:
Basic Economic
Principles for
the Clinical
Practitioner
Algorithms and
the Medication
Treatment of
People with
Serious Mental
Illness

Health Affairs 14(4):
180–190

Source

Clinical Decision
Making: From
Theory to
Practice. Benefit
Language:
Criteria That Will
Improve Quality
While Reducing
Costs

Medical
Necessity:
Do We Need It?

Title

The goals of this paper are to provide the reader with an understanding and rationale for the
appropriate use of treatment algorithms for people with serious mental illness. It suggests effective strategies for using treatment algorithms to improve the quality of treatment and to increase
the accountability of medication treatment. The paper also addresses potential dangers in developing practice guidelines and provides advice for avoiding these pitfalls. Issues related to legal
matters and managed care contracting are discussed briefly.

Knowledge of the basic economic factors underlying managed mental health care directly impacts
the clinical practitioners’ ability to make constructive changes in the system. To aid understanding
this article introduces the managed care marketplace model, the interactive relationship between
medical necessity and patient co-payment, and demand management economics. The author
encourages practitioners to develop strategies to overcome specific economic obstacles that
prevent the promotion of group psychotherapy.

The idea that benefit language is one of the most important determinants of the quality and cost
of care is at the core of this paper. Sample language is supplied describing health intervention,
medical condition, health outcomes, sufficient evidence, and cost effectiveness. It is noted that
the criteria are interconnected and points to some of the shortcomings of the proposed language.

The term medical necessity has been mainly a placeholder in insurance plans for over thirty years.
More recently, the national health care reform debate and litigation over denials of costly experimental treatments have broken the term out into open discussion about what a necessary service
is and who should decide if it is covered. This paper summarizes the history of the term and its
evolution from an insurance concept controlled by practicing physicians to a rationing tool used
by insurance administrators. How did national reform efforts address this terminology, and how
should we define medical necessity in a changing delivery system?

Summary/Abstract
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Anderson, G. F.,
and M. A. Hall

Moran, Donald W.

1997

1998

Jacobson,
Peter D.,
Steven Asch,
Peter A.
Glassman,
Karyn E. Model,
and John B.
Hernandez

Author

1997

Year

Appendix A. Continued

Medical Care
36(8):1295–1302

Health Affairs 16(6):7–21

Federal
Regulation of
Managed Care:
An Impulse in
Search of a
Theory?

When Courts
Review Medical
Appropriateness

Inquiry 34:143–154

Source

Defining and
Implementing
Medical
Necessity in
Washington State
and Oregon

Title

CONCLUSIONS: For practice guidelines to be accepted by the courts, it is more important to
focus on how insurance contracts are written than on how medical assessments are performed.

RESULTS: In 185 cases, a definitive decision was rendered, and the insurer was required
to pay in 57% of the decisions. Whether the insurer relied on an assessment or not, whether
the assessment process was formal or informal, and who conducted the assessment did
not appear to influence courts’ decisions, nor did the specificity of the coverage exclusion.
Significant predictors of courts ordering coverage were court jurisdiction, contract language
assigning discretion to the insurer, severity of patient’s condition, and whether the treatment
appeared to work for the particular patient.

METHODS: A structured review of all federal and state court health insurance cases decided
between 1960 and June 1994 that involved a dispute involving medical appropriateness was
performed. A total of 3,215 published court decisions were analyzed, of which 203 met the
criteria of relevance and 124 explicitly mentioned medical appropriateness criteria. The main
outcome variable was whether the court ordered the insurer to provide coverage.

OBJECTIVES: The authors examined how the courts have responded to public and private
insurers’ use of medical appropriateness criteria to establish coverage and payment policies.

Although there is growing demand for regulation of the managed care industry, regulatory proponents have yet to articulate a clear theory of regulation. Most observers acknowledge consumer
information problems that regulation could address, but there is no consensus regarding regulation of the broader public concern about restrictive medical-necessity determinations by health
plans. Concerns about these issues—which fall within the gray areas of divergent clinical opinion—may be difficult or impossible to address by explicit regulation. If policymakers forbear on
regulation of medical necessity determinations, private market innovation may ultimately remedy
this problem.

This paper reports on a qualitative study of how health care providers in the states of Washington
and Oregon define and implement medical necessity. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews, we found that few insurers or health care plans in our sample attempted to resolve the
ambiguities inherent in defining medical necessity. More importantly, our results suggest that
physicians in managed care plans were not using general definitions of medical necessity to
make clinical decisions, but instead relied on utilization management techniques to guide the
use of medical resources. We conclude that medical necessity as an organizing principle for
clinical practice decision-making is likely to continue to erode in a managed care environment.

Summary/Abstract
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Chodoff, Paul

Ford, William

Miller, Monica

Mohl, Paul C.

The National
Health Law
Program

Olson, Kristi

1998

1998

1998

1998

1998

Author

1998

Year
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The Threat of
Evidence-Based
Definitions of
Medical
Necessity

Medical
Necessity
Definition
Model Medicaid
Managed Care
Contract
Provisions

Medical
Necessity:
A Moving Target

Research:
The Debate
Over Medical
Necessity in
Case Law and
Government/
Industry Forums

Medical
Necessity:
Its Impact in
Managed Mental
Health Care

Medical
Necessity and
Psychotherapy

Title

The National Health
Law Program Report

The National Health
Law Program Report

Psychiatric Services
49(11):1391

Foundation for the
Advancement of
Innovative Medicine
Report

Psychiatric Services
49(2):183–184

Psychiatric Services
49(11):1481–1483

Source

Discusses possible consequences of using an evidence-based standard for determining medical
necessity. It points to the fact that many commonly used practices will fail to meet evidence-based
criteria. It also is concerned that minority groups, children, and women, who are historically
limited in access to care and trials, will suffer disproportionately under evidence-based criteria.

Provides NHeLP’s model medical necessity language.

Letter from the editor discussing physician culpability in engendering HMOs and medical
necessity definitions.

The report reviews the terms ‘medical necessity’ and ‘medically necessary care’ as they are
discussed in New York case law. They contend that the judicial, contractual, and statutory
developments in New York created a standard of care that was lower than the negligence
standard.

Discusses the impact of managed care medical necessity definitions on psychiatric care.
Points to some possible reasons why BHMOs focus on cutting short-term costs rather than
managing long-term costs, including short contract terms and labor-intensive reviews.

Managed care and, specifically, the need to conform to medical necessity requirements have
had a dramatic effect on the medical and psychiatric practice, especially on psychotherapy. The
author describes the progression of the concept of medical necessity from a simple accounting
of services reimbursable by insurance companies to an ambiguous term without definitional
consensus. He describes its relationship to the medical model and discusses the incongruity
between medical necessity and certain aspects of psychotherapy. He proposes a broader
concept—health necessity—based on an evaluation of the advantages, disadvantages, and
costs of medical and psychiatric services.

Summary/Abstract
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Berman, Steve

Bergthold,
Linda A.

1999

1999

Rosenbaum,
Sara, et al.

Author

1998

Year
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The Joint Commission
Journal on Quality
Improvement 25(8):
434–442

US Senate Committee
on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions
Report

Testimony to
the US Senate
Committee
on Health,
Education, Labor,
and Pensions:
Medical
Necessity:
From Theory
to Practice
Measuring and
Improving the
Quality of Care
of Health Plans

Center for Health
Services Research
and Policy

Source

Negotiating the
New Health
Care System: A
Nationwide Study
of Medicaid
Managed Care
Contracts

Title

BACKGROUND: More than 200 health care policymakers and researchers, clinicians, quality
professionals, and other representatives of managed care organizations, government, and
academia attended the fifth annual Building Bridges conference, “The Health Care Puzzle: Using
Research to Bridge the Gap Between Perception and Reality,” in Chicago, April 11–13, 1999.
Sponsored by the American Association of Health Plans and the Agency for Health Care Policy
and Research—and now, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention—these annual conferences are intended to promote research in measuring the quality and effectiveness of the services
health plans provide. Selected plenary sessions from the conference are represented in this
report. KEYNOTE ADDRESS: “Three worthy objectives” for managed care—harmonize practice
guidelines, develop evidence-based co-pays or price structure for drugs, and demystify medical
necessity—were discussed. PLENARY: A POPULATION HEALTH PERSPECTIVE: Population-based
care is designed to identify effective clinical and service interventions and ensure their efficient
delivery, identify ineffective interventions and minimize their use, and monitor outcomes and
change practice if outcomes are sub-optimal. Yet certain questions need to be asked about how
to put this strategy in place, especially, “Why should any individual or potential patient be willing
to be treated in a population-based delivery system?” THE FINANCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
BEHIND PREVENTION: The concepts of scientific evidence and financial evidence for prevention
were reviewed and applied in scenarios of the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of selected
preventive care services. Education efforts are needed to promote the use of effective interventions and encourage questioning of interventions with unproven or less important effectiveness
and poor cost-effectiveness.

Policy paper discussing the problems inherent in defining the term “medical necessity.” She
points out that the process by which decisions are made is far more important to understand
and improve than the terminology used to describe those decisions, that there is substantial
variation in the way medical necessity is defined and used in private contract, and that there
is considerable discrepancy between contractual definitions and the way those definitions are
applied in practice. Her final recommendation is that the Senate not define the terms in statute.
Rather they should appoint a broader group of stakeholders to take on the task.

Contains compiled list and analysis of medical necessity definitions contained in state Medicaid
managed care contracts.

Summary/Abstract
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The Atomic Bomb
Scare Over
Defining Medical
Necessity

Defining Medical
Necessity:
Strategies for
Promoting
Access to
Quality Care for
Persons with
Developmental
Disabilities,
Mental
Retardation, and
Other Special
Health Care
Needs

Lawmakers
Define Medical
Necessity

Statement of
the AMA to
the Committee
on Health,
Education, Labor
and Pensions,
United States
Senate

Title

Health Lobby Letters

National Center for
Education in Maternal
and Child Health Report

Modern Healthcare (3)

American Medical
Association

Source

Two letters regarding New York State’s medical necessity statute. The first opposes the statute
because of concerns that it leaves all medical decision-making in the hands of the physicians
and eliminates the plan’s abilities to conduct utilization reviews. The second letter is a rebuttal
that attempts to debunk the first point-by-point.

Discusses medical necessity determinations in regards to persons with developmental disabilities.
The report has a flow chart showing the dynamics of medical necessity decisions within current
service systems. It also provides its own specifications for determining medical necessity.

Discusses federal medical necessity legislation in brief.

Formal AMA statement before the Senate addressing the issue of medical necessity. Emphasizes
that the definition of medical necessity will become the standard applied to all review decisions.
Health plan definitions may place barriers between patients and specialty care. They also leave
most of the medical decision-making discretion with health plans as opposed to the patient’s
physician. Recounts 1998 AMA consensus definition of medical necessity, using a prudent
physician standard. It also mentions the health plan practice of retroactive denials for rendered
care, which the AMA believes should also be addressed.
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Business and Health (26)

Stanford University
Report

United States General
Accounting Office
Report

Decreasing
Variation
in Medical
Necessity
Decision Making

Employers’
Mental Health
Benefits Remain
Limited Despite
New Federal
Standards

The New England
Journal of Medicine
340(3):229–232

Source

Medical
Necessity Takes
Center Stage

Who Should
Determine When
Health Care
Is Medically
Necessary?

Title

This report examines the implementation and effects to date of the federal parity law, and focuses
on: (1) employers’ compliance and the changes made to their health benefit plans, (2) what is
known about the costs of complying with the law, and (3) the oversight roles of HHS and DOL in
enforcing the law. In brief, they found that most employers comply with the law; however, they
have become more restrictive in the number of hospital days or outpatient visits covered for
mental health when compared with traditional medical benefits. Few employers reported that the
law has resulted in higher costs. Finally, the recent laws have expanded DOL’s role in regulating
health benefits.

This is an in-depth report looking into the question of medical necessity. It deals with the variation and inconsistencies of definitions that the various stakeholders have. It notes a paucity
of research regarding health plan decision-making and whether medical necessity definitions
play a real role in decision-making. It documents a number of conferences and original research,
eventually concluding with a consensus for a model decision-making process and medical
necessity definitions. It concludes by reviewing the various stakeholders, their concerns, and
what actions they could take to decrease medical necessity variability.

Discusses the general background of the current medical necessity debate in brief.

In the authors’ view, an insurer should be able to set aside the recommendations of a treating
physician only in restricted circumstances. Decisions about coverage should continue to be
weighed against clinically accepted standards of medical practice. An insurer’s decision should
be lawful only if the insurer can prove that the decision rests on valid and reliable evidence that
is relevant to a patient’s individual circumstances. The authors advocate neither a return to total
autonomy for treating physicians in determining insurance coverage nor a system in which
insurers decide on coverage according to criteria that are totally independent of professional
standards of clinical practice. Rather, they propose maintaining the middle position represented
by current law. This middle position requires insurers to act reasonably and weighs the reasonableness of their conduct against professional standards of practice as reflected by valid and
reliable evidence.
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Psychiatric Services
51(6): 711–712, 719

Psychiatric Clinics
of North America
23(2):309–317

Medical
Necessity and
Psychiatric
Managed Care

Office of Personnel
Management Report

Large Employer
Experiences and
Best Practices
in Design,
Administration,
and Evaluation
of Mental Health
and Substance
Abuse Benefits:
A Look at Parity
in EmployerSponsored Health
Benefit Programs
What is
Psychiatric
“Medical
Necessity”?

Health Insurance
Association of America
Report

Source

“Medical
Necessity” and
Health Plan
Contracts

Title

The concept of medical necessity is a provision of commercial insurance contracts and federal
government Medicaid requirements that limits the payment to only those services that are essential for treating a person’s sickness, injury, or condition. The concept of medical necessity is one
tool used by third-party payers to contain their financial risk in a seemingly non-arbitrary manner.
Also, the definitions of medical necessity used by commercial insurers or by the federal government reflect their product’s or program’s philosophies. Expanding commercial insurance or
Medicaid psychiatric coverage would require changing those philosophies. As long as society
is faced with a greater demand for health-related service than resources to meet them, such
systems of rationing will be used. Even with full parity for psychiatric benefits, mechanisms will
be used by payers to limit or control demand, thereby controlling financial risk. The short-term
challenge for psychiatric advocates is to secure the most acceptable definitions of medical
necessity from third-party payers. The long-term challenge for MH/SA advocates and for all
health care advocates, is to develop a system that pays for the greatest number of quality services for the greatest number of people in need, in an affordable manner, regardless of diagnosis.

This article reviews AMA’s definition of medical necessity and points out problems of its application to psychiatry. It also recommends its own definition for psychiatry after a discussion of
HIPAA law and possible implications for fraud in psychiatry.

Prepared for OPM, this report described how large corporations were structuring their insurance
plans in order to deal with new mental health parity legislation. It discusses a ‘big picture’
approach, reportedly focusing on keeping employees healthy and well in order to avoid later
problems with absenteeism, disability, and lost productivity. Eight employers were studied:
American Airlines, AT&T, Delta Airlines, Eastman Kodak, IBM, General Motors, the Massachusetts
Group Insurance Commission, and PepsiCo. They highlight what they believe to be essential
mechanisms to providing parity in care as well as identify problematic areas. The author
discusses the use of managed behavioral care carve-outs. The document ends by making
recommendations regarding how OPM should structure future insurance programs.

This policy piece scripted on behalf of the HIAA highlights the problems of allowing medical
necessity to be defined by physicians rather than insurers. Essentially, it argues that legislation
changing the status quo would: (1) undermine utilization management and increase costs,
(2) encourage fraud and abuse, (3) undermine quality and perhaps even expose patients to
danger, and (4) undermine contract law. In the end they conclude that placing determination
powers back squarely in the hands of providers will simply undo all the progress made in health
care since its departure from widespread fee-for-service arrangements.
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American
Psych Systems
Provider Packet

United States
Public Health
Service Report

Mental Health:
A Report of the
Surgeon General

American
Psych Systems
Provider Packet

Psychiatric Services
51(4):445–459

Public-Sector
Managed
Behavioral
Health Care:
V. Redefining
“Medical
Necessity”—The
Iowa Experience

Health Law and Policy
Institute Report

AHRQ User Liaison
Program Report

Coverage
Decisions

The Difficulties in
Defining Medical
Necessity

AMA Private Advocacy
Group Report

Source

Medical
Necessity

Title

This packet of materials sent to psychiatric providers contains newsletters about recent changes,
a complete copy of the updated Utilization Management criteria, and a copy of policies and procedures regarding coordination of care and provider appeals. Medical necessity is defined in loose
terms for each condition; however, a separate set of admission criteria also must be met prior to
admitting a patient for a psychiatric condition or continuing care for a protracted period of time.

This comprehensive report gives detailed background into many facets of mental health care.
Chapter 6, “Organizing and Financing Mental Health Services,” gives an in-depth analysis of
the economic structure and costs of modern mental health care with comparisons to traditional
medical health care. The document also examines the issue of mental health parity, looking at
legislative trends and costs. Throughout the document, however, there is no discussion of mental
health medical necessity.

This article discusses psychiatric problems with medical necessity definitions and expresses
a need for ‘psychosocial necessity’ expansion. It reviews Iowa’s experience with managed
behavioral health care and prognosticates that psychiatrists will be forced to opt out of the
outpatient treatment of the severely mental ill due to current BHMO policies.

This short briefing on the nature of the current difficulties in defining medical necessity
concludes that a comprehensive approach that differs from third party rationing should be
used in forming a decision.

This report summarizes a session that evaluated the processes for making coverage decisions
in private, State, and Federal venues. Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield describes their decisionmaking process, built around a contractual definition of ‘medical necessity,’ which it provides.
The Massachusetts Medicaid model is based on statutory definitions of medical necessity
and evidence-based assessments of new interventions. HCFA is also described, drawing its
authoritative powers from section 1862 of the Social Security Act. Services or technologies
that fulfill the criteria of the definition are divided into 55 statutorily defined benefit categories.

This document contains the AMA model definition of medical necessity and discusses the
need for providing a definition that reflects a clinical determination rather than a business
determination.
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Consortium for Citizens
with Disabilities Report

Psychiatric Times XVIII:3

Medication
Management,
Medical
Necessity and
Residential Care

A Strong and
Consistent
Definition of
Medical
Necessity Forms
the Core of
Meaningful
Patient
Protections

Kaiser Permanente
Report

National Association
of Manufacturers Letter

Benefit Mandates

How EvidenceBased Balance
Sheets Can Help
Make Decisions

National Committee
for Quality Assurance
MBHO Handbook

Source

Standards and
Surveyor
Guidelines for
the Accreditation
of MBHOs

Title

Offers a proposed CCD medical necessity definition and discusses the implications such definitions can have on the disabled. It discusses the need to fabricate protections to ensure that
patients with disabilities get the care they need. They point to a need to address functional ability
in any final necessity definition.

This article considers the difficulties of applying medical necessity definitions, including the
AMA-APA definition, to the unique needs of the field of psychiatry. The term ‘ for convenience’
is found to be a potential obstacle to providing psychiatric care. The paper also laments the lack
of a specified role for external contributions from families, social workers, and non-professional
caretakers. The article voices concern over the HIPAA alterations that make penalization of
providers for medical fraud. It points to steeper fines, unclear definitions of medical necessity
as its standard, and the fact that no specific intent to defraud is necessary.

The author discusses the use of balance sheets and evidence-based medicine for clinical
decision-making. He points to their ability to summarize in one place all the critical information
needed to make decisions as a great strength.

Letter to Senator Gregg on behalf of National Association of Manufactures. The letter speaks out
against S 543, the Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act of 2001. They argue that the new bill
would greatly expand the parity laws of 1996 and would have many drawbacks. Costs would
increase, while other benefits would be reduced to meet the bill’s requirements. They argue that
there are no discernable limits to the scope of potential coverage. They also voice concern over
the bill’s preemption provisions that would preserve State legislation and extend it to ERISA plans.

These are the published guidelines used by NCQA to accredit MBHOs. Definitions of medical
necessity are not suggested by NCQA; the MBHOs’ definitions simply must be accessible and
include procedures for applying criteria based on the needs of individual patients and characteristics of the local delivery system. NCQA does define medical necessity denial and underscores
the need for MBHOs to use clinical practice guidelines.
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Health Affairs
20(1):200–206

RAND Health Report

The Costs of
Covering Mental
Health and
Substance Abuse
Care at the Same
Level as Medical
Care in Private
Insurance Plans

American Psychiatry
Association Report

Journal of Health
Politics, Policy,
and Law 26:2

Joint Commission
on Accreditation
of HealthCare
Organizations
MCO Handbook

Source

Prospects for
Improved
Decision Making
About Medical
Necessity

Statement of
APA Executive
Director to US
Senate Health,
Education, Labor,
and Pensions
Committee on
‘Parity for Mental
Health Treatment’

Evidence: Its
Meanings in
Health Care and
in Law. Summary
of the 10 April
2000 IOM and
AHRQ Workshop

2001-2002
Comprehensive
Accreditation
Manual for
HealthCare
Networks

Title

Research paper delving into the issue of the cost for health insurers to implement mental health
parity. Their results suggest that parity in employer-sponsored health plans is not very costly under
comprehensive managed care. Also data do not support excluding substance abuse from parity
efforts due to prohibitive cost, because decoupling mental health and substance abuse care in
terms of benefits cannot save any meaningful amount. These results may not apply to unmanaged
indemnity plans, and they may only hold for large employers but not for individuals or for small
groups buying insurance.

Previous research has shown considerable variability in the process and criteria used for decision
making in both public and private plans regarding medical necessity. This paper seeks to document differences in decision-making criteria and to explain the relationship between contractual
definitions and the way decisions are made in practice. The investigators used descriptions of
‘best practices’ and ‘unacceptable variations’ from health plan interviews to provide insight into
how medical necessity decisions are made. They also produced a model contractual definition
and decision-making process based on best-practice models.

This APA report to the Senate on the need for mental health parity legislation reinforces current
understandings of the scientific basis underlying the causal mechanisms of mental disorders
and provides evidence that parity insurance coverage is affordable, addresses a specific market
failure, and can support cost-effective treatment to reduce disability.

The author reviews Jacobson’s presentation entitled “Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in the Courts:
Recent Trends and Future Prospects.” Of note, he discusses making contracts more explicit with
regard to the use of CEA in coverage decisions. Havighurst mentions the possibilities of systematic
misrepresentation of benefits by insurers using this technique.

This manual lays out the various rights of the beneficiaries, response mechanisms, and ethical
outlook that JCAHO evaluates in determining if an organization receives accreditation. The
guidelines do not offer any standards for medical necessity definitions, but rather clearly define
standards regarding the medical decision-making process and information dissemination.

Summary/Abstract
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The criteria for determining medical necessity are clearly documented and
include procedures for applying criteria based on the needs of individual
patients and characteristics of the local delivery system.

The managed healthcare organization involves appropriate, actively
practicing practitioners in its development or adoption of criteria and
in the development and review of procedures for applying criteria.

The managed healthcare organization reviews the criteria at specified
intervals and updates them as necessary.

The managed healthcare organization states in writing how practitioners
can obtain the UM (utilization management) criteria and makes the criteria
available to its practitioners upon request.

At least annually, the managed care organization evaluates the consistency
with which the health care professionals involved in utilization review apply
the criteria in decision-making.

•

•

•

•

The MBHO has completed two levels of internal reviews, and its decision is
unfavorable to the enrollee, or has elected to bypass one or both levels of
internal review or has exceeded its time limit for internal reviews without
good cause and without reaching a decision.
The enrollee has not withdrawn the appeal request, agreed to another dispute resolution proceeding, or submitted to an external dispute resolution
proceeding required by law.

•

•

Has no material professional, familial, or financial conflict of interest with
the MBHO.

•

MBHO data tracking of external appeals for use in evaluating its medical necessity
decision-making process.

Implementation of independent review organization decision within specified
timeframe.

Enrollee exemption from the cost of external review, including filing fees, and
allowance of designating a representative to act on the behalf of the enrollee.

MBHO non-interference with the proceedings of the external review.

Conducts a thorough review in which it considers anew all previously
determined facts, allows the introduction of new information, considers
and assesses sound medical advice, and makes a decision or conclusion
that is not bound by the decisions or conclusions of the internal appeal.

•

Use of an independent review organization that meets the following criteria:

Notification to enrollees about the independent appeals program and clear and
timely explanations of denials and approvals to both enrollees and their physicians.

The enrollee is appealing an adverse determination that is based on medical
necessity, as defined by MBHO.

•

Eligibility criteria stating that the MBHO offers enrollees the right to an independent,
third party, binding review whenever:

UM 7.5 The managed behavioral healthcare organization has a procedure for providing
independent, external review of final determinations, including:

UM 2. To make utilization decisions, the managed healthcare organization uses written
criteria based on sound clinical evidence and specifies procedures for applying those
criteria in an appropriate manner:

•

NCQA Managed Behavioral Health External Appeals Standards

NCQA Managed Behavioral Health Utilization Management Standards

National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA)

Appendix B. NCQA and JCAHO Utilization Management and External Appeals Standards
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To the health care needs, as influenced by socio-cultural characteristics,
of the population served.

To the network’s mission.

To the network’s contractual obligations.

•

•

•

Providing members with a description of the treatment authorization process.

Having initial decisions made by an appropriately trained health care
professional using evidence-based, network-approved criteria to authorize
admission, care, and transition to another care setting.

Having a physician, dentist, or behavioral clinician review all initial treatment
authorization denials prior to notifying the member or their representative(s)
of an adverse determination.

•

•

•

The network’s process for authorizing care and treatment includes:

RI 2.1: The network provides an authorization process for care and treatment that is
timely, efficient, and meets member health care needs.

RI 2: The network provides for member involvement in care and treatment decisions.

Example of implementation for CC 8: The network requests the review criteria used
by any external entity that carries out a utilization review on the network’s members.
The review criteria are made available to those within the network responsible for
treatment and discharge decisions. When the external utilization review organization’s
recommendation conflicts with the member’s medical care requirements, justification
for the course of action taken is documented. Information from the external entity is
collected and incorporated into the network’s assessment and improvement activities.

JCAHO provides examples of implementation. “These examples are simply ideas for
your network to consider.”

CC 8.1: When utilization review results in an adverse utilization management decision,
the network provides the criteria for the decision and information regarding appeal to
the licensed independent practitioner responsible for the member’s care.

CC 8: When the network or an external entity conducts a utilization review of a licensed
independent practitioner’s or a network component’s care that results in denial of
payment, decisions by the licensed independent practitioner or network component
regarding ongoing care or discharge are based on the care required by the member’s
assessed needs.

In scope to meet the health care needs of the population served.

•

CC 1: Health care services provided directly or by arrangement are appropriate:

JCAHO Utilization Management Standards

Appendix B. Continued

Defined timeframes in which the member can anticipate response to an
appeal.
Appeal timeframes that are appropriate to the urgency of the member’s
health care needs.
An appeal review panel including health care professionals who are appropriately trained, experienced, and competent with respect to the care and
treatment involved, and who were not involved in the initial determination.
Informing members about further steps available when disagreements cannot be resolved through the treatment authorization and appeal process,
such as an internal grievance process, arbitration, legal proceedings, and
any other external review processes.

•
•
•

•

Including the aggregate complaint and grievance information in performance
improvement activities.
An appeal process for grievance decisions.
Member protection from any sanctions or penalties resulting solely or
primarily from using the complaint or grievance process.

•
•

A timely response to the member, substantively addressing the action taken
on the complaint or grievance.
•

Aggregating and reporting actions taken on complaints and grievances.
•

Procedures for registering and managing complaints and grievances,
including identifying the party receiving complaints and grievances.
•

•

The member has the right to voice complaints without fear of recrimination about the
care received and to have complaints reviewed and, whenever possible, resolved.
This right and the way it is protected are explained to the member. The network has
a means of providing for the following:

RI 5: The network provides for the receipt and resolution of complaints and grievances
from members in a timely manner.

Informing members how to seek appeals of adverse determinations.

•

The network’s process includes:

RI 2.2: The network provides a method for resolving disagreements between the
network and the member or designated decision maker(s) regarding care or treatment
authorization decisions.

JCAHO External Appeals Standards
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Informing members in a timely manner, in writing, when a request to authorize
treatment has been denied.

Informing members of the basis and reason(s) for the adverse determinations.

Informing members of the review criteria used to make the determination.

Providing members with information as to whether, and under what
circumstances, investigational procedures are available and are covered
by the network.

•

•

•

•

JCAHO Utilization Management Standards
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Burrell v. United
Health Care
Insurance

2001

Bedrick v.
Travelers
Insurance

1996

Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Virginia
v. Keller

Bauer v. Country
Life Insurance

1999

1994

Bancroft and
Bancroft v.
Tecumseh
Products

Case

1996

Year

US District Court
for the Eastern
District of
Pennsylvania

Supreme Court
of Virginia

US Court of
Appeals,
4th Circuit

US District Court
for Northern
District of Illinois

US District Court
for the Eastern
District of
Michigan,
Southern Division

Court

Made bad faith claim regarding
denial of coverage of inpatient
stay for post-traumatic stress
disorder. Plan argued that refusal
was based on both medical
necessity grounds as well as
ineligible treatment facility.

Appeal of summary judgment
awarded to Plan regarding denial
of benefits on medical necessity
grounds.

Appeal of summary judgment in
favor of Plan regarding the denial
of physical, occupational, and
speech therapy benefits.

Sought preliminary and permanent injunction for high dose
chemotherapy with allogenic
bone marrow transplant after
medical necessity denial.

Sought reimbursement for breast
reduction surgery; denied on
medical necessity grounds.

Claim

Disposition

Court found that there was no
clear evidence that the Plan
acted in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.

Court of Appeals found that there
was no evidence presented to
show that the Plan abused its
discretion.

On appeal, the court found the
patient did not receive a “full
and fair” review.

Partial summary judgment entered for Plan.

Affirmed lower court’s
summary judgment.

Reversed judgment in
regards to physical and
occupational therapy
and remanded with
instructions to grant
summary judgment for
the plaintiff. Affirmed all
other aspects of judgment, including denial
of speech benefits
specifically excluded
under the contract.

Procedure found to be experimen- Judgment entered for
tal and thus excluded from the
the Plan.
policy. There was no evidence that
the Plan administrator acted in an
arbitrary or capricious manner.

Court found that Plan administrator Judgment entered for
improperly denied benefits in an
the plaintiff.
arbitrary and capricious manner.

Disputed Subject

Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Reversed in part,
affirmed in part.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Insurer’s Decision
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Bushman v. State
Mutual Life

Camelot Care v.
Planters
Lifesavers

Chemacki v.
Meijer, Inc.

Couri v. Guardian
Life

Crocco v. Xerox
and American
Psych
Management,
Inc.

1993

2000

1996

1998

Case

1996

Year
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US Court of
Appeals, 2nd
Circuit

US District Court
for the Northern
District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

US District Court,
Western District
of Michigan,
Southern Division

US District Court
for the Northern
District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

US District Court
for the Northern
District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

Court

Appeal of judgment in favor of
plaintiff regarding the Plan’s
“full and fair” review guaranteed
under ERISA when making
benefit determinations.

Sought dental benefits denied
on medical necessity grounds.
Plan sought summary judgment.

Sought reimbursement for
immunotherapy and allergy
antigen injections after medical
necessity denial.

Sought reimbursement for care
delivered. Plan defined provider
as “primarily” a “custodial care”
facility and not a “hospital,” and
thereby expressly excluded it
from reimbursement under the
Plan’s contract.

Sought injunction in regards
to medical necessity denial
of high-dose chemotherapy
and bone marrow transplant.

Claim

Disposition

Summary judgment was
denied.

Judgment entered for
the Plan.

Affirmed in part,
On appeal, the court upheld the
reversed in part.
previous ruling that the Plan’s
administrator acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner and
remanded the case for a full and
fair review. It also found that
Xerox was not the administrator
in this case, dismissing Xerox
from the suit.

Court found that genuine issues
of material fact existed regarding
whether the insurer’s actions
constituted arbitrary and capricious conduct.

Claim fell outside 1-year window
following denial notification. Plan
administrator also was found not
to have acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.

Court found that the summary Plan Judgment entered in
description defined neither custo- favor of plaintiff.
dial nor domiciliary care that was
excluded from coverage. It found
the provider to be a hospital for
the Plan’s purposes.

Summary judgment
Court found that the policy
entered for the Plan.
language clearly stated that the
plaintiff’s illness was excluded
from coverage and that the plaintiff
failed to show that the Plan acted
in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.

Disputed Subject

Reversed.

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Insurer’s Decision
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Dowden v. Blue
Cross Blue Shield
of Texas

Esdale v.
American
Community
Mutual Insurance

1997

1996

Dettmer Clinic v.
Associated
Insurance

1993

Deville Nursing
Service v.
Metropolitan Life

Delmarva Health
Plan v. Aceto

2000

1992

D’Angelo v.
Blue Cross
Blue Shield of
Central New York

Case

1998

Year
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US District Court
for the Northern
District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

US Court of
Appeals,
5th Circuit

US District Court
for the Western
District of
Louisiana, Lake
Charles Division

US District Court
for the Northern
District of
Indiana, South
Bend Division

Court of Chancery
of Delaware,
New Castle

Supreme Court
of New York,
Appellate
Division, 3rd
Department

Court

Sought benefits for high-dose
chemotherapy with peripheral
stem cell rescue denied on
medical necessity grounds
as experimental. Plan sought
summary judgment.

Appeal of summary judgment in
favor of Plan regarding the denial
of expenses incurred in treatment
of silicone breast implant
complications.

Sought reimbursement for custodial care services denied on
medical necessity grounds.

Chiropractor sought reimbursement for rendered services
denied on medical necessity
grounds.

Plan sought declaration that it
had no duty to provide coverage
for a lung transplant.

Appeal of judgment in favor of
plaintiff regarding benefits denied
on medical necessity grounds.
Plan argued that verdict was not
supported by legally sufficient
evidence.

Claim

Disposition

Summary judgment
awarded to Plan.

Summary judgment
entered for Aceto.

Court found that evidence
Summary judgment was
presented revealed that the experi- denied.
mental status of the treatment was
unclear in the literature.

On appeal, the court affirmed the
Affirmed.
lower court’s ruling, finding nothing
arbitrary or capricious in the decision-making process.

Court found that Plan’s contractual Summary judgment
language clearly states that custo- entered for Plan.
dial care is not a covered service.
Plan’s decision was not arbitrary or
capricious.

Court upheld the insurer’s right to
determine medical necessity.

Court found that the policy did not
expressly exclude the procedure
and that a policyholder could
reasonably expect that services
necessary to life would be
provided.

On appeal, the court found that the Affirmed.
evidence was legally sufficient.

Disputed Subject

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Reversed.

Insurer’s Decision
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Evans v.
Blue Cross
Blue Shield of
South Carolina

Farley v.
Benefit Trust Life
Insurance

Fenio v.
Mutual of Omaha

Florence
Nightingale
Nursing Service
v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield of
Alabama

Fuja v. Benefit
Trust Life

Grethe v.
Trustmark
Insurance

1992

1994

1993

1993

1995

Case

1993

Year
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US District Court
for the Northern
District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

US Court of
Appeals,
7th Circuit

US District Court
for the Northern
District of
Alabama,
Southern Division

US District Court
for the Southern
District of Florida

US Court of
Appeals,
8th Circuit

US District Court
for the District of
South Carolina

Court

Sought preliminary injunction
and benefits for high-dose
chemotherapy and allogenic
bone marrow transplant denied
on medical necessity grounds.

Appeal of judgment in favor of
plaintiff regarding the denial of
“experimental” cancer therapy
on medical necessity grounds.

Sought reimbursement for
services provided. Plan argued
that services charges were
unreasonable and that nursing
care after IV removal was not
medically necessary.

Sought preliminary injunction
for high-dose chemotherapy
and allogenic bone marrow
transplant denied on medical
necessity grounds.

Appeal of judgment in favor of
Plan regarding the denial of highdose chemotherapy and allogenic
bone marrow transplant on
medical necessity grounds.

Sought reimbursement for radial
keratotomy denied on medical
necessity grounds.

Claim

Reversed.

Payment awarded to
plaintiff.

Preliminary injunction
ordered for plaintiff.

Affirmed.

Judgment and attorney’s
fees awarded to Plan.

Disposition

Preliminary injunction
The court, after de novo review,
was denied.
found that the plaintiff had not
met her burden of establishing
that the proposed treatment
met all the criteria for medical
necessity as defined by the policy.

On appeal, the court reversed the
lower court’s interpretation of
experimental, finding that the
treatment in this case was clearly
experimental.

Court found that the Plan
administrator had a conflict of
interest that tainted his judgment.
Nursing charges were found
to be reasonable.

Court found on review of evidence
that patient demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success
on the merits.

On appeal, the court found that
the burden of proof was on the
plaintiff to show that the procedure was not experimental.

Court found that the procedure
did not meet the requirements
of medical necessity set forth
by the contract.

Disputed Subject

Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Affirmed.
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Jones v.
Kodak Medical
Assistance Plan

1999

Heil v.
Nationwide Life

1993

Hundley v.
Wenzel and
Conseco Medical
Insurance

Heasley and
Heasley v.
Belden and Blake
Corporation

1993

2001

Harrison v.
Aetna Life

Case

1996

Year

Appendix C. Continued

US Court of
Appeals,
10th Circuit

Missouri Court
of Appeals,
Western District

US Court of
Appeals,
6th Circuit

US Court of
Appeals,
3rd Circuit

US District Court
for the Middle
District of Florida,
Orlando Division

Court

Appeal of judgment in favor of
Plan regarding denial of inpatient
substance abuse treatment and
allegation that insurer acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in
its denial determination.

Appeal of judgment in favor
of Plan regarding denial of
chiropractic care on medical
necessity grounds.

Appeal of summary judgment
awarded to Plan regarding the
medical necessity denial of
plaintiff’s inpatient psychiatric
treatment.

Appeal of judgment in favor of
plaintiff regarding the denial of
liver/pancreas transplant benefits
on medical necessity grounds.

Sought reimbursement for jaw
surgery denied on medical
necessity grounds.

Claim

Judgment vacated and
remanded.

Damages rewarded to
plaintiff.

Disposition

The case contained no medical
necessity definition per se but
instead included a provision
construed by the court as limiting
treatment to the guidelines used
by the managed behavioral health
subcontractor.

On appeal, the court reversed the
trial court’s findings. It found that
the medical director made his
decision in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Insurer’s Decision

Judgment entered for
the defendant.

Affirmed.

Reversed and remanded. Reversed.

Vacated the judgment
Court of Appeals found the lower
and remanded for
court erred by not reviewing the
further proceedings.
entire Plan and making its own
determination regarding the appropriate standard of review rather
than relying on the stipulation
made by the parties. Secondly,
it erred when it determined that,
as a matter of law, the treatment
was not medically necessary.

On appeal, the court found that
the lower court’s analysis was
suspect, as it was unable to
be determined whether the
procedure was experimental.

Court found that the insurer actually extended coverage not only
through its coverage provisions
but also through some of its limitations. The surgery was found
to be medically necessary and
not done for cosmetic purposes.

Disputed Subject
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Hunter v.
Wal-Mart Stores

Juliano v. HMO
of New Jersey

Killian and Killian
v. HealthSource

Koenig v.
Metropolitan Life

Lehman v.
Mutual of Omaha

Lewis v.
Trustmark
Insurance

2000

1998

1993

1992

1999

Case

1999

Year
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US Court of
Appeals,
4th Circuit

US District Court
for the District of
Arizona

US District Court
for the Northern
District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

US Court of
Appeals,
6th Circuit

US Court of
Appeals,
2nd Circuit

US District Court
for the Eastern
District of
Arkansas,
Western Division

Court

Appeal of summary judgment in
favor of Plan regarding denial
of benefits for high-dose
chemotherapy and allogenic
bone marrow transplant on
medical necessity grounds.

Sought reimbursement for highdose chemotherapy and allogenic
bone marrow transplant denied
on medical necessity grounds.

Sought reimbursement for
substance abuse care denied by
Plan. Plan argued that plaintiff
did not exhaust internal remedies.

Appeal of judgment citing arbitrary and capricious behavior
by Plan in regards to denial of
breast cancer treatment on
medical necessity grounds.

Appeal of judgment for reimbursement for home nursing care
denied on medical necessity
grounds. Plan argued that its
discretion allows for it to offer
care at skilled nursing facilities
and that private care was not
medically necessary.

Sought reimbursement for
hysterectomy twice denied
by Plan on medical necessity
grounds.

Claim

Plan’s motion to dismiss
the case was denied.

Case was affirmed in
part, reversed in part,
and remanded for
further proceedings.

Vacated and remanded.

Judgment entered for
plaintiff.

Disposition

On appeal, the court was unable
to conclude that the Plan was
unreasonable in their interpretation of the policy.

Affirmed.

Court found after de novo review
Judgment entered for
that the evidence presented
the Plan.
suggested that the procedure was
experimental and, therefore, not
covered under the Plan’s contract.

The court found that the evidence
showed that continued internal
appeal attempts would have
proven futile and useless.

On appeal, court found the Plan
to be arbitrary and capricious in
considering additional evidence
after deadlines, but not so in
making its determination.

Initial court found that the rates of
home nursing were actually less
than that of the skilled nursing
facility. On appeal, the court found
that additional proceedings were
needed to assess damages.

Plan administrator found to have
abused his discretion because the
involved physicians determined
that the operation was not the
next therapeutic step, rather than
determining that the operation
was not medically necessary.

Disputed Subject

Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Reversed.

Insurer’s Decision

Medical Necessity in Private Health Plans 101

Meditrust v.
Sterling
Chemicals

Miller v.
United Welfare
Fund

1999

1995

McGee v.
Equicor-Equitable
HCA

1992

McGraw v.
Prudential
Insurance

Maune v.
International
Brotherhood of
Electrical
Workers

1996

1998

Mann v.
Prudential
Insurance

Case

1992

Year

Appendix C. Continued

US Court of
Appeals,
2nd Circuit

US Court of
Appeals,
5th Circuit

US Court of
Appeals,
10th Circuit

US Court of
Appeals,
10th Circuit

US Court of
Appeals,
8th Circuit

US District Court
for the Southern
District of Florida

Court

Appeal of judgment in favor of
plaintiff regarding the denial
private nursing benefits on
medical necessity grounds.

Appeal of summary judgment in
favor of Plan regarding denial of
rehabilitative care on medical
necessity grounds.

Appeal of summary judgment in
favor of Plan regarding the denial
of physical therapy benefits on
medical necessity grounds.

Appeal of judgment in favor
of Plan regarding denial of
rehabilitative care on medical
necessity grounds.

Appeal of summary judgment in
favor of Plan regarding the denial
of benefits for breast implant
removal.

Sought benefits for uterine
monitoring services denied
on medical necessity grounds
as specifically excluded.

Claim

Affirmed in part,
reversed in part.

Summary judgment
entered for Plan.

Disposition

On appeal, the court upheld that
the Plan acted arbitrarily and
capriciously. It also found that the
lower court erred by considering
evidence outside of the administrative record.

Court of Appeals found that the
lower court had applied the
correct discretionary standard
and that the Plan did not act in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.

On appeal, the court affirmed
that ERISA governed action and
reversed conclusion that denial
of benefits was not arbitrary and
capricious.

Case was remanded
to trial court with
instructions.

Affirmed summary
judgment in favor
of Plan.

Case was affirmed in
part, reversed in part,
and remanded for
further proceedings.

On appeal, the court affirmed that Affirmed.
the patient’s transfer severed relations with Plan physicians and
prevented the Plan from making
necessary predeterminations of
improvement as required by
contract.

On appeal, the court upheld the
finding that the procedure was
not medically necessary. The
court found the case not trivial,
reversing the legal fee rulings.

Court found that the plaintiff
failed to provide evidence that
the Plan’s decision was arbitrary
or capricious.

Disputed Subject

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Affirmed.
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Milone v.
Exclusive
Healthcare

Neurocare and
Whitmore v.
Principal Life

Nichols v.
Trustmark
Insurance

Personnel Pool of
Ocean County v.
Trustees Fund

Risenhoover v.
Bayer

Scalamandre v.
Oxford Health
Plans

Semmler v.
Metropolitan Life

1999

1997

1995

2000

1993

1997

Case

2001

Year
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US District Court
for the Southern
District of
New York

US District Court
for the Eastern
District of
New York

US District Court,
Southern District
of New York

US District Court
for the District of
New Jersey

US District Court
for the Northern
District of Ohio,
Eastern Division

US District Court
for Northern
District of
California

US Court of
Appeals,
8th Circuit

Court

Sought benefits for patientcontrolled anesthesia denied
by Plan. Plan claimed that the
service was covered in the
physician’s package fee and
reimbursement would be
equivalent to double billing.

Sought reimbursement for highdose chemotherapy and allogenic
bone marrow transplant received
outside of Plan’s chosen hospitals
and denied on medical necessity
grounds.

Sought preliminary injunction to
prevent Plan from discontinuing
IV treatments for Lyme disease
after medical necessity denial.

Sought reimbursement for nursing benefits denied on medical
necessity grounds.

Sought benefits for high-dose
chemotherapy and allogenic bone
marrow transplant denied by Plan
on medical necessity grounds.
Plan sought summary judgment.

Sought reimbursement for
rehabilitation services delivered
after medical necessity denial.

Sought pre-certification for
breast reduction surgery after
medical necessity denial. Plan
later appealed, arguing that its
contract had a direct exclusion
for the surgery in her case.

Claim

Full benefits awarded to
plaintiff.

Judgment entered for
the Plan.

Judgment with prejudice
entered for Plan.

Plan’s motion for
summary judgment
was denied.

Judgment entered for
the plaintiffs.

Judgment entered for
the plaintiff. Lower court
decision upheld on
appeal.

Disposition

Court found no abuse of discretion On appeal, the plaintiff’s
using an arbitrary and capricious
motion to vacate the
standard.
judgment was denied.

Court found that the contract
language and actions of the Plan
made it impossible to comply with
pre-certification requirements.

Denial found not to be arbitrary or
capricious.

Court found that the decision was
reasonable and not arbitrary and
capricious.

Court found that genuine issues of
material fact exist as to whether
the treatment is experimental
and to whether the Plan had
‘reasonable justification’ for its
decision to deny benefits.

Plan found to rely on excerpts of
only one of the treating physicians
in exclusion of the others, thus
abusing its discretion.

Plan’s denial was found to be internally inconsistent and ambiguous.
Other women had been previously
approved. On appeal, the court
disagreed with the Plan’s interpretation of the contractual language.

Disputed Subject

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Reversed.

Reversed.
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Sven v. Principal
Mutual Life

Trustees of
Northwest
Laundry v.
Burzynski

Trustmark Life v.
University of
Chicago Hospitals

1996

1994

2000

Snell v. Travelers
Insurance

1993

Sophie and
Sophie v. Lincoln
National Life

Smith v.
Newport News

2001

1997

Sheppard and
Enoch Pratt
Hospital v.
Travelers
Insurance

Case

1994

Year
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US Court
of Appeals,
7th Circuit

US Court
of Appeals,
5th Circuit

US District Court
for the Northern
District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

US District Court
for Northern
District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

US District Court
for the Eastern
District of
Pennsylvania

US District Court,
Eastern District
of Virginia

US Court of
Appeals,
4th Circuit

Court

Appeal of judgment for Plan to
recover money spent on breast
cancer treatment later found to
be medically unnecessary.

Appeal of judgment in favor
of Plan regarding the denial of
reimbursement for provider’s
services.

Sought reimbursement for allergy
treatments denied on medical
necessity grounds. Plan sought
summary judgment.

Sought benefits for artificial
insemination denied on medical
necessity grounds.

Sought reimbursement for highdose chemotherapy and allogenic
bone marrow transplant denied
on medical necessity grounds.

Sought injunction in regards to
medical necessity denial of
coverage for high-dose
chemotherapy.

Appeal of judgment awarded to
Plan regarding denial of partial
benefits of 16-month long hospital
stay on medical necessity
grounds.

Claim

Preliminary injunction
granted.

Affirmed lower court’s
judgment.

Disposition

Affirmed.

Summary judgment was
denied.

On appeal, the court found that the Reversed.
provider hospital was entitled to
keep the money under the theory
of estoppel.

On appeal, the court affirmed the
lower court’s ruling that the
provider defrauded the Plan by
submitting claims for unorthodox
cancer treatments.

Court found that de novo standard
was most appropriate.

Court found that artificial insemina- Summary judgment
tion was not a covered benefit and entered for Plan.
further held that the plaintiffs could
not show that, in the absence of
treatment, state of health would
deteriorate.

Court found that the Plan was only Summary judgment
beholden to a deferential standard awarded to the Plan.
and the Plan’s decision was not
arbitrary and capricious.

Questioned whether Plan
administrator abused his
discretion in making the decision.

Court of Appeals affirmed that
the Plan administrator’s denial
of coverage was not an abuse
of discretion. The Plan’s failure
to provide specific reasons as to
why the hospitalization was not
medically necessary for the full
16 months was not necessary.

Disputed Subject

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Reversed.

Affirmed.
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Wellness Aerobic
Clinic v. United
HealthCare

Whitehead v.
Federal Express

1994

Case

1999

Year
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US District Court
for the Western
District of
Tennessee,
Western Division

US District Court
for Eastern
District of
Louisiana

Court

Sought preliminary injunction for
high dose chemotherapy with
peripheral stem cell rescue
denied on medical necessity
grounds.

Sought reimbursement for
rehabilitation services delivered
after medical necessity denial.

Claim

Court found it did not have the
authority to usurp the power of
Plan to interpret contract terms.
It did not find that the Plan acted
in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.

Denial of benefits found to be
legally correct and not an abuse
of discretion.

Disputed Subject

Preliminary injunction
denied.

Summary judgment for
Plan

Disposition

Affirmed.

Affirmed.
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New York

State

Aetna/U.S. HealthCare Inc./Prudential Health Plan of Hartford, CT; Excellus Health Plans of Rochester; Group Health Inc. of Manhattan; HIP Health Plan of
Greater New York, Inc.; Oxford Health Plans of Trumbull, CT; and Vytra Health Plans of Long Island, Inc. See: “Landmark Agreements Give Consumers New
Protections in HMO Disputes.” NY Attorney General’s Office Press Release. October 16, 2001. Available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us. Accessed October 29, 2001.
Attorney General of the State of New York, Health Care Bureau. “In the matter of Group Health Incorporated: Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to
Executive Law Section 63, Subdivision 15 (Exhibit A).” August 27, 2001.
Id., p. 4.
NY Attorney General’s Office Press Release. October 16, 2001. op. cit.

1

2

3
4

Rather than take the cases to trial, the Attorney General’s Office and the MCOs agreed to settle out of court. Under the terms of the settlement
agreements, the MCOs (while admitting no wrongdoing) agreed to reform their notification practices to bring them into compliance with state
law and to each pay $1 million towards the cost of the investigation. The Attorney General’s office will continue to monitor their practices until
January 2004, with a possible one-year extension of the monitoring for MCOs still found to be noncompliant.4

“Reasons and Clinical Rationale” means the individualized medical basis for an Adverse Determination. A statement of
Reasons and Clinical Rationale must demonstrate that the UR [Utilization Review] Agent made an individualized medical
assessment of the Enrollee by referring to the specific medical data relating to the Enrollee, which the Clinical Peer Reviewer
took into consideration when making the Adverse Determination. Merely stating that the service at issue is not medically
necessary is not sufficient, nor is a statement that the proposed service does not meet the UR Agent’s criteria. A statement
of Reasons and Clinical Rationale must be sufficiently specific to enable the Enrollee and/or the Enrollee’s health care
provider to make an informed decision about whether or not to appeal the Adverse Determination and to determine the
issue or issues to address in the appeal.3

The settlement agreements defined “reasons and clinical rationale” as follows, stipulating consideration of individualized medical assessments
and disclosure of sufficient information in adverse determination notices:

Denial of continuation of stay at psychiatric inpatient facility: Patient was cooperative throughout stay with no overt
psychiatric symptom according to the attending Doctor. Medication was discontinued during the stay. This referral does
not meet either severity of illness, or intensity of service and is therefore denied.2

A significant legal development regarding medical necessity was the series of October 2001 settlement agreements reached between the New
York State Attorney General’s Office and six large MCOs.1 Following a two-year investigation into how these MCOs informed their providers and
enrollees of adverse determination decisions on the grounds of medical necessity, Attorney General Eliot Spitzer found that these MCOs were not
in compliance with New York State’s utilization review law (discussed in more detail in Part 3 below). The focus of the investigation was on the
processes used by the MCOs in making their determinations and informing providers and enrollees of them, rather than the content of the medical
necessity definitions themselves. Spitzer’s office found, for example, that MCOs were often denying authorization or reimbursement for inpatient
mental health and substance abuse treatment and offering nothing more than a generic explanation that the service was “not medically necessary.” There was often no disclosure of the underlying reasons or clinical rationale used by the MCOs in making their decisions, which is required
in New York’s utilization review law. An example of such an inadequate disclosure, as contained in Exhibit A of the settlement agreements, was:

Description
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Maine
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6

5

Bureau of Insurance Rule Chapter 850(8) and (9).

In RE: United Behavioral Health, Consent Agreement with Maine Bureau of Insurance, op. cit. In RE: Cigna Behavioral Health, Inc., Consent Agreement with
Maine Bureau of Insurance, Docket No. 00-3003. Available at http://www.state.me.us/pfr/ins/ins003003.htm. Accessed April 17, 2002.

In distinguishing these two cases, it is notable that in the UBH case, its “separate therapists” guideline was not called into question on the
grounds of reasonableness or appropriateness. Rather, the company was cited for deficiencies in the processes it used to notify the enrollees
of the benefit denials. In the Cigna case, however, the Bureau found the application of the “48-hour rule” for transfer in medical necessity
decisions to be substantively inappropriate in light of the inadequacy of the provider network, which did not meet state standards.

The Bureau also found that the content of Cigna’s denial letters was not in conformance with Maine law, for many of the same reasons as the
UBH case. Cigna was fined $5,000, and further adjudicatory proceedings were dropped.

By reversing its denial of benefits, CBH acknowledged the need for holding Consumer’s child on an inpatient basis until her
move to Acadia. Participation by CBH in the unsuccessful effort on July 24th for an immediate transfer shows it then knew
or should have known that: 1) until the transfer could be effected, it was medically necessary for the child to continue
receiving inpatient care at EMMC; and 2) CBH’s guideline for transfer to a psychiatric facility within 48 hours of admission
to an acute care hospital could not be met where, as here, through no fault of Consumer there was no psychiatric facility
reasonably available to accept her daughter prior to July 27th.

In the Cigna case, an enrollee was denied benefits for the last three days of her minor child’s five-day inpatient stay at a hospital on the
grounds that the child ostensibly could have been transferred to a psychiatric facility after the first 48 hours. On the fifth day, the child, who
was suicidal, was transferred to a non-Cigna-contracted facility on the first day that facility had a vacant bed. There were no other contracted
or non-contracted facilities in Cigna’s network within 60 minutes travel distance from the enrollee’s home (required by Maine law). Following
a series of reviews and appeals, Cigna reversed its original denial nearly a year later. The Bureau of Insurance found that:

In the UBH case, two separate enrollees were denied coverage for mental treatment of two or more family members by the same therapist.
At the time, UBH had a written guideline that it was generally necessary for family members to receive concurrent treatment by separate
therapists. The Bureau found that the denial notices did not adequately conform to the state agency rules6 in that they did not contain the
qualifying credentials of the reviewer; did not include a statement of the reviewer’s understanding of the consumer’s reasons for appeal; did
not clearly state the decision and clinical rationale in sufficient detail to allow the consumers to respond further; did not include a reference
to the evidence or documentation used for the adverse determination; did not include a description of the procedures, time frames, and
consumers’ rights for second level grievance review; and did not include a notice of the right of the consumers to contact the Bureau of
Insurance. UBH was fined $10,000, and further adjudicatory proceedings were dropped.

In 2000, both United Behavioral Health and Cigna Behavioral Health, Inc., entered into consent agreements with the Maine Bureau of Insurance.5
Health plan enrollees had filed complaints with the Bureau concerning denials of coverage based on medical necessity grounds. A subsequent
determination by the Bureau that the denials were not in conformance with Maine rules regarding utilization review led to the agreements.
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